VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #1117/01 2262129
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 132129Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1923
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0545
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0353

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001117 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR EUR/CE 
STATE FOR ISN RICHARD STRATFORD 
STATE FOR ISN/RA TADD KOCA 
STATE FOR SCA/RA JASON MCCLESSAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2033 
TAGS: PARM PREL IAEA KNNP ENRG ETTD IN GM
SUBJECT: (C) NSG CHAIRMAN EXPECTS PUSHBACK ON INDIA 
CIV-NUKE DEAL 
 
REF: A. BERLIN 1051 
     ¶B. STATE 85948 
 
Classified By: Economic Minister-Counselor Robert Pollard 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: At an August 13 meeting with EMIN and 
Econoff, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Chairman Viktor 
Elbling, along with staff advisors Goetz Lingenthal and Joerg 
Polster, stressed support for an NSG exception for India and 
agreed with the USG on the need to press for a consensus at 
the upcoming Extraordinary NSG Plenary in Vienna on August 
21-22.  He was not optimistic about the odds of reaching an 
agreement in August, however, given likely objections from 
other NSG members, he foresaw the need for a second meeting. 
Members of the German delegation reported that Germany is 
inclined to favor text modifcations reflecting a concern 
about India's non-proliferation credibility.  Despite the 
significant obstacles ahead, we believe that in the end, both 
Elbling and the Germans will strenuously work to shape a 
result that will support the fundamental principles of the 
U.S. approach.  End Summary. 
 
KEEPING THE SCHEDULE ON TRACK: PUSHING FOR AUGUST CONSENSUS 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) As NSG Chairman, Elbling said he would manage the 
deliberation process in a way supportive of USG objectives to 
reach an NSG consensus in the August 21-22 Plenary.  He 
strongly discouraged hypothetical discussions about a date 
for a second Plenary, even though he admitted that one 
probably would be necessary.  (COMMENT: On July 25, MFA State 
Secretary Reinhard Silberberg told the Charge d'Affaires 
(CDA) that according to Elbling, it may actually require 
three meetings to cover all the issues. END COMMENT)  Elbling 
took exception to recent media speculation on an alleged 
second Plenary date scheduled for September 2 and denied that 
either he or the MFA had ever proposed this.  In fact, he 
feared that such speculation would actually undermine the 
goal of achieving consensus at the first meeting, as some NSG 
members would lose focus, and others would use it as an 
excuse for further delay.  (COMMENT: In his remarks to CDA, 
Silberberg also noted that Germany did not want to convey the 
impression that "the job can not get done in the first 
meeting". END COMMENT)  He did worry, however, that even if 
the NSG reached consensus, certain members would naturally 
feel compelled to consult with their Cabinet or Parliament, 
adding another element of uncertainty on the timing. 
 
NOTHING SAID YET, BUT GERMANY ANTICIPATES OPPOSITION 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Elbling anticipates dissenting voices among the NSG 
members because of proliferation concerns, but so far he has 
not received any official notice from any NSG member, nor any 
word on the issues they are likely to bring up.  He had 
heard, for example, that New Zealand, Switzerland, Sweden, 
Ireland, and Austria are among the likely skeptics, but all 
remain tight-lipped about their concerns. 
 
¶4.  (C) Nonetheless, Elbling said he fully expects that some 
NSG members would challenge the agreement because of the 
alleged weakness of India's assurances.  Elbling noted that 
critics had claimed, inter alia, that 
-- India's moratorium on nuclear testing is strictly 
voluntary and not in any way legally binding; 
-- there was no guarantee that even if an NSG agreement were 
in place, India would not recommence testing if Pakistan, for 
instance, were to begin testing weapons of its own; 
-- the deal might set a bad precedent.  If this deal were put 
in place for India, what would stop other non-NSG countries 
from lining up for similar concessions? 
 
¶5.  (C) Elbling made clear it that he did not share these 
views and was prepared, if necessary, to forcefully counter 
these points and promote the advantages of an accord with 
India at the Plenary, but as the NSG Chair, he would not want 
to be drawn into an extended debate.  Moreover, the 
opportunity to air complaints on the first day could in his 
view set the stage for movement toward a possible consensus 
the next day. 
 
GERMANY MAY RAISE CONCERNS FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
¶6.  (C) Elbling had previously warned us (REF A) that Germany 
would raise questions about the draft text, in part to 
satisfy skeptics in the Bundestag and their constituencies. 
In this meeting, Elbling assured us that there was core 
political support from Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister 
Steinmeier on the India agreement.  He likewise reiterated 
his support of U.S. objectives, balanced by his obligation to 
serve as an honest broker. 
 
¶7.  (C) Elbling, on the other hand, was careful to distance 
himself from the German delegation, making it clear that its 
function is separate from his role as NSG Chair.  Polster and 
Lingenthal -- members of the German NSG delegation also 
present in the meeting -- indicated to us that they would 
indeed welcome a discussion in the Plenary on stronger 
assurances from India, such as a firmer pledge not to test 
again.  Elbling also added that the Germans might raise the 
issue of what an India deal would mean for the 
non-proliferation regime overall.  (COMMENT: Although Polster 
and Lingenthal are seasoned experts on these issues, they 
will not by their own account make the final call; that will 
be up to the political leadership. END COMMENT) 
 
¶8.  (C) Lingenthal further observed that there is not a 
strong domestic consensus in favor of the deal.  Elbling 
offered that he fully expected some opposition in the 
Bundestag from all sides of the political spectrum, but this 
would not influence the government's position.  (COMMENT: In 
his remarks to CDA, Silberberg highlighted that German 
Parliamentarians are very active on this issue and that many 
German NPT purists are unsupportive of the deal. END COMMENT) 
 In the final analysis, Lingenthal stated, NSG members would 
need to weigh the advantages of a new strategic partnership 
with India against their nonproliferation objectives. 
 
¶9.  (C) COMMENT.  In an aside with EMIN, Elbling admitted he 
was "not optimistic" about the odds of success in the NSG 
deliberations, not because the arguments for the agreement 
were not sound, or because the U.S. would not receive strong 
support from like-minded countries, including Germany. 
Rather, he was gravely concerned because of the need to 
achieve unanimity among all 45 NSG members, and because of 
the very tight deadline they were working under.  We remain 
convinced, however, that Elbling will work strenuously to 
facilitate success, and Germany will back the India exception 
after all is said and done.  Elbling indicated that he and 
the German delegation would arrive early in Vienna to permit 
bilateral discussions with other NSG members, and that he 
especially welcomed the opportunity to meet with the U.S. 
delegation. 
TIMKEN JR