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Viewing cable 08SEOUL1524, DP CHAIRMAN CHUNG SE-KYUN ON FTA, BEEF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SEOUL1524 2008-08-01 07:07 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1524/01 2140707
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 010707Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1073
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4570
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8868
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4695
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 2768
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001524 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KN KS
SUBJECT: DP CHAIRMAN CHUNG SE-KYUN ON FTA, BEEF 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador made a July 23 courtesy call 
on newly elected Democratic Party (DP) Chairman Chung 
Se-kyun.  During the cordial meeting, conducted entirely in 
English, the two discussed prospects for ratification of the 
KORUS FTA.  Chung said the DP was prepared to support FTA 
ratification, but with two conditions:  that the ROKG provide 
adequate adjustment assistance for those affected by the FTA; 
and that there be some sign of progress with U.S. 
Congressional ratification, including possibly President Bush 
sending the agreement to Congress for ratification.  The 
Ambassador noted that while the Administration was working 
hard to build Congressional support for KORUS, prompt 
ratification by Korea's National Assembly could help that 
process, whereas a delay by Korea could lead some KORUS 
opponents to say "Korea's clearly in no rush either."  On 
beef, Chung said the DP's position was that the bilateral 
beef agreement should be changed, and that Korea's Animal 
Disease Law should also be amended to address concerns about 
U.S. beef.  The Ambassador noted we would have to agree to 
disagree on that:  U.S. beef is safe, is tested at a higher 
rate than required by the OIE, and our bilateral agreement is 
consistent with international scientific standards.  Asked 
about possible constitutional amendments, Chung noted that 
with just 81 members in the 299-seat legislature, the DP was 
in poor position to negotiate on possible amendments, and 
would wait until it had a stronger voice in the Assembly 
before pursuing amendments.  During the prolonged photo spray 
to start the cordial meeting, the two discussed the FTA, and 
Chung noted that the Ambassador had dealt with many headaches 
during his tenure, including North Korea, beef and alliance 
issues.  The Ambassador noted that the two countries had 
addressed those through our shared will to strengthen the 
alliance, and that had applied to our productive relationship 
with former President Roh just as it applied to our good 
relationship with current President Lee Myung-bak.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
--- 
FTA 
--- 
 
2.  (C) In a July 23 meeting, Democratic Party Chairman Chung 
Se-kyun said the DP was prepared to support FTA ratification 
by Korea's National Assembly.  The GNP majority could ratify 
the FTA on its own, he said, but "the Democratic Party will 
agree, with terms and conditions -- there will be no 
obstacles on the Korean side."  Those two conditions were 
that assistance be provided to the affected agriculture 
sectors in Korea -- something he noted had already been 
prepared by the Agriculture Ministry, and "should not be a 
big problem" -- and some progress with U.S. Congressional 
ratification, such as President Bush sending the agreement to 
Congress for ratification.  The Ambassador said he was 
pleased to hear of DP support for the KORUS FTA, since it 
would be a disappointment if the party that negotiated the 
FTA wouldn't support it.  Chung agreed, and said that 
provided its conditions were met, "the Opposition party won't 
just say no." 
 
3.  (C) Turning to timing, Chung said that since the KORUS 
FTA had already been sent to the previous 17th National 
Assembly and debated extensively, "if both sides are willing 
to ratify the FTA, we can do it in two weeks."   Ideally, the 
U.S. Congress could keep pace with the Korean legislature so 
there would be "balance" to the process and no long gap 
between passage in Korea and in the U.S.   Chung lamented 
that in the relevant U.S. bills and the agreement itself was 
still with the Bush Administration and had not been submitted 
to the Congress for review, let alone ratification.  The 
Ambassador said that while the Administration was working 
hard to build Congressional support for the FTA, if Korea 
ratified the agreement, it could help those efforts to get 
the KORUS FTA on the Congressional agenda.  If Korea waited, 
KORUS opponents in the U.S. would say that "clearly, Korea is 
in no hurry" -- that would be cited as an excuse not to vote 
on the FTA.  Moreover, given the complex pre-negotiation with 
Congress that occurred before sending an FTA to Congress for 
a vote, it could be hard to control the dynamic interaction 
that goes on before officially sending the KORUS FTA to 
Congress.  Clearly it would be in no one's interest for us to 
do so unless we were confident the votes to approve were 
there.  Chung remarked that he expected lawmakers in the U.S. 
to be swayed more by their constituents than by the actions 
of the Korean legislature.  Therefore, he and others in Korea 
had little confidence that ratifying the FTA in Korea would 
serve as a catalyst for passage in the U.S. 
 
4.  (C) Chung said it worried him and many Koreans that 
Democratic presidential candidate Obama has expressed an 
anti-FTA stance.  The Ambassador replied that Senator Obama 
was currently one of 100 Senators, and while his vote was 
important, we were hopeful that if a vote could be scheduled, 
the KORUS FTA could win the necessary majorities in both the 
House and Senate.  Chung concluded the discussion of FTA 
ratification by saying Korea would try to work on that 
legislation in August, and asked, "If Korea acts first on FTA 
ratification, do you think there will be responsive action by 
the U.S. Congress?"  The Ambassador noted that we hoped so, 
and that action by Korea would take away excuses from the 
KORUS skeptics. 
 
---- 
BEEF 
---- 
 
5. (C) Chung said that the DP was not happy with the beef 
agreement the two governments had reached.  "Our position," 
Chung explained, "is that there are some major problems in 
the agreement that need to be improved or changed." 
Additionally, the DP hoped to amend the Animal Disease Law 
(in order to limit imports of U.S. beef). The DP's view was 
that any new laws would take precedence over previous 
announcements or agreements made by ministers or vice 
ministers; the beef agreement had not been signed by the 
president so Chung said his party's view was that the 
agreement could be overruled by an act of the Assembly. 
Chung compared this to the KORUS FTA, which he said had been 
signed by President Roh and so could not be amended  (when 
reminded that former Trade Minister Kim Hyun-chong had 
actually signed the KORUS FTA for Korea, Chung said that he 
meant President Roh had signed it ceremonially). 
 
6.  (C) The Ambassador said we would have to agree to 
disagree on beef.  We had worked hard over two months to 
react to the situation and come up with solutions to address 
people's concerns.  We thought some of those concerns were 
exaggerated, but they were real, so we took steps to meet 
them in USTR Schwab's exchange of letters with Trade Minister 
Kim and in the "additional negotiations."  Those represented 
solemn commitments.  Both sides wanted to avoid renegotiation 
because it would inevitably lead to calls to renegotiate the 
FTA.  In addition, U.S. beef was safe so the current 
agreement was appropriate.  Chung said many in Korea were 
upset that the Korean beef agreement was different than the 
U.S. agreements with Japan and Taiwan.  The Ambassador 
replied that the current U.S. beef agreements with those two 
economies pre-dated the U.S. designation as a "controlled 
risk" country by the OIE, but added the U.S. was working on 
new agreements with the two economies that would be modeled 
on the Korean agreement. 
 
----------- 
NORTH KOREA 
----------- 
 
7.  (C) Chung asked if negotiations with North Korea on 
denuclearization were proceeding well.  The Ambassador said 
that, though six months behind schedule, progress had been 
made on disablement of Youngbyon and the DPRK's declaration 
of its nuclear programs.  Now it was necessary to verify the 
DPRK declaration and work to eliminate its nuclear weapons in 
phase 3. 
 
------------------------ 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
------------------------ 
 
8.  (C) Replying to the Ambassador's query about the 
possibility of a Constitutional amendment, Chung said that 
the DP, with just 81 members, was in a poor position to 
negotiate on any possible amendment, so the party would aim 
to wait and amend the Constitution when the DP had a stronger 
voice.  He noted there were many opinions on when and whether 
the Constitution should be amended; some in his own party 
were calling for immediate discussion of amendments (such as 
changing to two four-year Presidential terms or changing to a 
Parliamentary system).  Pro-Park Geun-hye lawmakers were also 
for starting work to amend the Constitution soon, Chung said, 
while those loyal to President Lee hoped to delay 
discussions. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10.  (C) Chung was Minister of Commerce and Industry (MOCIE 
-- precursor to the current Ministry of Knowledge Economy) 
from February to December 2006 under former President Roh, 
and was an important proponent of the KORUS FTA.  As leader 
of the main opposition party, this should be a boon for us, 
and it was encouraging to hear that his concerns about timing 
notwithstanding, he was unequivocally supportive of KORUS FTA 
ratification.  Unfortunately, the opposition is more 
factionalized than the ruling GNP, and his voice is not 
necessarily the voice of the party.  Opinion polls continue 
to show majority public support for the FTA in Korea; 
however, there is also increasing concern among political 
circles in Seoul that given the steady stream of negative 
reports on KORUS's prospects in Congress, the National 
Assembly might do well to await some indication of meaningful 
progress in the U.S. ratification debate before taking a 
tough vote to ratify the KORUS FTA here in Korea. 
VERSHBOW