VZCZCXRO2354
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1152/01 2140936
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010936Z AUG 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1474
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001152 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AF/SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR 
BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
 
C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y  -  PARA MARKINGS 3,7,8 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM SU
SUBJECT: RIVAL FACTION DEVELOPING IN SLM/MM 
 
KHARTOUM 00001152  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d 
) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Senior leaders within the Sudan Liberation 
Movement of Minni Minnawi (SLM/MM) appear ready to break off 
from Minnawi and form their own parallel movement, according 
to senior SLM/MM loyalists in two separate meetings with 
poloff on July 31.  These leaders, including the Deputy 
Chairman of SLM/MM, have formed a rival group within 
Minnawi's movement.  Sources stated that NCP leaders, 
especially Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie and 
Intelligence Director Salah Gosh, are responsible for 
creating this split, as they have pressured, bribed, and 
enticed Minnawi's rivals.  Minnawi loyalists stated that they 
are aggressively combating this latest attempt to divide and 
conquer their movement, and will likely fire those disloyal 
to Minnawi in the coming weeks.  One Minnawi loyalist 
threatened that this constant attack on their movement has 
forced senior SLM/MM leaders to begin the fight for an 
independent state of Darfur.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PUBLIC SIGNS OF THE RIFT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2.  (SBU)  On July 29, almost all Sudanese newspapers 
prominently featured a press release from Dr. Rayah Jumaa 
Mahmud, Deputy Chairman of SLM/MM who stated that the absence 
of Senior Presidential Assistant Minni Minnawi will not 
affect the Darfur Peace Agreement.  He added that Minnawi's 
decision to remain in Darfur was personal and did not 
represent SLM's position.  Mahmoud also told journalists 
separately that "If Minnawi comes back, he is welcome - but 
if not, the movement will not be affected."  On the same day 
the extremist Arabic daily "Al-Intibaha" reported that 
well-informed sources in the  SLM stated there are "intensive 
meetings being held among the leadership of SLM, revealing a 
powerful trend within the movement for the dismissal of 
Minnawi."  (NOTE:  Mahmoud is the second highest ranking 
official in SLM/MM.  Prior to his May 2008 departure to the 
field, Minnawi personally told poloff that Mahmoud would 
represent him well in meetings with S/E Williamson.  Mahmoud, 
from the Masalit tribe, is also the highest ranking 
non-Zaghawa in SLM/MM.  END NOTE.) 
 
CONVERSATION WITH RAYAH 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶3.  (C) On July 31, Rayah Mahmud told poloff that his statements 
reported in Sudanese media were accurate.  Mahmud added  that 
he has become frustrated with Minnawi, especially as the 
latter left for the field "without telling me or anybody else 
what his plans were."  Mahmud said that the SLM should work 
with the mechanisms established by the DPA, rather than 
retreating to the field.  Although he denied that there is an 
internal competition in SLM/MM, he acknowledged that there 
are problems in the movement, especially with the way 
decisions have been made.  Mahmud said that poloff should 
focus his SLM/MM outreach with SLM/MM representatives such as 
Yaya An-Neel, Omar Dahia, Issa Baha' El-Deen and several 
others. 
 
DIVIDE AND CONQUER CONTINUES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶4.  (C) SLM/MM spokesman Sayf Al-Haroun told poloff on July 
30 that the presence of this rival and disloyal faction led 
by Rayah Mahmud and Mustafa Tirab has made SLM/MM even more 
fragile than it was several months ago.  Haroun provided 
poloff with a list of military commanders and political 
leaders within SLM/MM who are aligned with Mahmud and 
constitute 6 out of 10 leaders of the movement's liberation 
council.  (Note:  see para 10 for a detailed list.  This list 
corresponds closely with a separate list provided by Rayha 
above.  End Note.)  Haroun stated that Minnawi's absence from 
Khartoum, his lack of leadership, ethnic divisions within 
SLM/MM, and the attraction of rival rebel movements (i.e. 
especially JEM following their May 10 attack) are all reasons 
for SLM/MM's division and precarious state.  "Minni has put 
his people in Khartoum in an awkward situation by leaving 
them here without clear instructions or support," stated 
Haroun.  Haroun added that even Minnawi's bodyguard may be 
aligned with this rival faction, and spying on Minnawi's 
meetings, plans, and strategy.  Haroun also noted that 
Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie and Intelligence Chief 
Salah Al-Gosh take the NCP's lead in bribing, buying-off and 
promising power to Minnawi's competitors. 
 
POTENTIAL LOSS OF ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN SLM/MM 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶5. (C)  Haroun stated that if this group does splinter from 
SLM/MM that it will take much of SLM/MM's ethnic diversity 
with it, leaving SLM only with the Zaghawa of Minnawi's 
 
KHARTOUM 00001152  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
particular clan and region (Wogi-Daqeen).  Haroun stated that 
in this process of division, SLM leaders not closely aligned 
with either group are being slowly pushed out of SLM/MM. 
"Minnawi's clan of Daqeen have become an inner circle, and 
they are losing the small Masalit presence with Mahmud, the 
Fur with Tirab, and the Galay-Gargay Zaghawas," stated 
Haroun.  Haroun said even though Dr. Raya Mahmud is the 
highest ranking member of this faction, the treacherous 
Mustafa Tirab is likely pulling the strings and working 
closely with NCP leaders.  Sayf stated that Minni has been 
aware of Tirab's plot for a long time and that twice within 
the last year Minnawi ordered his followers to invade Tirab's 
home and accused him of collaborating with the NCP. 
 
"THE INSIDE THREAT" 
- - - - - - - - - - 
¶6.  (C)  Minnawi loyalist and Head of SLM/MM Capacity and 
Party Building, Bushara Hassan, separately told poloff on 
July 30 that SLM/MM faces an "inside threat."  Hassan also 
said that the problem rests primarily with Mustafa Tirab, 
Rayah Mahmud, and some of SLM/MM's Zaghawa-Gali Gargay 
commanders.  He said those based in South Darfur, who felt 
that they have not been rewarded for their fighting, have 
been particularly difficult.  Bushara claimed that the GoS 
has attempted to bribe many of these commanders.  According 
to Bushara the coordination and planning between the rival 
movement in SLM/MM and the NCP is quite advanced.  Bushara 
said that the rival leaders are planning a trip to Addis 
Ababa to argue to the African Union that they should be 
recognized as the sole legitimate leaders of SLM. 
 
LAST CHANCE FOR TRAITORS AND POSSIBLE RESHUFFLING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶7.  (C) Bushara added that these SLM leaders will be given a last 
chance to exhibit their loyalty to Minni.  He sad that SLM 
intelligence has already started to purchase plane tickets 
and plan for the travel of these rival members to North 
Darfur.  He observed that within weeks these members will be 
presented with tickets, and if they decline, they will 
automatically be kicked-out of SLM/MM.  Bushara said that he 
and other Minnawi loyalists have already excluded some 
members of this rival movement from SLM/MM meetings.  He also 
stated that Minnawi is strongly considering requesting a 
reshuffling for those SLM/MM members who hold positions in 
the GNU, which would mean the removal of many leaders from 
state and federal positions. 
 
RETURN TO WAR? 
- - - - - - - - 
¶8.  (C) Bushara noted that after re-organizing his field 
commanders and spending significant time in the field, 
Minnawi is "stronger than ever."  He said that Minnawi is 
becoming increasingly frustrated by GoS's meddling in SLM/MM 
internal affairs, their lack of DPA implementation, and its 
attempt to obstruct his communication with the international 
community.  (Bushara specifically mentioned that Minnawi has 
been frustrated by the GoS's repeated denial of CDA 
Fernandez's requests to see Minnawi in the field.)  According 
to Bushara, Minnawi has been left with no other option but to 
"think about starting the fight for the Democratic Republic 
of Darfur."  Upon hearing this poloff expressed surprise at 
this extreme language, to which Bushara responded, "we've 
tried to work with this government, so what other option is 
left for us?"  As an example of SLM's readiness to return to 
combat, Bushara stated that when delivering a letter to 
President Bashir from Minni Minnawi, Senior Minnawi Advisor 
Mohammed El-Tijani stated, "You'll see that this is a 
handwritten letter from the field.  It is written in the way 
that we used to write letters back when we started the war." 
CDA Fernandez spoke to Minnawi on July 30 and after 
perfunctory avowals about returning to Khartoum, he 
reiterated complaints about the NCP trying to divide his 
movement and eventually assassinate him. He added that "the 
door is still open to return or to resuming the armed 
struggle." 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶9.  (C) Combating the NCP's consistent strategy of 'divide 
and conquer' is a constant battle for all opposition 
political parties, rebel movements, and the SPLM and SLM. 
Division in Minnawi's camp is nothing new, as observers and 
insiders have often questioned Mustafa Tirab's loyalty to 
Minnawi for years.  What is significant about these events is 
that Minnawi's absence from Khartoum may have provided room 
for this dissension, and that more importantly, his second in 
command appears ready to hijack the movement.  Rayha was 
careful to temper his remarks when speaking to poloff, but 
his list of insiders, criticism of Minnawi, and his moderate 
 
KHARTOUM 00001152  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
remarks on the NCP all signal that something is likely in the 
works.  Although it is difficult to evaluate the long-term 
political or military significance of this fissure, it is 
clear that the GoS views Minni's absence as a threat and 
appears to be actively attempting to replace his movement 
with a more NCP-friendly alternative.  The NCP's divide and 
conquer modus operandi continues.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶10.  (C)  List provided by Sayf Al-Haroun: 
 
MEMBERS OF COMPETING FACTION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1)  Dr. Rayeh Jumaa Mahmoud, Deputy Chairman of SLM/MM, 
Member of Parliament, Head of Social Committee in National 
Assembly (Masalit) 
2)  Issa Baha' El-Deen - President of the Liberation Council, 
Deputy Wali, North Darfur State 
3)  Mustafa Tirab - General Secretary of the SLM (Fur) 
4)  Yaya Hassan An-Neel - SLM/MM Military Spokesman, S. 
Darfur Sector leader (Zaghawa, Galay Gargay clan) 
5)  Omar Suliman Dahia - Chief Security Commander SLM/MM 
(Zaghawa, Galay Gargay clan, related to individual above) 
6)  Arku Suliman Dahia - Deputy High Commander (Zaghawa, 
Galay Gargay clan, related to two individuals above) 
7)  Issa Musa Gerri Chief of Police (Zaghawa) 
8)  Abdalkareem El-Shek - Commissioner, North Darfur. 
FERNANDEZ