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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001886 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID PINS SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - UNEASINESS AT PRESIDENCY 
 
REF: NAIROBI 1885 
 
NAIROBI 00001886  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: SPECIAL ENVOY JOHN YATES, REASON 1.4 (C) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  A series of telephone calls from President 
Yusuf, reinforced by multifarious other reports and rumors 
July 31, suggest a shaken Villa Somalia unnerved by and 
uncertain of Ethiopian intentions.  The ongoing rift between 
Yusuf and Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein, with the 
latter's attempt to sack Benaadir governor and Mogadishu 
mayor Muhammad Umar Habeb, aka Mohammad Dheere, probably 
precipitated the panicky feelings, but at minimum exacerbated 
the uneasiness.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) President Yusuf telephoned Special Envoy Yates 
mid-day July 31 ostensibly to explain his position on the 
Prime Minister's attempt to dismiss Benaadir governor and 
Mogadishu mayor Muhammad Umar Habeb, aka Mohammad Dheere, but 
in reality, it now seems, to worry about indications of an 
Ethiopian withdrawal.  At that point, Yusuf said, the threat 
was only rumors but given substance by Ethiopian forces 
leaving command posts near the former pasta factory and 
national stadium.  He did acknowledge, as we had been told 
separately, the rotation out of the Ethiopian troops was made 
possible by the arrival of new Somali forces that had been 
trained by the Ethiopians.  Yusuf said if the Ethiopians left 
before the arrival of UN or other international forces 
projected by the Djibouti Agreement, the Transitional Federal 
Government would be finished.  He asked the Special Envoy if 
the United States knew Ethiopian intentions and if not, if we 
could find out.  The Special Envoy agreed to pursue the 
question with Embassy Addis. 
 
¶3.  (C) Before there was any response to the first inquiry, 
SE Yates received an early evening call from Yusuf's staffer 
Hussein, who reported to have received a call a few minutes 
earlier from Ethiopian Force Commander Colonel Yohannes.  The 
message Yohannes delivered, according to Hussein, was &We 
are withdrawing our forces from Mogadishu tonight and taking 
the artillery with us.8  Hussein said President Yusuf was 
deeply concerned over the purported Ethiopian announcement 
and had instructed him to call the Special Envoy to implore 
the Ethiopians to reverse the decision to withdraw until 
forces were available to replace them.  The impossibility of 
TFG survivability without them was again invoked. 
 
¶4.  (S) In rapid order a series of further reports directly 
from other Somalis, or through other Embassy elements, 
described increasingly dire developments either taking place 
or expected imminently.  These included, inter alia: that 
Yusuf had abdicated or was about to; that he had requested 
safe passage from Mogadishu to his Puntland base; that Villa 
Somalia would be abandoned within 12-24 hours, and so on. 
Underpinning all the doom was said to be Ethiopian 
disgruntlement, with Yusuf's uncooperative handling of Prime 
Minister Hussein's attempt to dismiss Mohammed Dheere being 
the final straw (reftel).  (COMMENT:  We had been reliably 
told earlier in the day by a senior TFG official that in fact 
Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin had telephoned Yusuf 
and unsuccessfully tried to persuade the President to 
cooperate with his Prime Minister, rather than thwart him. 
END COMMENT).  In any case, it was universally assumed that 
none of the calamitous happenings being predicted (or in some 
cases already reported as fact) would be possible without 
Ethiopian complicity. 
 
¶5.  (C) After consulting with the Department's Africa Bureau 
about the implications, including a possible request of the 
USG to provide Yusuf safe passage, the Special Envoy called 
President Yusuf late in the evening July 31 to try to discern 
directly from him what was actually transpiring.  Yusuf 
immediately mentioned his vulnerability in the face of 
Ethiopian withdrawal, said he had neither forces nor materiel 
to hold out more than a couple of days and said he needed 
ammunition and small arms.  He did not mention abdication, 
nor until prodded, possibly departing Villa Somalia.  Yusuf 
subsequently acknowledged that there were contingency plans 
in place for him to go either to Puntland or to Kismayo if 
the situation warranted it.  These plans, he indicated, had 
been in place for a long time, not newly developed for 
immediate execution. 
 
¶6.  (C) At light of day August 1, there was little indication 
 
NAIROBI 00001886  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
that anything had actually happened or was about to, although 
considerable uncertainty prevailed.  Reports from Embassy 
Addis Ababa, Mogadishu and locally that the Ethiopians were 
in the process of withdrawing seem grossly exaggerated. 
Today, Addis reports that one company of troops moved, but 
only within normal rotation redeployment.   Late on July 31, 
Yusuf said the Ethiopians around Villa Somalia had departed 
and that he had requested additional AMISOM troops and now 
was being protected by them, his own Presidential Guard, and 
Mohammad Dheere,s militia.  On-the-scene observers in 
Mogadishu, however, report that Villa Somalia is still 
guarded by Ethiopian, AMISOM and TFG militia forces. 
Overnight the Ethiopians responded with mortar barrages to 
insurgent attacks; there seem to have been several 
engagements.  Sources tell us al-Shabaab and other insurgents 
have undertaken to assure that the newly-arrived Somali 
security forces pay a price for fighting in the ranks of the 
TFG which explains the high frequency of attacks overnight 
and a prevailing concern for personal security by citizens 
throughout Mogadishu. 
 
¶7.  (C) COMMENT:  The situation is by no means clear or 
secure.  It seems certain that the tensions between 
Ethiopians and the TFG (specifically Yusuf) persist.  It 
seems probable that the Ethiopians are doing some feinting 
and obfuscating about their own intentions to put some 
pressure on President Yusuf.  The TFG divide between the 
President and Prime Minister is now wider and deeper 
following the Mohammad Dheere snafu.  We understand that a no 
confidence motion still to be debated by Parliament in Baidoa 
but the Prime Minister and his people feel that the votes to 
unseat him are not present so the storm can be weathered. 
Still, suspicions abound.  Somali Director for Intelligence 
General Mohamad Warsame Farah "Darwish" is back in Nairobi 
meeting with various players under murky circumstances. 
Former Prime Minister Ali Gedi's presence looms.  The TFG has 
limped through many previous crises but this one has a 
different, less definable feeling to it which bears close 
attention.  Mogadishu, we are told, is eerily quiet this 
Friday with most people staying off the streets in apparent 
anticipation of concerted violence. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) COMMENT, CONT:   To our mind, more immediacy on 
implementing the Djibouti Agreement with the TFG cooperating 
with the opposition partners might be the most promising 
course at this juncture--along with close monitoring and 
intervention with the principals whether in Mogadishu, 
Baidoa, Nairobi or Addis Ababa.  END COMMENT. 
SLUTZ