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P 010843Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8729
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001238 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR (JONES), EUR/SCE (HOH, SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS); 
DEFENSE FOR FATA, BEIN; NSC FOR BRAUN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA -- PRESIDENTS' ADVISORS PLAY SIGINIFICANT 
ROLE IN SHAPING DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTION 
 
REF: 07 SARAJEVO 674 
 
Classified By: Michael Murphy for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Over the past year and a half, we have worked 
closely with the cabinets and advisors to the three members 
of Bosnia's Tri-Presidency: Bosniak Haris Silajdzic, Serb 
Nebojsa Radmanovic, and Croat Zeljko Komsic. As we reported 
previously, (reftel), the advisors play a significant role 
not only in shaping the Presidents' views on policy issues, 
but also in setting the tone for interactions among the 
Presidents themselves. By and large, relations between the 
cabinets are poor, and there is little coordination among 
them on routine administrative issues, much less on important 
policy matters. Internal splits in Silajdzic's and 
Radmanovic's cabinets have exacerbated an already 
dysfunctional policy-making process in the Presidency. 
Relations between the three Presidents are also strained by 
the preoccupation in Komsic's cabinet with building Komsic's 
political standing within Bosnia and his Social Democratic 
Party (SDP), which often diverts Komsic's and his staff's 
attention from official business. END SUMMARY 
 
DESPITE RECENT MODERATION, SILAJDZIC STAFF REMAIN DIVISIVE 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Silajdzic assumed the Chairmanship of the Presidency 
in March.  His tenure has not been marked by the rhetorical 
excess and ideologically-driven obstructionism that many 
observers anticipated from him.  This has changed over the 
last week when Radovan Karadzic,s arrest prompted Silajdzic 
to launch into a series of nationalist diatribes similar to 
those he made after the February 2007 International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) verdict.  Several factors may explain 
Silajdzic's relative quiescence prior to Karadzic,s arrest, 
including his extensive international travel schedule as 
Chairman; the period of political calm associated with the 
SAA endgame in late spring; and, Silajdzic,s avowed strategy 
of waiting until there is a new U.S. administration before 
aggressively pressing his agenda.  However, Silajdzic's 
tactical shift may also owe something to the emergence of his 
Chief of Staff, Nura Pino-Zimic, as the most powerful figure 
in his cabinet.  Pino-Zimic, formerly a senior procurement 
official in the Federation government, is less ideological 
than her Bosniak Diaspora colleagues Legal Advisor Damir 
Arnaut and Foreign Policy Advisor Sejfuhdin Hodzic.  This 
does not mean Pino-Zimic is any less committed to 
Silajdzic,s "vision" than Arnaut or Hodzic, but she is less 
emotional than they are.  As a consequence, she is less prone 
to advise Silajdzic to pursue "lesser issues" that have so 
often captured the imagination of her colleagues (e.g. 
objections to the BiH Agreement with the Serb Orthodox Church 
that Arnaut vigorously pressed). 
 
¶3. (C) Pino-Zimic's emergence has caused tension within the 
cabinet.  Arnaut, who has often used his influence to 
reinforce Silajdzic's worst instincts, has seen his influence 
diminish in recent months.  Several months ago Arnaut told us 
that he had decided to leave the cabinet, and not long 
afterwards, he launched a public bid for a seat on the 
Bosnian Constitutional Court, an effort that ultimately 
proved unsuccessful.  Arnaut recently told us that he planned 
to stay in the cabinet for the time being, but admitted he 
has been increasingly absent from the office, spending time 
with his newborn child and wife, fellow Silajdzic Advisor 
Sanja Bagaric. For his part, Hodzic has also told us that he 
has considered leaving the cabinet and resuming the banking 
career he left in London. Hodzic, more polished yet no less 
ideological than Arnaut, has long chafed under Silajdzic's 
management style.  He has regularly raised with his 
difficulty dealing with the President's frequent mood swings. 
Hodzic has also told us that he and his wife, a doctor by 
training, would like to relocate somewhere where they could 
"earn real money." 
 
¶4. (C) Arnaut and Hodzic remain divisive figures within the 
Presidency. Komsic's and Radmanovic's staffs strongly dislike 
both of them, and often use their presence as an excuse to 
not engage with Silajdzic's cabinet.  Radmanovic's staff 
believe Arnaut in particular to be an anti-Serb zealot, and 
point to his role in crafting Silajdzic's response to the ICJ 
verdict as evidence, arguing Arnaut provided Silajdzic with a 
 
SARAJEVO 00001238  002 OF 003 
 
 
sloppy, if not deliberately misleading, assessment of the 
verdict and its implications. The other two cabinets have 
also complained that Hodzic seeks to use international forums 
and discussions with foreign dignitaries to present a 
one-sided (i.e., Bosniak-centric) view of Bosnia. On several 
occasions during a recent US Embassy supported NATO tour to 
Brussels and Vilnius, Hodzic subjected his foreign 
interlocutors to lengthy political monologues arguing the 
need for a centralized state government structure.  One such 
monologue drew a heated rebuke from Radmanovic Advisor Danilo 
Petrovic. 
 
INTERNAL SPLIT IN RADMANOVIC CABINET 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) President Radmanovic's staff remain the most 
professional and diligent in the Presidency.  We continue to 
find his advisors effective interlocutors on issues of 
bilateral concern, who thoroughly prepare for meetings and 
follow-up on our conversations when it is required. Their 
professionalism and poise contrast starkly with most of the 
staff surrounding Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad 
Dodik, who often take unnecessarily provocative positions on 
issues and prefer an aggressive approach to discussions. 
Despite their polished approach, Radmanovic's advisors will 
reflexively repeat unconstructive positions enunciated by 
Dodik and the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) 
when the RS or to the Serb position in Bosnia are challenged. 
 For example, Radmanovic Chief of Staff Miroslav Vujicic 
recently told a visiting delegation from Washington that he 
would not support Euro-Atlantic integration processes if they 
"altered the RS territorially, politically or economically in 
any way." 
 
¶6. (C) Since the October 2007 political crisis, a split in 
Radmanovic's cabinet has developed that has undermined its 
effectiveness and complicated our interactions his advisors. 
The cabinet now appears divided between staff with a strong 
personal loyalty to Radmanovic and those whose primary 
allegiance is to SNSD.  Radmanovic's Foreign Policy Advisor 
and son-in-law, the 28-year-old Danilo Petrovic, has become 
the President's closest advisor.  Petrovic, who deals with 
both macro policy issues and mundane scheduling concerns, has 
become a valuable Embassy contact, and has practical and 
pragmatic views on most issues.  Vujicic, newly hired Legal 
Advisor Boris Buha, and Foreign Policy Advisor Nina Sajic 
represent the SNSD wing of Radmanovic's cabinet.  Vujicic 
served as the SNSD chairman for East Sarajevo, while Sajic, a 
former low-ranking Ministry of Foreign Affairs employee, is 
the daughter of a prominent Banja Luka businessman and SNSD 
contributor.  Straddling the two groups is Security Advisor 
Dzuro Beronja, a former Army of Republika Srpska Colonel and 
intelligence officer, who, while always aware of the official 
SNSD position on a given issue, has developed a close 
personal relationship with Petrovic and is often in his 
company. 
 
¶7. (C) Relations between the two intra-office factions have 
greatly soured in recent months, and relations between 
Petrovic and Sajic are particularly bad.  Petrovic has 
complained to us about Sajic's "meddling," and recently, 
while Sajic was abroad on official travel, had her desk and 
work items moved from the office they shared in the 
Presidency building.  Petrovic and Beronja are now rarely in 
Radmanovic's Sarajevo office, which has become the domain of 
Vujicic and Buha, preferring to work out of either 
Radmanovic's Banja Luka office or their hotel in East 
Sarajevo.  Sajic, who told us recently that she hopes to 
receive an Ambassadorial appointment from Radmanovic, now 
spends most of her time on international travel on behalf of 
the President. Despite the fact that Sajic serves as 
Radmanovic's Foreign Policy Advisor, Petrovic is insistent 
that all official communication between the Embassy and 
Radmanovic's office go through him and bypass Sajic and 
Vujicic.  He also claims that this is Radmanovic's preference 
as well. 
 
THE KOMSIC AND IBROVIC SHOW 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) President Komsic's cabinet remains dominated by his 
Chief of Staff and childhood friend, Amir Ibrovic. Ibrovic 
 
SARAJEVO 00001238  003 OF 003 
 
 
also owns the popular Tito Bar, a Yugoslav-themed 
establishment that recently moved to larger premises in the 
State History Museum. Ibrovic is a colorful character, prone 
to alcohol-infused monologues about public policy, Bosnia's 
future, and Komsic's popularity.  Ibrovic has actively sought 
to build a good working relationship with the Embassy, and at 
times he has been a valuable channel to Komsic.  Ibrovic has 
also sought, on several occasions, to use his Embassy 
contacts for unorthodox "requests," such as his request that 
the U.S. provide him with military green paint for Tito Bar 
(a request we ignored).  Several months ago, Komsic delivered 
an ultimatum to Ibrovic that he either had to behave in a 
more professional manner or leave his post as Chief of Staff. 
Ibrovic took the President's warning seriously, and his 
conduct in the office has improved.  Nonetheless, his 
abrasive style continues to inhibit the development of good 
working relationships with the other cabinets.  Advisors in 
both Silajdzic's and Radmanovic's cabinets, and the senior 
staff of the Presidency Secretariat, complain frequently 
about Ibrovic's disruptive behavior at meetings. For example, 
the Presidency General Secretary told us that Ibrovic has 
delayed a joint decision on the official gift of the 
Presidency to foreign dignitaries by insisting, over the 
objections of his colleagues in the other cabinets, that it 
be ceremonial pistols. 
 
¶9. (C) Ibrovic has worked, with significant success, to craft 
the Komsic's image as a pro-Bosnia populist in tune with the 
needs and concerns of average people. (Note: Recent polling 
confirms that Komsic is Bosnia's most popular politician, 
though most of his support comes from Bosniaks.  Croats, whom 
Komsic nominally represents, remain unhappy with him. End 
Note) Under Ibrovic's direction, the cabinet has become 
primarily focused on organizing and advancing activities that 
fit with this broader narrative, often to the detriment of 
conducting official business. In the winter, Komsic started 
his own web blog, which was regularly updated with commentary 
on political and social issues. The blog, which Ibrovic and 
other Komsic staffers have confessed to us is written by 
Ibrovic and not Komsic, quickly became one of the most 
popular websites in Bosnia.  At Ibrovic's urging, Komsic has 
used his public appearances to highlight several key themes: 
Komsic is a strong leader focused on the average citizen's 
concerns; Komsic pursues "justice" for all victims of the 
war; and, Komsic defends the territorial integrity and state 
of Bosnia.  Komsic's long-term political aspirations are 
unclear, but his popularity, if he maintains it, will provide 
him with opportunities beyond his current role as President. 
Komsic and Ibrovic have told us that the President is 
considering the timing of a possible challenge to Zlatko 
Lagumdzija for leadership of the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP). 
 
¶10. (C) Aside from Ibrovic, Komsic maintains a small 
inner-circle of advisors in his cabinet.  Zeljko Knez, a 
Croat who commanded units of the Bosniak-dominated Army of 
BiH during the war, has become an advisor without portfolio 
and travels with Komsic on most international trips.  Knez, 
who colleagues affectionately refer to as "Commander" or 
"General," is often adrift on policy issues but seems to have 
developed a close personal bond with Komsic.  Sarajevo 
University Professor Boris Tihi is intended to provide Komsic 
with policy gravitas, though his outside employment makes it 
difficult for him to play an active role in the cabinet. 
Komsic's Foreign Policy Advisor, Nerkez Arifhodzic, 
previously served as Bosnian Ambassador to Turkey and as the 
Head of Protocol in the MFA.  Despite his extensive 
diplomatic experience, Arifhodzic has become a lightening rod 
for the other cabinets who have shared numerous stories with 
us about his dismissive, arrogant, and, at times, aggressive 
behavior. Arifhodzic also seems to have drawn the ire of his 
own colleagues -- Ibrovic routinely refers to him as an 
"idiot" and told us that Komsic hired him "just because he 
needed someone to go to receptions."  Komsic's other two 
advisors, Legal Advisor Dijana Tabori and Media Advisor Irena 
Kljajic, are both young and, by Tabori's own admission, play 
minimal roles in the cabinet. 
ENGLISH