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OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHTH #1203/01 2391537
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 261537Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2388
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/US MISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 001203 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018 
TAGS: GR PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR LAGON'S SEPTEMBER 1-3 
VISIT TO GREECE 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DEBORAH MCCARTHY.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND 
 (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Welcome to Athens.  Your visit is an excellent 
opportunity to press Greece to show progress on TIP issues if 
it wishes to avoid a Tier-Two Watch-List rating.  Your visit 
comes at a particularly delicate moment in U.S.-Greece 
relations.  A NATO ally and EU member, Greece has been 
helpful in some areas, such as its support for our naval 
facility at Souda Bay, while also taking positions at odds 
with U.S. interests, such as moving closer to Russia on 
energy pipeline deals.  Bilateral relations have been 
particularly difficult since Greece vetoed the Republic of 
Macedonia's NATO accession at the Bucharest Summit in April. 
You will face interlocutors who are reluctant to believe that 
U.S. criticism of Greece's TIP record is anything other than 
retribution for the Macedonia veto. 
 
YOUR MEETINGS 
------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In line with the requests we received from your 
office, we are arranging several meetings with government 
officials and NGOs, as well as visits to a shelter.  These 
meetings include Secretary General of the MFA Agathocles, 
Minister of Justice and Public Order Hatzigakis, and members 
of the Inter-Government TIP Committee.  NGOs you will see 
include the European Women's Network (ENOW), Klimaka, and ACT 
UP, among others. We also hope you will agree to present, 
along with Ambassador Speckhard, an award to NEW Life's Emma 
Skjonsby-Manousaridis, one of the 2008 TIP Heroes.  We are 
also planning a press event where you will have the 
opportunity to talk about the importance of human trafficking 
as a global challenge. 
 
¶3. (SBU) During your visit you will have n opportunity to 
highlight issues in the G/TIP Action Guide for Greece, 
including the development of a system for reporting arrests, 
prosecutions and punishments; increased protection and 
services for victims and witnesses; increased law enforcement 
efforts; prosecution of trafficking-related corruption; as 
well as to encourage the Government of Greece to raise the 
overall awareness of TIP issues.  We have previewed the 
Action Guide with the Ministries of Justice and Foreign 
Affairs in anticipation of your visit. 
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) The Greek Parliament ratified on July 31, 2008, a 
bilateral agreement with Albania on child repatriation, which 
had been pending for several years, providing protection and 
aid to children who have been victims of trafficking.  The 
agreement provides for safe repatriation of children to 
Albania and appointment of custodians, and measures to combat 
the root causes of child trafficking, such as improved access 
to education. The agreement also establishes a Central 
Coordination Committee that will aim to improve efficiency of 
state entities devoted to trafficking.  It will enter into 
force when published in the Government Gazette. 
 
¶5.  (U) The TIP police (a section of the National Police's 
Organized Crime Division) issued a report on its activities 
during its first two years.  Key elements include: 
 
-- The TIP police investigated 69 cases and dismantled 13 
international organized criminal networks in cooperation with 
INTERPOL and EUROPOL. 
 
-- The TIP Police filed court papers against 287 persons in 
Greece and abroad, on the basis of which 192 Greeks and 
foreigners were arrested.  Of the 192, 117 were charged for 
participation in a criminal organization; 52 were arrested in 
Greece, while warrants were issued for the others.  Of those 
arrested in Greece, many are in pre-trial detention or have 
been released on probation until their cases are heard by the 
courts. Most cases are pending.  Four have been tried on 
first-degree charges, and sentences of 15-19 years were 
imposed. 
 
-- Protection and aid was offered to 127 men, women, and 
children, many of whom were voluntarily repatriated. Of the 
127, 41 were recognized as trafficking victims by the 
prosecutor and were placed in NGO shelters.  These numbers 
have decreased slightly from previous years due to 
conflicting data. 
 
¶6. (SBU) On June 2, governors of border provinces in Greece, 
Bulgaria, and Turkey met as part of their on-going 
discussions on trafficking issues and re-affirmed their 
 
ATHENS 00001203  002 OF 003 
 
 
commitment to support victims and to strengthen measures 
against traffickers. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The European Women's Network (ENOW), Klimaka, and 
the Greek Council for Refugees -- all dynamic NGOs and 
official partners of the MFA in combating trafficking in 
persons -- complained to us about delays in receiving funds 
from the Development Aid Division of the MFA.  All three NGOs 
said cooperation with the Development Aid Division was ad hoc 
and funds were made available only after very long delays. 
As a result, Klimaka was forced to close a trafficking 
victims, shelter in 2007.  Nickie Roumbani, President of 
ENOW, alleged that the government shelter EKKA was also at 
minimal operation level due to delays in receiving committed 
funds.  ENOW and other NGOs expressed admiration for police 
work but were very critical of the Ministry of Justice and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
¶8. (U) At the same time, however, Hellenic Aid maintained its 
ongoing commitment to help fund the Transnational Action 
Against Child Trafficking (TACT) program in Albania, at its 
accustomed 100,000 Euros/annum levels.  USAID is also a major 
contributor to this program. 
 
GREEK MEDIA GUIDE 
----------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) In this year's Freedom House survey, the Greek media 
is rated as "free," albeit near the bottom of the Western 
Europe group alongside Spain and Italy.  In some respects, 
however, it is more reminiscent of the Middle East, with a 
tendency toward sensationalism and conspiracy theories. 
Editorial and reporting lines largely support the economic 
and political interest of the various medial outlets owners. 
The issue of trafficking has been the subject of sporadic 
Greek media attention for the past several years, usually 
within the larger context of migration.  Recent examples 
include a mid-July report during the prime-time newscast of a 
popular TV station, which noted neither Russia nor Greece has 
an adequate legal framework to address sex trafficking.  This 
was part of a series on increased Russian tourism and travel 
here. 
 
¶10. (SBU) For your roundtable discussion, we plan to invite 
Greek diplomatic correspondents from both print and broadcast 
outlets who are familiar with our annual TIP report and U.S. 
policy in general.  Nevertheless, you may wish to spend up to 
several minutes at the start of the discussion to put the TIP 
issue in global context, as well as to convey information 
about Greece and your meetings here, including the award 
presentation to the director of the NGO "Nea Zoi."  The 
off-camera discussion will be in English, with the local 
staff available to assist with any Greek translation needs 
that may arise for individual reporters. 
 
OTHER ISSUES 
------------ 
¶11. (C) Although these and other TIP issues will be the focus 
of your meetings, we also provide the following background on 
other topical issues that could emerge -- even informally -- 
in your discussions.  U.S.-Greece relations are decidedly 
mixed.  On the positive side, Greek-U.S. military-to-military 
cooperation and the work between our law enforcement 
officials remains strong.  The U.S. Navy base at Souda Bay on 
Crete is a growing hub for transport and logistics in the 
Middle East theater, and Greece is among the largest 
purchasers of U.S. military equipment.  The Greeks have also 
been good partners on domestic and international 
counterterrorism issues, and we are working hard to ensure 
that the overall political environment does not undermine 
this cooperation on the security front.  In Kosovo, Greece is 
providing personnel to the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULUX), 
the International Civilian Office (ICO), the OSCE Mission, 
NATO (KFOR), and has ongoing dialogue with Kosovo 
authorities.  At the same time, U.S. and Greek positions on a 
number of key issues have diverged. 
 
MACEDONIA 
--------- 
 
¶12. (C) Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Greece objected 
to the Republic of Macedonia's name.  At the April NATO 
Summit, Greece blocked the invitation of Macedonia into the 
Alliance under its constitutional name "The Republic of 
Macedonia" -- a top U.S. priority.  Since the Summit, we have 
continued to urge both Athens and Skopje to work rapidly for 
a solution.  Greek/Macedonian relations have been dealt an 
additional setback by a tart exchange of letters between 
Macedonian PM Gruevski and Greek PM Karamanlis on questions 
related to the "Macedonian minority" in Greece. 
 
ATHENS 00001203  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
KOSOVO 
------ 
 
¶13. (C) Greece does not appear likely to recognize Kosovo in 
the immediate future but is playing a reasonably constructive 
role behind the scenes.  Greece has been among the most 
active players in the EU in engaging with Serbia post-Kosovo 
independence and in encouraging Serbia's European and 
Euro-Atlantic perspective. 
 
RUSSIA/GEORGIA 
-------------- 
 
¶14. (S) PM Karamanlis has pursued a policy of an enhanced 
relationship with Russia.  This is evident in deals on energy 
pipelines but also in Greek purchases of Russian military 
equipment, numerous reciprocal high-level visits, and 
expanding trade and cultural ties.  But Greece also has 
historical ties to Georgia.  The Russian/Georgian crisis has 
put Greece in a tight spot.  The GoG has come out in suSarkos with Russian defense 
industry officials and the ratification in September of the 
Southstream gas pipeline agreement.  The Embassy has pushed 
the GoG hard to cancel or delay these ill-advised moves. 
 
¶15. (C) It is important to stress, however, that while the 
GoG has been rhetorically supportive of Southstream, it has 
taken concrete steps to realize the Turkey-Greece-Italy 
Interconnector (TGI).  This is the first pipeline to carry 
Caspian gas to Europe without going through Russia or through 
Russian-controlled pipelines.  TGI is an important step in 
realizing our Southern Corridor strategy of increasing energy 
diversity and security for Europe.  Thus, Greece has found 
itself in the cross hairs of an intense effort by Russian 
Gazprom to minimize the flow of Azerbaijani gas through 
Greece.  We believe that Gazprom's Southstream pipeline, 
which is designed to follow the same route as TGI, is 
designed to undermine TGI. 
 
GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS 
-------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) Greece's role in the Aegean continues to impact its 
rapprochement with Turkey and the Cyprus dispute. The 
Greek/Turkish bilateral relationship has improved in recent 
years, repeatedly evidenced by Athens, ongoing support for 
Ankara's EU membership and PM Karamanlis' January visit to 
Turkey.  There has, however, been no tangible progress on 
long-standing disputes over continental shelf and the status 
of islands in the Aegean. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Although the Cyprus issue has been stymied since 
the Greek Cypriots rejected the UN-brokered Annan plan to 
reunify the island in a 2004 referendum (Turkish-Cypriots 
accepted the Plan), the election of Cypriot President 
Christofias and his engagement with his Turkish-Cypriot 
counterpart is widely seen as a new opportunity to reach a 
comprehensive solution on the island.  While Greece has 
unique influence with the Greek Cypriots, it does not have 
the same level of influence as Turkey has with the Turkish 
Cypriot community.  The Greeks remain suspicious that Turkey 
may not be as committed to achieving a permanent settlement 
to the issue. 
MCCARTHY