VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #1188/01 2351655
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221655Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2373
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0377

S E C R E T ATHENS 001188 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2018 
TAGS: GR PGOV PREL MARR RU GG
SUBJECT: TFGG01: RUSSIA-GEORGIA CONFLICT: ATHENS DIPLOMATIC 
PUSH 
 
REF: A. STATE 89769 
     ¶B. 07 ATHENS 2375 
     ¶C. ATHENS 1183 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DEBORAH MCCARTHY.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND 
 (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Greek MFA and MOD officials are saying the 
right things on Greece's support for Georgia's territorial 
integrity and the early withdrawal of Russian forces from 
Georgia.  At the same time, a team of Russian defense 
industry experts is scheduled to visit Athens next week to 
discuss Greek purchase of Russian armored personnel carriers 
(BMPs), and the Greek Parliament is scheduled to ratify the 
Southstream pipeline project with Russia in September.  We 
are working to turn off both these ill-advised moves, but are 
getting mixed signals from Greek officials.  Further 
discussions on these issues with Greek diplomats in Brussels 
and Washington could be helpful. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Charge delivered ref A points on the Russian-Georgia 
conflict to Constantinos Bitsios, diplomatic advisor to PM 
Karamanlis, and to Aristides Agathocles, MFA Secretary 
General.  She urged Greece's continued support of the common 
NATO position and the withdrawal of Russian forces from 
Georgian territory to their pre-crisis positions.  Charge 
also encouraged continued Greek humanitarian assistance to 
Georgia and expressed U.S. appreciation to Greece for its 
decision to send two monitors for the OSCE mission.  Bitsios 
assured us that Greece firmly supported Georgia's territorial 
integrity and noted that he had personally pressed Russian 
representatives in Athens firmly on the immediate withdrawal 
of Russian troops from Georgian territory.  At the same time, 
Bitsios said Greece was wary of starting down a path toward a 
new Cold War by isolating Russia.  A better path, he argued, 
was one of dialogue and negotiations.  We pushed back, noting 
that while no one wished to see a new Cold War, Russia needed 
to repair the damage it had done. 
 
¶3. (C) Agathocles likewise underscored Greece's full support 
for Georgia's territorial integrity and said Greece would not 
accept changes to borders.  He explained that it was a matter 
of principle for them, both in the case of Georgia and in the 
case of Kosovo, whose independence Greece has not yet 
recognized.  Agathocles said they had told the Russians 
"strongly" that any attempt to revise borders would be 
unacceptable.  He had asked the Russians why they were not 
withdrawing more quickly.  They had responded that, first, 
they had found ammunition dumps in the captured territories 
and had to destroy them to keep them from falling into the 
hands of gangs.  Second, the Russians claimed there were no 
law-enforcement authorities in Gori and they could not leave 
the area unattended.  Agathocles was unpersuaded by these 
arguments.  Like Bitsios, however, Agathocles also argued 
that it was not in the interests of the West to isolate 
Russia at this time. 
 
RUSSIAN TECHNICAL TEAM TO ATHENS FOR BMP NEGOTIATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4. (C) Greek press reports Thursday indicated that a team of 
Russian technical experts was scheduled to travel to Athens 
next week for discussions on Greek procurement of 450 
Russian-made armored personnel carriers (BMPs).  NOTE: This 
is part of a larger arms purchase agreement that PM 
Karamanlis signed with President Putin late last year.  Ref 
¶B.  END NOTE.)  We raised the issue with Bitsios and 
Agathocles, noting that such a visit now would be unhelpful 
@h undercut and be inconsiQupport of the NATO posQitarian 
assistance e& was important not to 
allow Russia to think it was "business as usual" as long as 
Russia had troops occupying Georgian territory.  Bitsios 
appeared to take these arguments on board but had no direct 
response.  Agathocles thanked us for this information and 
said he understood that such a visit would not be helpful at 
this point and that they would "turn it off."  A/Polcouns 
also discussed the issue with former Foreign Minister and 
reported Karamanlis confidante Antonis Samaras, who agreed 
"absolutely" that the optics of such a visit now would be bad 
and promised to make sure "those who needed to know" would be 
told. 
 
¶5. (C) To put greater pressure on the GOG to cancel the 
Russian visit and to alert colleagues in the diplomatic corps 
to the issue, Embassy officers contacted a number of 
third-country embassies in Athens.  Georgian Charge Zurab 
Aleksidze said our efforts were a good initiative, that he 
would report the issue back to Tbilisi, and would take up the 
 
issue himself with Deputy Foreign Ministry Kassimis, who is 
heading the MFA's Georgia crisis center.  UK PolCouns Lisa 
Whanstall also expressed concerned and said she would cable 
London for instructions on how to proceed. 
 
CHOD BLASTS RUSSIANS 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (S/NF) DATT discussed the Russian BMP visit with Chiefof 
Defense General Grapsas.  Grapsas at first said he knew 
nothing of the visit but confided that if such a visit were 
scheduled, he would certainly have it stopped.  Shortly after 
returning to the Embassy, Major General Reklitis called DATT 
and told him that the Russian technicians were coming to 
visit Greece but they were not sponsored by anyone in the 
Hellenic Ministry of Defense or Hellenic Military and were 
only coming to meet with civilian commercial officials. 
Therefore, Grapsas could not postpone or terminate the visit. 
 COMMENT: While it is conceivable that the Russians are 
coming to talk to private Greek companies because there are 
reportedly offset provisions in the BMP deal, it is highly 
unlikely that the Greek Pentagon would not have contact with 
such a delegation.  Moreover, most of the Greek defense firms 
are quasi-state enterprises, so a Russian meeting with 
"private" Greek defense firms would still likely involve 
Greek officials.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶7. (S/NF) Grapsas went on to express very negative views on 
the Russians.  He opined that Russia was a country that could 
not be trusted and that history had proven this fact time and 
again.  Grapsas underscored his distrust of Russia by 
pointing out that it was taking advantage of high oil prices, 
a result of terrorist acts, to illegitimately generate wealth 
and fund its military buildup and modernization.  He said the 
U.S. should not allow the Russians to occupy Georgia and 
should remove them and push on into Russia to teach them a 
lesson.  He went on to say that despite its claims, Russia 
was not a democracy and the world was naive if it thought 
Russia could change from a hegemonic, centrally controlled, 
communist state to a true capitalistic democracy in only 18 
years.  Grapsas reiterated that Greece had historical ties 
with Georgia and would do whatever was required to help them. 
 He opined that the U.S., NATO, and the EU would have to 
rebuild Georgia and Russia would not like it.  He pledged 
Greek support in the form of military forces, humanitarian 
aid and support (i.e. diplomatic clearances for over flights 
and sealift), as required. 
 
OTHER DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) A/Econcouns delivered ref A points to Peep Jahilo, 
Estonia's Ambassador to Greece.  Jahilo indicated that there 
was no doubt that Estonia was firmly allied with Georgia and 
believed Moscow was in the wrong.  He said that Estonia was 
one of the first countries to send humanitarian assistance to 
Georgia.  He shared that Estonia would continue to stand with 
NATO and was watching developments closely.  Jahilo believed 
that Russia had been put on notice by the NATO statements and 
the fact that very few countries were supporting its 
position.  However, he noted, Russia was now taking steps to 
help it "save face."  For example, according to him, the 
Russian military attach in Estonia yesterday demarched the 
Estonian military that it was freezing its bilateral military 
cooperation with Estonia for the time being.  On Greece, 
Jahilo indicated that while he was heartened to hear recent 
statements by Bakoyannis he was wary of the fact that 
Karamanlis had been utterly silent on Russian's actions. 
 
¶9. (C) A/DCM delivered reftel points to Ukrainian Charge, 
Taras Malisevski.  Malisevski, who appreciated the 
information, noted that his embassy had not discussed the 
issue with the GoG, in large part because his Ambassador was 
to return to post on September 6.  He did specifically state 
that, while Bakoyannis had made some useful statement on 
Georgia, his government had noticed PM Karamanlis had been 
"very silent" on the matter. 
 
GEORGIA CRISIS AND GREEK ENERGY POLICY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C)  A/DCM discussed the situation in Georgia and its 
impact on Greece's energy policy with Else Loverdou, Energy 
Advisor to the Minister of Development, on both August 18 and 
August 22.  In the first meeting, Loverdou noted that the GoG 
was interested in moving forward with the four-way Turkey, 
Greece, Italy and Azerbaijan political agreement on the TGI 
pipeline.  A/DCM welcomed this move and outlined USG policy 
on Russia in wake of Georgia: now was not a time for 
 
"business as usual" with Russia, also on the energy sphere. 
A/DCM specifically noted that the U.S. would be particularly 
concerned by Greek movement on the Southstream pipeline. 
The second discussion focused on an article in the August 22 
edition of the Greek newspaper Ethnos, reporting that the 
Russian Government had just completed ratification of its 
bilateral agreement with Greece on Southstream, and that the 
GoG would now move forward quickly on its own Parliamentary 
ratification.  Loverdou did not dispute these facts, but 
called the Greek ratification process "routine."  She noted 
that the Russian Government ratification of the agreement did 
not require action by the Duma, but rather by the Russian 
Ministerial Cabinet alone.  This process, she said, had now` Greek Government had, fe Southstream agreemenQr to 
the summer receQg in the queue" for 
r`ted that Parliament would@t September 25.  "You do Q 
ratified their SouthQh Russia..." she 
noted. (NOTE: This has also come up in press channels and 
Embassy has decided to note privately to our journalist 
contacts that now is not the time to move forward with any 
Southstream-related agreement.  END NOTE.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C)  The Georgia crisis has put Greece in a tight spot 
because of its historically close ties to both Georgia and 
Russia.  FM Bakoyannis' statement in Brussels (ref C) and the 
statements of other Greek officials (PM Karamanlis has been 
silent on the issue thus far) came out strongly for Georgia's 
territorial integrity and the early withdrawal of Russian 
troops.  Greece is also supporting the OSCE monitor mission 
with two monitors and promises of ten more later and has 
provided funds and materiel for humanitarian assistance.  At 
the same time, having a Russian technical team visit next 
week to discuss an arms purchase and the Greek Parliament 
ratifying the Southstream project would send the wrong signal 
to Moscow that Greece is still willing to do business as 
usual.  We have made a push to turn off these ill-advised 
moves.  Further discussions on these issues with Greek 
diplomats in Brussels and in Washington could be helpful. 
MCCARTHY