VZCZCXRO8086
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHPOD #0209/01 2241732
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111732Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0898
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 0983

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PODGORICA 000209 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR MW
SUBJECT: PRO-SERB OPPOSITION PARTIES PROMISE PROTESTS SHOULD GOM 
RECOGNIZE KOSOVO 
 
PODGORICA 00000209  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Rumors that the GoM will recognize Kosovo in 
the near future have been building, even as virtually all 
observers agree that the move will be widely unpopular here. 
Montenegro's largest pro-Serb political force has promised mass 
protests, and although not all pro-Serb parties have signed on, 
some demonstrations are probably inevitable.  While many contend 
that the intensity and duration of protests will be limited, the 
GoM -- concerned that recognition will embolden radicals, 
sharpen ethnic and political divisions, and sour relations with 
Serbia -- continues to calculate how best to minimize the 
fall-out.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
An Unpopular Move 
 
----------------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (U) Rumors that the Montenegrin government will recognize 
Kosovo have been building over the past month, fueled in part by 
FM Rocen's public assertion in early July that the GoM intends 
to take this step.  Although Rocen did not specify a time, 
speculation has centered on August/September. 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Kosovo recognition will be politically risky for the 
GoM.  While we have not seen published opinion polling, it is 
widely believed that a significant majority here opposed 
Kosovo's independence and opposes recognition now.  Citing 
private surveys, prominent pollster Milos Besic told us recently 
that a "clear majority" was against recognition.  With the 
exception of the Albanian parties, opposition also spans the 
political spectrum, with many contending that recognition is 
unpopular even with many rank-and-file members of the ruling 
Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). Some opposition leaders 
have cited figures suggesting that 80 percent or more of 
Montenegrins oppose independence. 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) More than 30 percent of Montenegrins identify 
themselves as Serbs, while 5-7 percent are Albanians and another 
10-15 percent are Bosniaks/Muslims.  Many Montenegrins therefore 
worry that recognition could upset the country's delicate ethnic 
balance.  They are also concerned that it would sour relations 
with neighboring Serbia.  Moreover, a significant number of 
Montenegrins -- particularly Serbs - feel passionately that 
Kosovo is and should remain Serbian.  (Note:  A February 
demonstration against Kosovo independence in Podgorica drew 
10,000 protestors, a large number for tiny Montenegro.) 
 
 
 
Serb Parties Promise Protests 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Pro-Serb opposition forces have vowed that they will 
not let recognition pass without a fight.  On July 21, Serbian 
List alliance leader Andrija Mandic -- who placed second in the 
April presidential election -- repeated his earlier pledge to 
lead "mass protests" should the GoM recognize.  Mandic told us 
on July 25 that his call for demonstrations was designed to 
dissuade the GoM from taking the plunge.  (Note:  Mandic has 
told us privately that he has no doubt that the GOM will 
recognize Kosovo.)  Serbian List MP Zoran Zizic also told us 
August 1 that recognition -- which he believed could come later 
in the month -- would be "a disgrace" for Montenegro and vowed 
to support "sharp protests." 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Serbian List will be joined by other smaller 
pro-Serb groups, such as the Democratic Serbian Party (DSS). 
DSS leader Ranko Kadic told us passionately on July 25 that 
recognition of "the false state" of Kosovo was a line the GoM 
must never cross.  Kadic worried the GoM would recognize later 
this month, even though he said President Vujanovic had promised 
a parliamentary debate before any decision.  Kadic conceded that 
it would be difficult to mobilize supporters in August, but 
promised, "We will be ready to react."  He also opined that 
protests could turn violent, although he claimed that any 
violence would be instigated by the Montenegrin secret police. 
 
 
 
PODGORICA 00000209  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
Crack in Serb Unity? 
 
-------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) The small pro-Serb People's Party (NS) has struck a 
discordant note in an otherwise unified Serb party front.  While 
sharply opposing recognition (which would be "disastrous and 
shameful") NS party leader Predrag Popovic announced July 22 
that he would not participate in protests.  Deputy NS leader 
Dragan Soc told us July 28 that while recognition would 
destabilize Montenegro and harm relations with Serbia, "the time 
for demonstrations has passed."  As many as 30,000 people could 
take to the streets, he said, and the situation could spiral out 
of control.  It therefore was better to respond politically, he 
said.  (Note:  When asked to comment on the NS's stance, Mandic 
told us, "don't worry, they will join; they have no choice.") 
 
 
 
Moderate Opposition Weighs Options 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Socialist People's Party (SNP) deputy leaders Vasilije 
Lalosevic and Nevan Gosovic told us July 27 that their party -- 
which believes recognition will jeopardize domestic stability 
and relations with Serbia -- sent "a clear warning" to the GoM 
after Rocen's July statement and felt that the GoM had pulled 
back as a result.  Furthermore, Gosovic said former PM 
Sturanovic had assured SNP leader Srdjan Milic that the issue 
would be debated in Parliament before any decision was made. 
While Lalosevic predicted that citizens would take to the 
streets spontaneously if the GoM recognized, both he and Gosovic 
refused to comment on whether the SNP would participate.  (Note: 
 the SNP joined the February demonstration). 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) The moderate Movement for Change (PzP) is courting both 
Albanian and Serbian voters and consequently has kept a low 
profile on the issue.  Party leader Nebojsa Medojevic has said 
publicly that the GoM should not rush to recognize, and deputy 
PzP leader Goran Batricevic told us in late July that 
recognition would squeeze the moderate opposition between 
radicals and the GoM, "taking us back to the pre-(Montenegrin) 
independence period."  However, Batricevic told us August 5 that 
he now thought that Montenegro should recognize as soon as 
possible, "so we can put the issue behind us."  PzP MP and 
spokesman Koca Pavlovic also assured us that, while he believed 
recognition was "not a smart idea," the PzP would respect the 
GoM's decision and would not participate in demonstrations. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) Kosovo recognition is widely unpopular, and not only 
among the 30-plus percent of the population who identify 
themselves as Serbs.  Public protests are virtually inevitable 
should the GoM recognize, and parties with heavy Serb voter 
bases -- such as the SNP and the NS -- will be hard-pressed to 
resist joining.  We note that the NS's decision not to 
participate in demonstrations has caused considerable angst 
within the party, with calls for leader Popovic's resignation. 
 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) But while the situation is unpredictable, most 
observers expect protests to be limited in size and duration. 
"The time for big reactions has passed," one senior coalition MP 
told us, while another DPS politician said the recent government 
change in Serbia had dampened the opposition's energy.  The fact 
that Serb parties have acted within the constitutional and legal 
order, despite often inflammatory rhetoric, also should help 
keep a lid on passions.  Nevertheless, virtually all 
Montenegrins, both for and against the move, worry that 
recognition will embolden radicals and sharpen ethnic and 
political divisions.  As a result, the GoM -- which has assured 
us that recognition is a matter of when, not if -- continues to 
calculate the timing in order to minimize the political fall-out 
(septel). 
MOORE