VZCZCXRO2476
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2795/01 2441313
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311313Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9144
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002795 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PTER PINS PINR IZ
SUBJECT: PRT ANBAR: ANBAR PROVINCE ON THE EVE OF PIC 
 
Classified By: PRT Team Leader James Soriano for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is a PRT Anbar reporting cable. 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Security responsibility in Anbar Province is 
scheduled to be transferred from the Coalition Forces (CF) to 
Iraqi national and provincial authorities in a ceremony in 
Ramadi on September 1.  Called Provincial Iraqi Control 
(PIC), the event is a milestone marking the transition to the 
period of post-conflict recovery.  Among the factors 
contributing to tipping the province in our favor are the 
turn of public opinion against Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the 
phenomenon of tribal mobilization, the increase in police 
recruitment, and the effectiveness of combined operations 
between CF and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).  Challenges in 
the period ahead are formidable.  The province is not yet out 
of the woods on the security front and has a litany of 
economic woes, especially regarding basic services.  On the 
political front, local entities are forming to challenge the 
dominance of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) over the 
Provincial Council (PC), and deep distrust of the GOI is 
widely held among provincial notables.  Nonetheless, both the 
PRT and MNF-West see the period ahead as an opportunity to 
strengthen the gains made on the security front.  In an 
increasingly permissive environment, we will be moving 
forward with a series of economic and governance initiatives 
as highlighted in our Joint Common Plan.  End Summary. 
 
Provincial Iraqi Control 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) In a ceremony scheduled to take place in Ramadi in 
the next few days, Anbar Governor Ma,amoun Sami Rasheed will 
sign a memorandum of understanding with the Commanding 
General of MNF-West documenting the transfer of 
responsibility for local security from CF to Iraqi national 
and provincial authority.  The transfer, officially called 
Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC), is a milestone marking the 
transition of Anbar Province from the days of a violent 
insurgency into the period of post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
¶4.  (C) The PIC ceremony takes place against a backdrop of 
continuing security improvements.  To be sure, AQI cells are 
still at large and looking for openings, but overall the 
level of violence has declined dramatically in the past 20 
months.  There were only 79 security incidents recorded 
throughout the province in July, and August's tally is on 
track to be even lower.  This compares to the 1,700 to 2,000 
monthly security incidents typically experienced in the fall 
of 2006 during the height of the Battle for Anbar. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) It was at that time that an internal MNF-West 
intelligence assessment found that the "the social and 
political situation has deteriorated to a point" that 
combined CF and ISF "are no longer capable of militarily 
defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar" (Washington Post 
November 28, 2006). 
 
Then and Now 
------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) That was then.  Today the changes on the local 
scene are remarkable: 
 
-- Two years ago, the insurgency knocked Anbar's provincial 
and municipal governments into disarray or forced them 
underground.  Under threat, the Provincial Council (PC) fled 
to the relative safety of Baghdad and many local councils 
disbanded.  But as security improved in 2007, the PC returned 
to its traditional seat of power in Ramadi that summer. 
Today, virtually every city and town has a mayor and a 
functioning municipal council. 
 
-- In the summer of 2006, there were several hundred Iraqi 
Police (IP) on the provincial roles, and recruitment drives 
were lucky to attract two dozen applicants.  Several urban 
areas had no IP at all.  Today, there are 28,000 IP on the 
rolls, and every city and town has a functioning police 
force. 
 
-- Two years ago, many of the tribes were ambivalent towards 
CF or aligned against us.  Today, tribal leaders are openly 
cooperative and some have begun to organize as political 
parties.  Local citizens who previously shunned contact with 
CF today openly socialize with them. 
 
-- Two years ago, the criminal court system ceased 
functioning because of insurgent threats.  Today, criminal 
courts are in session and even hear terrorism-related cases. 
 
BAGHDAD 00002795  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
-- Two years ago, there was little financial and policy 
support from the GOI - GOI financing for capital projects was 
minimal or nil.  Today, the flow of GOI financial resources 
has resumed, giving the province the wherewithal for badly 
needed improvements. 
 
-- During the insurgency, many mosques typically spewed forth 
calls for insurrection.  Today, moderate religious teachers 
have resumed their places.  They actively discourage 
extremism and several of them are on tap to participate in an 
inter-faith dialogue visit to the U.S. 
 
-- Two years ago, the insurgency disrupted normal economic 
and social life.  Parents kept their children home from 
school, many businesses were shuttered, and the highways were 
unsafe for travel.  Today, markets are open and economic and 
social life is returning to normal. 
 
Four Factors 
------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Anbar Province is moving in the right direction. 
With hindsight, analysts will sift through the data for 
causal explanations, but at this stage four key factors, 
interacting among themselves, seem to have tipped the 
battlefield in our favor. 
 
-- The first factor was the turn of public opinion against 
AQI.  A psychological breakthrough took place in 2006-07. 
The public re-defined AQI as the enemy and CF as friendly, or 
at least not as the enemy.  AQI's excesses ) its murder and 
intimidation of local notables ) had much to do with the 
shift in sentiment, but the mosques also played a role. 
Still inadequately understood by outsiders, the mosque, which 
fomented insurrection in 2004-05, became a voice of 
moderation in 2006-07. 
 
-- Second is the well-known story of tribal mobilization and 
MNF-West's success in supporting it.  Starting in Al-Qaim in 
2005-06, tribal leaders gradually built ties with local 
MNF-West units.  However, the best known example is the Anbar 
Awakening Council, founded by the late Sheikh Sattar Abu 
Risha and a group of like-minded tribal leaders in the Ramadi 
area in September 2006. 
 
-- Third, as noted above, there was the increase in police 
recruitment.  In hindsight, it is clear that they filled the 
power vacuum of 2003-06 that had allowed AQI to move about 
unimpeded in the province. 
 
-- Finally, there was the effectiveness of combined CF and IP 
and military operations.  The CF's staying power bought time 
until local security forces and local government could get on 
their feet.  The other factors - the turn of public opinion, 
tribal mobilization, and the increase in police recruitment - 
did not happen merely because of a spark of local initiative. 
 They happened because CF made them happen. 
 
The Post-Conflict Environment 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Although positive trends continue, Anbar is still not 
out of the woods.  AQI's capabilities may be diminished, but 
the enemy is still present.  A June suicide attack near 
Fallujah that killed three Marines and 14 Anbaris is a 
reminder of the continuing threat.  Looking ahead, the 
challenges are formidable.  The economic woes are well-known 
and similar to those elsewhere in the country.  However, 
there are two challenges that bear close monitoring. 
 
¶9.  (C) The first is the local political scene.  The Iraq 
Awakening Conference, or Muattamar Sahawa Al-Iraq (MSI), is 
the chief opposition party, and has long sought to oust the 
governing Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) from its dominant 
position.  At stake is the control of the PC, patronage, and 
financial resources. 
 
¶10.  (C) The IIP is an off-shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
It is chiefly urban in character, attracts technocrats to its 
ranks, and ambivalent, if not hostile, to the CF occupation. 
By contrast, the MSI has a power base among tribal leaders. 
It denounces parties with a religious affiliation and 
publicly supports CF, referring to them as "friendly forces" 
in public pronouncements. 
 
¶11.  (C) Since 2006, the MSI (and its predecessor 
organizations) have denounced the PC as illegitimate, having 
been formed by the IIP on the slender reed of the widely 
boycotted 2005 election.  In that poll, only 3,700 votes were 
cast in a population of 1.4 million, with the IIP garnering 
some 2,700 votes. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00002795  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The low turnout took place when Anbar was 
estranged from the national political process and voters 
heeded calls for an election boycott.  The situation is 
different today.  At least 34 political entities are 
registered to contest the next election, and over 326,000 
citizens, some 44 percent of the eligible voters, have 
registered to vote.  Both the MSI and IIP are eyeing election 
strategies. 
 
Provincial-GOI Relations 
------------------------ 
 
¶13.  (C) Regardless which party emerges on top, it will be 
faced with managing the often dysfunctional relationship 
between Ramadi and Baghdad.  Anbaris are deeply suspicious of 
the GOI.  They fear Shi'a overreach, and many see an Iranian 
hand behind a plot to dominate the province.  Such 
perceptions and fears shape local attitudes and behaviors, as 
seen in Anbar's 2005 national election boycott.  Feeding 
those anxieties is a list of local grievances against the 
GOI.  Anbaris see a constant stream of empty GOI promises and 
arbitrary decisions.  There have been the non-payment and 
inadequate logistical support for the police, border 
corruption and security, and the ongoing local concerns over 
the Article 140 motion purporting to detach a large swath of 
eastern Anbar and assign it to Karbala province.  More 
recently, there was the drama of the PIC process itself. 
Originally set for late June, the transfer of security was 
delayed so as to give local officials time to iron out 
differences with the GOI. Those differences, on security 
matters at least, were settled with the signing August 21 of 
an MOU between the GOI and the Governor detailing the Command 
and Control (C2) of Iraqi Security Forces in Anbar. 
 
What the PRT is Doing About It 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14.  (C) As the local environment continues to improve, the 
PRT is partnered with MNF-West in moving forward on such 
initiatives as budget execution, economic development, 
agriculture, and rule of law.  We have more opportunities for 
contact with Anbaris than ever before, and those 
opportunities appear to be growing.  In general, the Anbaris, 
especially those in government, are supportive of our efforts 
and see a continuing need for USG technical assistance and 
support in the future.  The combined objectives of the PRT 
and MNF-West seek to exploit this favorable situation and to 
deepen the gains made in the one-third of Iraq's land area 
called Anbar province. 
BUTENIS