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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9140
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002792 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL IZ
SUBJECT: ERBIL:  MORE BELLIGERENT KURDISH RHETORIC SIGNAL 
OF HEIGHTENED TENSIONS 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 2702 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 2660 
 
Classified By: RRT Deputy Leader Tamlyn; reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team message 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Increasingly heated rhetoric from Kurdish 
interlocutors is a sign of the strain placed on the 
Shia/Kurdish alliance following the failed effort to pass the 
provincial elections law and the GOI demand that the 34th 
Peshmerga unit withdraw from Diyala.  In an August 21 
meeting, a senior advisor to KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan 
Barzani was deeply pessimistic about relations between Erbil 
and Baghdad.   He and other hard-line Kurds are openly 
speculating that recent "Arab" actions may require a resort 
to force to maintain the Kurdistan Regional Government,s 
(KRG) territorial control and autonomy in Iraq ) points 
reinforced during Senior Advisor Krajeski's August 24-28 trip 
to the KRG (septel).  KRG officials are increasingly inclined 
to fault the U.S. for not recognizing that (in their view) 
the Kurds are the only true U.S. ally in Iraq, and to condemn 
the U.S. for urging the Kurds to make disproportionate 
political concessions.  End Summary. 
 
Diyala Events Signal "Shia Strategy" to Push Kurds above 
Green Line 
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¶2.  (C) Dr. Nouri Sinjari, Chief of Staff to KRG Prime 
Minister Nechirvan Barzani, told RRT Deputy Team Leader (DTL) 
and RRTOff August 21 that the Kurds remain the only true US 
ally in Iraq, yet the US continues to push the Kurds "too 
far."  Citing the "unconditional support" the Kurds gave to 
GoI Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki last year at the USG's 
request, Dr. Nouri said the Kurds now regret that decision, 
as it allowed Maliki to consolidate his power.  He said the 
recent events in Diyala signal the beginning of a Shia 
strategy to push Kurdish forces back behind the pre-2003 
Green Line.  Maliki is feeling strong, Dr. Nouri said, and 
that Kurds "would fight" if Arab aggression continued. 
Clearly concerned that the withdrawal of the 34th Peshmerga 
unit portended similar requests for other Peshmerga 
withdrawals, he warned, "don't push us past our lines ) we 
will fight." 
 
¶3.  (C) Concerning Diyala, an exasperated Dr. Nouri said that 
the Kurds moved south of Khaneqin, Diyala Province at 
Maliki's direct request in 2006.  Instead of thanking the 
34th Peshmerga unit for their work in stabilizing the area, 
Dr. Nouri fumed, Maliki gave them 48 hours to depart.  Dr. 
Nouri expected that the ensuing vacuum would allow a corridor 
for AQ to enter from Iran )exactly the situation which the 
Peshmerga had been asked to prevent.  Dr. Nouri described an 
August 19 meeting between Sunni tribes and KRG PM Barzani, in 
which the tribes asked PM Barzani to send back the 34th unit 
and defend them against the Shia.  Dr. Nouri also said that 
the Iraqi Minister of Defense had asked the Kurds to remain, 
only for PM Maliki to ignore his request (Dr. Nouri believes 
that the Prime Minister is under the negative influence of 
the Iraqi Air Force).  The Kurds would never incorporate the 
34th Peshmerga unit into the Iraqi Army (IA), Dr. Nouri said, 
noting that Baghdad wanted to keep the IA an Arab army, 
facilitating future attacks against the Kurds. 
 
U.S. failing its "only true ally" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (C) Dr. Nouri vigorously chastised DTL and RRTOff for the 
U.S. failure to realize that the Kurds were its only true 
ally in Iraq.  He asked repeatedly (if rhetorically) for RRT 
members to explain what the United States had done for the 
Kurdistan region and bemoaned the lack of a "U.S.  Kurdish 
policy."  Arguing that the U.S. treated the Kurds as 
unimportant and did not give Kurdish requirements due 
consideration, he threatened that "we could create problems 
for Iraq."   He also spoke disparagingly about U.S. 
assistance in the KRG, noting "you waste your money on NGOs 
and journalists that just cause problems(.and you achieve 
nothing."  He added that NGOs were useless, given the Kurdish 
tribal mentality, and expressed his confidence that the KRG 
would take hundred of years to develop into a democracy. 
When DTL and RRTOff attempted to describe the millions of 
dollars spent on infrastructure projects in the KRG, Dr. 
Nouri brushed aside the comments, noting that all the US 
efforts are focused on other parts of Iraq. 
 
Comment and look ahead 
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BAGHDAD 00002792  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶5.  (C) As the KRG Prime Minister's Chief of Staff, Dr. Nouri 
is able to influence the work of KRG ministries, and - 
although he does not engage directly in negotiations with 
Baghdad - he is in a position to influence KRG PM Barzani's 
perspective.  His provocative statements reflect an 
unvarnished view of what may be the dominant KRG perspective 
on relations with Baghdad.  While senior Kurdish officials -- 
especially Iraq President Jalal Talabani but also (to a 
lesser extent) KRG President Masoud Barzani -- make more 
restrained private and public statements and have a more 
nuanced view of KRG-Baghdad relations, the tendency among 
Kurds to contemplate a "back to the trenches" position when 
feeling threatened makes it harder to de-escalate crises. 
Souring relationships between Kurds and Arabs over Kirkuk and 
a reemergent concern that their Arab neighbors will again 
betray them could push the Kurds further into a bunker 
mentality, allowing hard-line Kurds to drown out the moderate 
voices still open to compromise.  Dr. Nouri's  emphasis on 
the Kurdish willingness to fight  - combined with KRG 
Minister Mohammed Ihsan's recent remark that the Kurds are 
pursuing a military strategy (Ref B) -  are ominous 
indications of a readiness to pursue other options should 
political negotiations between the Kurds and Arabs stall. 
End Comment. 
BUTENIS