O 160450Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8358
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 002736


E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK
SUBJECT: PML DEBATES MUSHARRAF'S OPTIONS

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

¶1.  (C)  Summary.  In an August 15 meeting with Ambassador,  Pakistan Muslim League (PML) leaders outlined their realistic  best case scenario for Musharraf.  He resigns with an  indemnity package guaranteed by the Chief of Army Staff  (COAS), the Army provides him and his family lifetime  security, and a successor is chosen allowing Musharraf to  pass the baton of power to someone trustworthy.  The last  condition is unlikely to happen until day 29 of the 30  allotted by the constitution to choose a new president.

However, the other conditions mirror what COAS Kayani told  Ambassador in a conversation (septel) earlier in the day.

PML leaders believe it is in their interest to delay the  process to set Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif against each  other; they will use parliamentary tactics if necessary to  slow things down.  They confirmed the safe parachute option  of Musharraf seeking refuge in the UAE is still being  discussed.  End Summary.

¶2.  (C)  Ambassador and Polcouns met August 15 with Pakistan  Muslim League (PML) President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and  Opposition Leader Pervaiz Elahi, at their request.  The  discussion  centered around President Musharraf's options; no  doubt the same debate is being repeated in all of Pakistan's  political salons this week.

¶3.  (C)  Shujaat said that Musharraf had not yet decided what  to do.  It was down to two choices:  resign before charges  are filed or resign after having defended himself.  Shujaat  argued that it was better for Musharraf, the PML and the U.S.  if Musharraf defended himself against what would be baseless  charges.  Even if Musharraf had to resign immediately after  defending himself (i.e. before an impeachment vote he would  lose), this would remove any stain against his name and the  party's image.

¶4.  (C)  Elahi disagreed, saying it would be better for  Musharraf to resign before impeachment charges are filed;  however, there were conditions.  There should be a broad  indemnity (that did not equate to pardon for crimes that  Musharraf had not committed).  The Army should provide  security for Musharraf and his family for their lifetime so  Musharraf could live out his life in Pakistan.  The Chief of  Army Staff should be the guarantor of the indemnity agreement  because neither Asif Zardari nor Nawaz Sharif could be  trusted to abide by their promises.  And, the decision on who  would become President should be made before Musharraf  resigns so that he could hand over power in good conscience  to someone trustworthy. The key for Elahi was the wording of  the indemnity package and the guarantor.  Shujaat agreed that  if Musharraf had to resign it should be on the grounds  outlined by Elahi.  There was some discussion of whether it  would be possible to extend any immunity guarantee to PML  party leaders, but Shujaat dismissed this idea.

  U.S. Views
----------

¶5.  (C)  Asked what the U.S. wanted or feared, Ambassador  said that we did not want Musharraf humiliated; he should be  able to live in Pakistan as an elder statesman with the  benefits that accrue to former presidents.  The U.S. would  not encourage Musharraf to resign but equally we would not  try to convince him to fight.  We had made this position  clear, she said, to both major parties in the coalition.

¶6.  (C)  Ambassador said it would be far better for  Pakistan's image if Musharraf were allowed to remain in  Pakistan rather than flying off in the night to a third  country.  Shujaat agreed, but said that ISI interlocutors  were working on the UAE option.

  Time Factor
-----------

¶7.  (C)  Shujaat argued that time was on the PML's side; if  they waited long enough, Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif would  turn on each other.  Elahi agreed, saying that the coalition  had not yet decided on the charge sheet.  They faced a  difficult balancing act--if they included charges like  Musharraf's action on the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) or military  action in the tribal areas, they would invite opposition from  the Army.  Elahi argued that Musharraf's extra-constitutional  actions in both 1999 and 2007 had been blessed ex-post facto  by the courts so they could not fairly be listed on the  charge sheet.  Citing Zardari's Sunday Times accusations that  Musharraf had siphoned off U.S. Coalition Support Funds,  Elahi worried that the coalition would make unsubstantiated  allegations about corruption by Musharraf or his family.

Ambassador said she hoped she had ended Zardari's attempts to  make that unfounded allegation.  Elahi indicated that  Musharraf was planning to sue for libel over the Sunday Times  piece.

¶8.  (C)  Elahi, a former Speaker of the National Assembly,  also said the PML had a few parliamentary tricks to play that  would prolong the process.  For example, they could file a  motion calling for a confidence vote on the Speaker.  The  Speaker would have to win that motion before any further  impeachment action could be taken.

  Next President
--------------

¶9.  (C)  Shujaat and Elahi would not identify a candidate  they would support to replace Musharraf. ""That will be up to  the coalition,"" said Shujaat.  But they agreed it should be a  non-political elder statesman.  They agreed that Nawaz would  never accept Zardari as President and insisted that the Army  would also oppose Zardari.

¶10.  (C)  Comment:  The Chaudhrys seemed resigned to  debating, not if but how and when Musharraf would leave  office, and they see the value of slowing the process down as  much as possible.  As always with the Chaudhrys, the  discussion was frank, practical and aimed at keeping their  options open for the future.  Pakistani history has taught  them to expect payback for the last eight years of their  political maneuvering, and they are bracing for  disintegration of the party and defection of many PML members  in the coming days. Still, these are a couple of canny  politicians, and there are many second acts in Pakistan.

PATTERSON