VZCZCXRO0254
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #2580/01 2410602
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280602Z AUG 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9739
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002580 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SE RS
SUBJECT: KOSOVO DEVELOPMENTS IN LIGHT OF GEORGIA 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 90978 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 2545 
     ¶C. MOSCOW 1564 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells: reasons 1.4 
 (b, d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In an August 26 meeting immediately prior 
to Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, MFA 
Special Envoy for Kosovo Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko 
justified the independence of the territories, arguing that 
the "genocide" of Ossetians exceeded the suffering of 
Kosovars in 1999.  Serbian diplomats, reiterating Belgrade's 
strategy of "strategic silence," took issue with GOR efforts 
to depict Serbian support for actions in Georgia. 
Botsan-Kharchenko described a compromise-seeking Belgrade on 
all but the issue of Kosovo's recognition.  He expressed 
disappointment with the UNSYG's handling of the transition of 
UNMIK to EULEX.  Underscoring Russian support for continuing 
the OSCE mission in Kosovo, he urged U.S. endorsement of the 
Swiss candidate, taking into account Belgrade's opposition to 
the Austrian nominee.  Botsan-Kharchenko questioned U.S. 
opposition to the ICJ ruling, arguing it provided cover to 
Tadic to make compromises elsewhere.  On Bosnia, he 
downplayed RS PM Dodik's rhetoric, asserting the RS 
leadership remained loyal to the state, if not at the expense 
of the entities.  End Summary 
 
Kosovo Precedent for Georgia 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In an August 26 meeting that immediately preceded 
Russia's announcement of its recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, MFA Special Envoy for Kosovo Aleksandr 
Botsan-Kharchenko underlined that the GOR considered Kosovo a 
precedent for Russian actions, but stressed that it Russia 
had taken "no initiative to put Abkhazia and South Ossetia on 
the path of independence."  Over our objections (Ref A), 
Botsan-Kharchenko continued to draw parallels between Kosovo 
and Georgia, arguing that the "genocide" experienced by the 
Ossetians outstripped the suffering of Kosovars in 1999.  The 
only difference in the situation, he maintained, was that the 
Serbs were not responsible for bombing Kosovo, in contrast to 
Saakashvili's violence.  Noting the August 25 parliamentary 
debate over extending recognition, Botsan-Kharchenko 
expressed his approval for statements made by representatives 
that South Ossetia and Abkhazia had more of a right to 
independence and self-determination than Kosovo (Ref B). 
 
MFA Twists Belgrade's Position 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C)  Serbian Charge Yelitsa Kuryak confirmed to us on 
August 25 that Belgrade sought a low profile in this 
conflict, given the obvious shift in Russian position on the 
"primacy of international law" and the parallels between 
Kosovo and the Georgian territories: "we are silent."  Kuryak 
stated that "we must support the territorial integrity of 
Georgia" and that Russian recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia would be "a very bad step."  She was quick to dispel 
Russian media reports of Serbian humanitarian assistance to 
South Ossetia, noting that the news had been planted by a 
Serbian businessman resident in Moscow, who had close ties to 
former President Kostunica.  While Serbia would not issue a 
denial, Kuryak said there were in fact no shipments of 
assistance to South Ossetia.  The MFA also had gone silent, 
Kuryak noted, and had held no consultations with the Serbian 
Embassy over the consequences of Russia's policy in Georgia 
for its support for Serbian territorial integrity.  There was 
continued pressure from Russian officials for Belgrade to 
ratify the energy agreement, with Kuryak questioning Russian 
good faith over the long-term, noting that there was no 
similar Russian ratification planned. 
 
Russia On Changing Stance in Belgrade; UNSYG 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) In response to our concerns that a complete transition 
to EULEX was required in order to prevent efforts at de facto 
partition, Botsan-Kharchenko observed that Belgrade had 
reduced its rhetoric on Kosovo due to its desire to work with 
the EU.  While Belgrade could not recognize Kosovo, 
Botsan-Kharchenko argued that the Tadic government was 
looking for reasons to work with the international community. 
 He assessed that Belgrade could ultimately accept EULEX, as 
long as there was some figleaf of UN cover. 
Botsan-Kharchenko predicted firmer opposition to EULEX among 
Kosovar Serbs, and pushed for the officers to be posted under 
an UNMIK umbrella.  While welcoming the dialogue between 
UNMIK and Belgrade, Botsan-Kharchenko stressed Russian 
disappointment that UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon agreed to a transfer of 
 
MOSCOW 00002580  002 OF 002 
 
 
authority from UNMIK to EULEX without receiving approval of 
the broader UN. 
 
OSCE 
---- 
 
¶5. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko said that Russia believed the OSCE 
had a continuing role to play in Kosovo, but stressed the 
need for Belgrade's approval of the OSCE mission head, since 
it was the "host-country" (Ref C).  While acknowledging our 
objections, Botsan-Kharchenko argued that on "purely 
technical grounds" it made sense to support the Swiss 
candidate, who was acceptable to Belgrade, over the new 
candidate from Austria, who would not be acceptable.  Russia 
would continue to urge international consideration of 
Belgrade's interests, and believed that U.S. support for the 
Austrian sacrificed the larger goal of an effective OSCE 
operation in Kosovo. 
 
Taking the Case to ICJ 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko said Russia had difficulty 
understanding U.S. objections to Belgrade's proposed review 
of Kosovo's independence by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ).  He argued that Russia supported the proposal 
for "practical reasons," since the adoption of a resolution 
at UNGA would enable Tadic to demonstrate to domestic 
constituencies that "he has done all he can." 
Botsan-Kharchenko said it was in the West's interest to ease 
pressure on Tadic and provide him room to maneuver.  Any ICJ 
decision, he argued, would be "years in the making" and was 
unlikely to be clear-cut in the final analysis.  For tactical 
reasons, the ICJ was worthwhile as a pressure valve. 
 
Bosnia: Don't Overestimate Dodik 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Noting our concerns over continued statements and 
actions by the RS PM to weaken the Bosnian Federation, 
Botsan-Kharchenko urged the U.S. to not overestimate the 
importance of Dodik's pronouncements.   In a change of tone, 
Botsan-Kharchenko argued that neither Russia nor Dodik saw in 
Kosovo a precedent to be applied to Republika Serbska. 
Dodik, Botsan-Kharchenko asserted, supported the Dayton 
Accords, but would continue to oppose efforts to strengthen 
the center at the expense of the entities' continued 
survival. 
BEYRLE