VZCZCXRO7936
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHRH #1298/01 2381323
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251323Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9049
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE 9709
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEHRH/CHUSMTM RIYADH SA IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHRMAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  IMMEDIATE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0245
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001298 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018 
TAGS: PREL KCIP ENRG EPET PGOV PTER ASEC SA
SUBJECT: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN SAUDI 
ARABIA: UPDATE FOLLOWING INITIAL ASSESSMENT 
 
REF: RIYADH 01252 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Horacio Ureta for reasons 1.4 (B) an 
d (D). 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  The USG's first assessment for Saudi 
Arabia's Abqaiq oil facility was completed on August 19.  It 
was a success in that it established the basis for our 
working relationship under the auspices of the Joint 
Commission on Infrastructure and Border Security Protection 
(CIP).  Following the initial vulnerability assessment 
conducted at Abqaiq (Ref A), members of the assessment team 
provided Post's primary working-level Ministry of Interior 
(MOI) contact Dr. Khalid al-Ageel with several interim 
findings.  Al-Ageel revealed details on some of MOI's 
uneasiness with Saudi Aramco's security practices, and he 
explained MOI's plan to ensure Saudi Aramco enacts the 
recommendations that flow from vulnerability assessments 
conducted as part of the CIP program.  End summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Saudi Review Process for Assessments 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) On August 20, MOI's al-Ageel met Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Energy William Bryan, members of the assessment 
team, and Econ Off informally to discuss the team's 
preliminary findings and to convey how the Saudi government 
wanted to handle the results.  Al-Ageel asked the team to 
prepare an executive summary for Assistant Minister of 
Interior HRH Prince Muhammad bin Naif.  Al-Ageel noted that 
Prince Muhammad bin Nayif and his aide, Dr. Sa'ad al-Jabri, 
expressed keen interest in the team's progress during the 
assessment.  To ensure Saudi Aramco carried out all the 
recommendations of this and any other assessments, MOI's 
Higher Commission for Industrial Security (HCIS) would first 
review the final assessment report.  Prince Muhammad, and 
possibly the Interior Minister HRH Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz, 
would approve the assessment and then forward the document to 
the Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals (MINPET).  Al-Ageel 
did not want Saudi Aramco to have the chance to influence or 
to change the assessment conclusions during the approval 
process.  After the two ministries approved the document, 
MINPET would inform the highest levels of Saudi Aramco, and 
MOI would advise the Facilities Security Force (FSF) 
commander.  Al-Ageel said the official review process would 
take no more than two weeks.  He added that neither MOI nor 
MINPET would argue about formal CIP recommendations, but if 
MINTPET had a concern or objection, the matter might have to 
be decided by the king himself. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Continuing MOI-Saudi Aramco Friction 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (S) Al-Ageel described how he was kept well-informed about 
Saudi Aramco's support to the first assessment team's work. 
Dammam-based MOI/HCIS officer Captain Adel al-Utaybi called 
al-Ageel when Eastern Region Aramco Security Director Samir 
Raslan placed limits on the level of cooperation from his 
subordinates.  Al-Ageel received the same information from 
one of the team's primary Abqaiq counterparts, Adel al-Saad, 
who is Raslan's subordinate.  Al-Ageel intended to report 
Raslan's unhelpful attitude to Prince Muhammad.  (Note:  MOI 
has a role in approving Saudi Aramco's selection of personnel 
for critical security posts, such as those at Abqaiq, and in 
this way al-Ageel says he retains his own, unilateral links 
to important security personnel in Aramco.) 
 
¶4. (S) Beyond the bureaucratic problems, al-Ageel said Prince 
Muhammad was very concerned about the possibility of 
terrorists gathering details about the vulnerabilities of 
this and other critical facilities.  He recalled how Saudi 
Aramco's President Abdullah Jum'ah was convinced terrorists 
had detailed information about Abqaiq's critical nodes prior 
to the 2006 attack, when the attackers sought to sever the 
Shaybah-Abqaiq pipeline.  Since the attack, Saudi Aramco has 
been under orders to report any problems at Abqaiq, however 
slight, to King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Sa'ud.  This close 
attention to the plant means MOI is under intense pressure 
from the senior Saudi royals to improve security at the 
company's important facilities. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Provisional Assessment Highlights 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Representatives of the assessment team advised 
al-Ageel that the final analytical product would be complete 
in six to eight weeks (approximately mid-October).  Including 
the two weeks al-Ageel said MOI and MINPET needed to gain 
Saudi government approval for the release of the report, the 
team estimated the report could be formally presented to the 
CIP Commission in late October.  Al-Ageel told us this was a 
good time frame.  The team reported Abqaiq security personnel 
had a good security culture, and after some initial 
Aramco-imposed restrictions, the assessment team had open and 
repeated access to all key parts of the plant.  Al-Ageel 
asked about the new vehicle fence Saudi Aramco was building 
at the plant.  After the team provided some positive remarks 
about the barrier, he mentioned that MOI did not like the way 
Saudi Aramco installed it without in-country testing and 
without MOI's approval.  The team offered to provide new 
testing information on the vehicle barrier.  (Note:  Post 
will pass this to MOI for release to Saudi Aramco.)  Notably, 
the team thought the FSF performed well during a test of 
response time for the detection of intruders approaching the 
facility's outer perimeter.  FSF patrols outside the facility 
were active and their equipment appeared to be adequate.  The 
security force's gate procedures also appeared sound, if 
unevenly enforced.  The team noted the Quick Reaction Force 
(QRF) lacked armored vehicles and night vision equipment. 
The Abqaiq QRF consisted of two groups of 12 men from MOI's 
Special Security Force, although the Abqaiq unit was under 
the operational control of the FSF unit based at the plant; 
the team believed MOI should consider addressing this 
organizational anomaly by having FSF establish its own QRF. 
 
¶6. (S) Comment:  This is CIP's first success.  The assessment 
provided useful information that, in the end, will help 
improve the security of Saudi Arabia's most critical oil 
facility.  MOI officials are being candid about their 
concerns over Saudi Aramco's security procedures, and more 
importantly MOI is eager to hear and accept USG 
recommendations.  The assessment also provided valuable 
information for our effort to improve the FSF as an integral 
part of CIP's mandate.  We will continue to work with 
al-Ageel and other MOI interlocutors to move this program 
forward.  The next step is to establish appropriate dates for 
the first meeting of the CIP Commission here in Riyadh.  End 
comment. 
PAIGE