VZCZCXRO9601
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2561/01 2261409
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131409Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8821
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 002561 
 
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TAGS: PGOV PREZ IZ
 
SUBJECT:  PRT TEAM LEADER'S CONFERENCE - MOVING FORWARD 
 
(U)  This message is Sensitive but Unclassified; not for Internet 
distribution 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Begin Summary:  The message of the July 6-7 Team Leader's 
Conference was clear:  Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) must 
lay the groundwork for Iraqis to assume greater responsibility, 
which will occur sooner rather than later.  State-DoD cooperation 
will be essential as DoD turns its attention from combat operations 
to civilian-led capacity building.  Ambassador Crocker challenged 
team leaders to be actively involved with their Iraqi counterparts, 
and remain sensitive to the present reality that Iraqis want to 
govern their own country.  How quickly we thin out will depend on 
candid PRT assessments of progress.  General Petraeus echoed 
Ambassador Crocker's sentiments and provided his overall assessment 
of the security situation and what that means for the future of 
PRTs.  In his view, now that the security situation has improved, 
the Coalition is increasingly able to shift its focus from combat 
operations to capacity building.  Other presenters, representing 23 
different offices and agencies, built on the themes expressed by 
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, telling team leaders their 
plans for the future. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) All 31 teams were represented, including the teams led by 
the Italians and the Koreans.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
AMBASSADOR CROCKER:  PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS, U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS, AND 
MOVING FORWARD 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU) "Governance is working," remarked Ambassador Crocker as he 
opened the conference.  "We know it because it's being targeted," he 
continued, referring to recent attacks on government institutions 
and the judiciary.  He was optimistic that we would continue to make 
advances in many areas, but encouraged participants not to overstate 
those advances when reporting.  "Tell it straight," he said, "put up 
flags.  Progress in Iraq is not linear; one step forward is often 
accompanied by two steps back."  In other words, "don't put lipstick 
on a pig."  The Ambassador then relayed to participants the three 
big issues on his mind:  provincial elections, the nature of 
U.S.-Iraqi relations in the future, and how to work ourselves out of 
a job. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Provincial Elections:  Ambassador Crocker was circumspect 
when talking about whether provincial elections would occur, opting 
not to predict.  Instead, he offered an assessment of the elections 
process.  The Ambassador said there was likely to be an open-list 
system, which allows voters to choose individual candidates rather 
than a party that would likely create certain challenges.  The major 
concerns will be security and process.  Iraq struggles with a 
largely uneducated electorate with little experience in how an 
open-list system works, and there will be security challenges 
associated with candidates campaigning individually. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) U.S.-Iraqi Relations:  Ambassador Crocker spoke about 
U.S.-Iraqi relations in the context of our challenges ahead.  One of 
these will be negotiating the terms of our future military presence 
in Iraq.  Emphasizing that "we must get it right," he noted that we 
are now negotiating a SOFA agreement that will define every aspect 
of our presence in Iraq when the current UN mandate expires (Chapter 
7 will expire at the end of this year).  The challenge ahead will be 
working with the Government of Iraq to put together a framework that 
addresses both Iraqi and U.S. interests. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Moving Forward:  In the Chief of Mission's view, momentum 
is building among Iraqis who want to govern their country their own 
way.  As this situation evolves, team leaders must ensure that 
Iraqis are equipped with the tools necessary to succeed in their 
efforts.  Ambassador Crocker cited a few examples of what we need to 
do before turning control over to the Iraqis -- QRF projects should 
focus on building capacity, PRTs should evaluate the present threats 
on the judiciary to determine whether there is a broader effort to 
undermine it, and we should engage the Sadrists to help us learn 
more about what they want and help them understand that the U.S. 
government is not anti-Shi'a.  The Ambassador added that the extent 
to which we understand that Iraq is a sovereign state will help 
guide our actions.  His parting comment urged team leaders to keep 
in mind whether and where our long-term interests would warrant a 
permanent presence as consulates, and where to phase out PRTs 
altogether. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
GENERAL PETRAEUS:  "THINNING-OUT, NOT HANDING-OVER" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU) MNF-I (General Petraeus):  General Petraeus told the PRT 
leaders that his guidance to the military is to "thin out, not hand 
over."  The difference is significant, he noted.  Thinning out 
implies we are still tracking what's going on and still have a 
presence, whereas handing over implies complete turnover, a 
 
BAGHDAD 00002561  002 OF 004 
 
 
situation for which the Iraqis may not be fully prepared.  Advisors, 
transition teams, and PRTs were all part of thinning out, 
maintaining situational awareness and generating an impact that is 
disproportionate to their numbers.  General Petraeus emphasized the 
favorable direction in which the situation is trending, noting that 
security incidents are at the lowest levels in over four years, Al 
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and militias have been substantially degraded, 
Iraqi Security Force (ISF) capability is increasing (Iraqi soldiers 
are dying at a rate more than three times that of U.S. forces), and 
the Government of Iraq is increasingly in control.  He emphasized 
that these gains are occurring even as coalition forces are being 
reduced.  The military has played an important role in stabilizing 
the security situation, he said.  Violence has been reduced through 
various operations aimed at rooting out insurgents and AQI networks 
although he cautioned, pockets still remain. General Petraeus 
likened the activities of remaining AQI elements to a lethal and 
dangerous mafia-like organization, while it still has elements of an 
ideologically-inspired terrorist group. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Although Petraeus explained the challenges facing Iraq, he 
also expressed guarded optimism about the future.  With an economic 
foundation in place (record oil profits, infrastructure 
improvements, micro-loans and employment initiatives, and progress 
in the international banking), he noted, Iraqis will be well 
postured to take charge as security conditions in various areas 
allow.  Nonetheless, General Petraeus expressed his concerns about 
what Iran will decide to do; how much and what kind of influence 
Iran will wield; whether AQI will reinvigorate its activities and 
regenerate its source of support (something he noted was unlikely 
unless the Sons of Iraq were disbanded); and catastrophic events in 
the oil and electricity sector that could set back progress and 
cause widespread discontent within the populous. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Petraeus provided his candid view of the role of PRTs and 
the importance of Foreign Service Officers.  He said we should 
encourage Congress to support maintenance of the PRT presence, 
arguing that contributions from PRTs in the field are vital.  One of 
our biggest mistakes, Petraeus observed, was allowing the early 
incarnation of the PRTs (operating under a different name during 
CPA) to fall by the wayside once Iraqis transitioned from CPA to 
sovereignty.  It was time lost, he asserted.  Recognizing the 
valuable work of Foreign Service Officers, he noted that he has 
advocated for the expansion of the Foreign Service in order to 
address the types of challenges we now face. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The General closed on an upbeat note, commenting that we 
can succeed in Iraq.  He noted that Sunni and Shi'a have lived in 
peace in the past, drawing distinct contrasts to the conflict in 
Bosnia, where many observers and participants had served.  "Iraq is 
not the Balkans," he noted.  "In the Balkans, thousands of years of 
hostility separated the two ethnic groups.  Sunni and Shi'a, 
however, have lived together in peace before."  Once the security 
situation improved, he predicted, "Iraqis will be in good shape to 
pave their own way." 
 
--------------------- 
CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS 
--------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The following are the highlights of more than 23 separate 
briefings and discussion sessions: 
 
-- OPA Director:  The OPA director chaired a productive dialogue 
with the team leaders, telling them she would provide PRTs the tools 
they needed to accomplish their goals.  OPA is working hard to get 
more subject matter experts on the PRTs and looking at ways to 
co-locate international organizations (e.g., the United Nations) 
with teams.  The director challenged the group to build up the soft 
side of our efforts in preparation for the situation long after the 
military has gone.  She also noted the need to look for ways to get 
satellites into Iraqi hands, and urged teams to concentrate on 
projects that were sustainable and irreversible.  She echoed 
Ambassador Crocker's words, detailing the importance of laying out 
the end-state, noting that phasing-out should be conditions- (not 
calendar-) based.  PRT observations, she noted, would form the basis 
of a report to Congress.  In closing, she reminded the group that 
Iraq had resources and one task of PRTs was to help protect those 
resources from thieves, as well as to teach the Iraqis how to 
budget, apportion, and implement. 
 
-- Security:  The RSO Office continues to strongly support the PRTs 
and is increasing the number of RSO personnel at the four REOs. 
This innovation has resulted in a marked increase in the number of 
movements and time on the ground for RSO support movements.  The RSO 
Office is working with MNC-I and MNF-I on the basic concepts of 
protection to enhance the safety and security of everyone.  The 
final conclusions will be incorporated into a document that outlines 
these concepts for PRT/ePRT movements.  The RSO Office offers a 
range of security classes and stressed that personal security 
awareness and the reporting of incidents is everyone's 
 
BAGHDAD 00002561  003 OF 004 
 
 
responsibility. 
 
-- CIDNE:  CIDNE is an unclassified platform to store and share 
information.  This system will avoid duplication of effort in the 
field.  MNC-I will implement CIDNE by August 20 of this year.  CIDNE 
will provide year-to-year continuity by allowing users to access 
historical information on one consolidated platform.  For example, 
if a military civil affairs officer visits a rice mill during their 
tour, that officer can enter their report into CIDNE so their 
successor can access it.  Otherwise, we start anew each year as a 
result of rapid staff turnover. 
 
-- Health and Human Services:  Our public health advisor noted that 
Iraq has good public health professionals, but the core of public 
health needs to be rebuilt.  To address that need, the health 
attache's office is focused on four objectives.  The first is to 
improve human resources and provide expertise to the Ministry of 
Health.  The Ministry of Health currently is trying to flush out 
corrupt elements, encourage health promotion, privatize the system, 
and build local capacity in order to move its agenda forward.  We 
will assist in those efforts.  The second focus is to rebuild the 
public health surveillance infrastructure.  The third is population 
health, with the difficult challenge of educating a population about 
health that in some areas can be 60 percent illiterate.  Also, Iraq 
needs hospitals, emergency services, and clean water.  The fourth is 
governance, creating cooperative exchanges of technical and 
scientific expertise.  In the 1970s, Iraq was the paragon of public 
health systems in the Middle East.  Getting it back to that level is 
the goal, though it will take time, the speaker acknowledged.  The 
brain drain resulting from the Iran-Iraq war and two Gulf wars has 
been a persistent problem; 17,000 Iraqi health professionals fled 
during that period.  Iraq needs those physicians to return to Iraq. 
Health is an easy win for all; it crosses all ethnic, religious, and 
sectorial boundaries. 
 
-- Assistance and Returns of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): 
There's good news and bad news.  The good is that Iraqi displaced 
persons have been returning home since September 2007.  The bad is 
that one out of every six Iraqis is still displaced.  Unfortunately, 
not a lot of them are returning home because they now may be a 
minority group in an area where their ethnic/religious group was 
once a majority.  The return is made more difficult for some, who 
find that squatters now live in their homes.  One of the two 
speakers predicted that we wouldn't see an organized return.  People 
will return once they have reached a certain comfort level.  That 
threshold is different for each person or family.  In order to see a 
substantial influx, we will need a more stable security environment, 
progress in the way of political reconciliation, and to address the 
issue of squatters, lamented one of the speakers.  And once IDPs 
return, they will need shelter and jobs. 
 
-- USAID:   The road ahead for USAID will be characterized by leaner 
programs, noted Iraq's USAID Mission Director.  Due to the budget 
supplemental shortfall, some projects will run at a decreased level; 
some will be realigned programmatically or geographically; a few 
programs will be transferred to the Government of Iraq; and certain 
projects will merge in order to maximize impact of resources.  The 
salient features of the next generation of projects will reinforce 
USAID's development of strong linkages between local and provincial 
officials and empower communities to better articulate their needs. 
 
-- MNC-I (MajGen General LeFebvre):  MNC-I Deputy Commanding General 
LeFebvre offered one certainty - that the way ahead will be less 
military action and greater DoD-State cooperation in 
capacity-building.  In this regard, he echoed General Petraeus. 
MNC-I is working closely with the Office of Provincial Affairs on a 
strategy to re-define our terms of engagement and shift priorities. 
BG LeFavre is committed to completing this strategic objective 
within the next couple months.  Whatever the outcome, he impressed 
upon team leaders that their relationship with the battlespace 
commander was essential. 
 
-- Political:  The political counselor spoke about the changing 
political climate in Iraq since the Charge of the Knights offensive 
in the south.  He identified assumptions, opportunities, and 
challenges in the new political environment.  He also reiterated the 
objectives for a successful mission in Iraq. 
 
-- CETI (Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq):  Ambassador 
Charles Ries spoke about economic progress in Iraq, including recent 
agreements by Gulf nations to forgive Iraqi national debt.  He also 
covered new developments that affected the mission in Iraq in the 
U.S. supplemental appropriations bill for fiscal year 2008, 
including changes to funding levels for various programs.  He 
discussed Iraqi Council of Representatives' legislation and what it 
would mean for potential foreign investors. 
 
-- QRF (Quick Response Funds):  Two officers managing QRF funds 
briefed on overall funding and spending figures for the program. 
They emphasized the availability of an additional $250,000 in 
 
BAGHDAD 00002561  004 OF 004 
 
 
Democracy Funds.  They also briefed the mechanics of the various 
spending mechanisms within the QRF portfolio, including 
micro-purchases, direct procurements, and grants.  In addition, the 
speakers discussed grant implementation through the PRT or 
Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), a USAID implementer. 
 
-- USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture):  Agriculture in Iraq is 
suffering from 30 years of neglect, disrepair and lack of 
organization.  Sound market policies do not exist.  Corruption, as 
in all facets of Iraqi life, is serious.  USDA is working with the 
Ministry of Agriculture to develop a strategic plan for agriculture 
and market-oriented trade policies.  While the speaker mentioned 
there were a number of projects already in operation, he noted two 
major problems: land tenure for private farmers and local control of 
water resources.  Resolving those issues would be a big step for 
Iraq's agriculture sector.  USDA currently has 22 agricultural 
advisors serving at 14 locations in Iraq. 
 
-- PRDC (Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committees):  A 
program officer from ITAO provided an update on PRDC funds, which 
support projects that both Iraqi leaders and coalition forces 
establish as priorities for Iraqi reconstruction projects.  The 
speaker said that progress in disbursement of funds had been slower 
than expected.  He warned that funds for fiscal year 2007 could 
expire before being obligated.  The speaker proposed that all funds 
allocated be consolidated and that pending projects be re-evaluated 
to facilitate obligation of funds. 
 
-- Other topics covered in the conference were MECC synchronization, 
managing personalities on teams, OPA assessment plans, supplemental 
and budget execution, internal management issues, strategic effects, 
and public diplomacy. 
 
CROCKER