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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001245 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TRIPOLI PLEASE PASS TO NEA A/S CWELCH, DEPARTMENT FOR 
NEA/ARP, WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2018 
TAGS: EG EU IR IS IZ MU PGOV PREL SA UNC UNGA
SUBJECT: TOPICS FOR ABDULLAH/MUBARAK MEETING: EGYPTIAN DCM 
ON COUNTERING IRAN 
 
REF: RIYADH 1137 
 
RIYADH 00001245  001.4 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: CHARGE' D'AFFAIRES MICHAEL GFOELLER 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY:  On August 13, at Egyptian request, Pol 
Counselor met with Riyadh Egyptian DCM Hussam Essa.  Essa 
expressed grave concerns over continued Iranian nuclear 
ambitions, noting that this topic would be an agenda item in 
the upcoming meeting between Saudi King Abdullah and 
President Mubarak, currently scheduled for August 15 in 
Cairo.  Essa relayed the message that Egypt asks to have side 
discussions on Iran during the 6   2   1 meetings, as well 
being kept informed and consulted of any P5   1 discussions 
vis-a-vis Iran.  Essa advised that a combination of strict 
economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and stability in 
Iraq would sufficiently force Iran to change its direction. 
He commented on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, noting that it 
is "no longer a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, 
but between Palestinians and Palestinians."  Essa also spoke 
to the economic fragility of the Palestinian Authority in 
relation to outstanding financial commitments from Arab and 
especially Gulf nations, and specifically how the Saudi 
Arabian Government (SAG) has inquired to the (Government of 
Egypt) GOE about the utility of their financing to the 
Palestinian Authority given the deteriorating situation. 
Lastly, Essa argued that the situation in Lebanon is no 
longer "Christian against Muslim, but Shia against Sunni," 
and made clear that Iranian and Syrian incursions into 
domestic Lebanese problems were playing factions against each 
other and hurting any long-term stability for Lebanon.  END 
SUMMARY 
 
IRAN, IRAN, IRAN 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (S) At the urgent request by the Egyptian Embassy in 
Riyadh, Pol Counselor met with Riyadh Egyptian DCM Hussam 
Essa on Aug. 13.  During the 90 minute meeting, Essa went on 
at length, sometimes emotionally, about the threat of Iranian 
expansionism and its uranium enrichment program.  He 
repeatedly requested that Iran become a main topic for the 6 
  2   1 discussions along with Iraq, and for Egypt to be kept 
informed of any P5   1 meetings.  He touched on Lebanon, the 
Palestinian territories, Arab unity (or lack of), Iraq, 
Syria, and the need for regional Saudi leadership.  He also 
raised the GOE's "grave concern" over reports that Oman had 
invited Iran to be an observer in Peninsula Shield, the joint 
military defense component of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
Essa advised that these would form the agenda when Saudi King 
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, on his return from Morocco to 
the Kingdom, meets with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on 
Aug. 15 in Cairo.  Note: The press reports that Omani Sultan 
Qaboos would join the Abdullah-Mubarak meetings, but Essa 
never mentioned Qaboos's participation.  Essa said this same 
demarche would be delivered to AmEmbassy Cairo by the GOE. 
 
HOW TO STOP IRAN: "SQUEEZE THE COMMON MAN" 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (S) Essa recommended separate breakout sessions on Iran 
during 6   2   1 meetings.  He also stated the GOE would like 
to be informed of any information arising from P5   1 
meetings regarding Iran.  Essa was extremely concerned about 
Iranian nuclear ambitions, and noted that escalation 
vis-a-vis Iran coincides with problems in Lebanon, Palestine, 
and Iraq.  Essa's recommendation to thwart Iranian's nuclear 
ambitions are "strict economic sanctions, diplomatic 
 
RIYADH 00001245  002.4 OF 003 
 
 
isolation, and stability in Iraq" while leaving Iran a 
"face-saving option" if it acquiesces.  In doing so, Essa 
admitted recent success in Iraq, stating that "things are 
moving in a better way."  He asserted forcefully that the 
best way to change Iranian behavior is to "squeeze the common 
man" through "severe sanctions," which would make it 
impossible for the Iranian government to continue "in the way 
they are," and hence cripple any popular support, or 
toleration, of Iranian expansionism and its nuclear ambitions. 
 
¶3. (S) Essa remarked that "some Arab brothers are OK with 
playing proxy to Iran" as well, identifying Syria and 
segments of Lebanon.  He argued that Iran is playing the 
"factional card" by using proxies to play one side against 
one other in a bid for power.  Essa also shared the rumor 
that Iran was actually settling some of its citizens in Iraq 
in order to "influence future referendums." 
 
¶4. (S) Essa conveyed that the Egyptian Embassy in Tehran had 
been contacted by an "Omani diplomat" there, who had relayed 
that Oman has invited Iran to have observer status in 
Peninsula Shield.  Kassem argued that this was obviously "bad 
for Peninsula Shield," as the mission of this cooperative 
security arrangement is to oppose regional threats, like Iran. 
 
PALESTINIAN INCURSION INTO GAZA: COULD "HAPPEN AGAIN" 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶5. (S) Essa spoke of the deteriorating situation in Gaza, 
noting that the conflict no longer is between "Israelis and 
Palestinians, but between Palestinians and Palestinians," 
referring to the internal political and security struggle 
between Hamas and Fatah.  He noted that the recent January 
2008 flood of Palestinians from Gaza into Egypt as they 
breached the security wall north of Rafah was Hamas trying to 
"embarrass the Egyptian Government."  Essa related that 
certain "intelligence reports" suggest the same situation 
could unfold again, and very soon.  He shared the GOE is 
"looking at ways" to prevent the recurrence of another flood 
of Palestinians into Egyptian territory. 
 
¶6. (S) Essa also noted that the Palestinian Authority is 
currently in a "grave financial situation."  He stated that 
the GOE had sent a letter to the SAG to reconfirm its 
financial commitments to the Palestinians, to which the 
response was clear the SAG was actually giving over 100% of 
its obligations.  Note: The SAG had separately confirmed to 
us their contributions (Reftel).  Essa stated the SAG had 
complied with 100% of its pledges, the U.A.E. 90%, and 
Algeria 75%.  He lamented  other Arab nations, notably the 
other Gulf countries, are not living up to their commitments. 
 Essa stated that the SAG has approached the GOE regarding 
Saudi funding of the Palestinian Authority, expressing 
concern over its true utility, as now "Muslims are fighting 
Muslims."  Essa quipped Saudi Arabia is "the Arab leader we 
need."  Throughout the discussion on the Palestinians, Essa 
never once blamed Israel nor made any negative comments 
concerning Israel or Israeli policy, but rather was extremely 
concerned that the internal Palestinian conflict over 
political and security control was raising questions amongst 
donors and Arab supporters. 
 
FACTIONS IN LEBANON: SIGN OF THINGS TO COME? 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) Essa commented on Lebanon by opining that previously 
the conflicts involved "Christian against Muslim," but now 
they are "Shia against Sunni, or Muslim against Muslim." 
 
RIYADH 00001245  003.6 OF 003 
 
 
Essa stated he hoped such a conflict would not spread to 
other parts of the Middle East, but warned if such factional 
conflicts within Islam were to continue, events similar to 
those that are transpiring in Lebanon may arise in other 
Islamically "mixed" nations, such as Bahrain, as well as 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
¶8. (S) During the meeting, Essa noted some statistics on 
Egyptians population figures in Saudi Arabia as well as Hajj 
and Umrah numbers for Egyptian citizens.  He stated there are 
over 2 million Egyptians in Saudi Arabia, noting that many of 
these are illegal overstayers from Hajj and Umrah.  Essa 
estimated that approximately 75,000 Egyptians travel to Saudi 
Arabia for Hajj, and 800,000 for Umrah every year. 
 
¶9. (S) Essa asked Pol Counselor for a readout on the July 
meeting between President Bush and Saudi Foreign Minister 
Saud al-Faisal in Washington.  He also asked about any 
upcoming high-level USG visits to Saudi Arabia, as well as 
the status of the several bilateral agreements that were 
signed by the USG and SAG during the May POTUS visit.  Pol 
Counselor was noncommittal in response. 
 
¶10. (S) COMMENT.  Given the Egyptian DCM's urgency and 
emotion during this meeting, it appears Iran has crossed a 
red line with the GOE.  The SAG has long been wary and to an 
extent, fearful, of Iran.  It seems the Egyptians share these 
feelings.  Essa's comment about Saudi Arabia being an "Arab 
leader" was noteworthy and may have meant to perhaps imply 
that Riyadh has eclipsed Cairo as the true leader of the Arab 
world.  It also appears the SAG is disillusioned and 
developing donor fatigue with the Palestinians.  The 
Abdullah-Murarak-Qaboos meeting in Cairo may yield new Arab 
initiatives to counter Iran.  We will seek an immediate 
readout from the SAG once the King returns to the Kingdom. 
END COMMENT. 
GFOELLER