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FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1528
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002112 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM AMBASSADOR YAMAMOTO FOR: 
NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA BOBBY PITTMAN 
STATE DEPARTMENT ASSISTANT SECRETARIES FRAZER (AF), KRAMER 
(DRL), WITTEN (PRM), AND FORT (INR) 
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR P, D, F, G, S/CRS, AND S/P 
USAID ADMINISTRATOR FORE AND ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATORS 
ALMQUIST (AFR) AND HESS (DCHA) 
OSD DAS WHALEN 
DNI NIO/AFRICA CARSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV ASEC EAID ET
SUBJECT: U.S.-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS MESHED IN UNEASY INTERNAL 
POLITICAL DYNAMICS 
 
REF: A. ADDIS 1154 
     ¶B. ADDIS 1571 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (S/NF) The growing independence in bilateral policy 
discussions by hard-liners within the ruling Ethiopian 
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) party -- 
including members of the  Central Committee and Executive 
Committee or "Politburo", as well as by powerful outsiders 
like military Chief of Staff General Samora and National 
Intelligence Service Chief Getachew Assefa -- combined with 
the "foils" of Prime Minister Meles in sending negative 
messages to the U.S. and other nations, have led to reversals 
as well as shifts in the Ethiopian Government's (GoE) 
actions.  Almost overthrown by central committee dissenters 
in 2001 over differences on the Eritrea border conflict, the 
Prime Minister has recovered and enjoys solid control within 
the Committee.  Still, underlying fissures within the 
Committee remain, exacerbated by growing perception gaps 
between the Committee and outsiders requiring careful 
management by the Prime Minister.  Both Gen. Samora (a 
non-member of the Committee) and Getachew are clearly 
"tougher" hard-liners who are not advocates of the U.S. 
relationship, but due to their senior and influential 
positions could potentially pose problems for U.S. relations 
despite the close ties their respective ministries have with 
the United States.  The hard-liners in general are not 
opposed to the U.S., but seek tough EPRDF control over 
government operations, procedures, and structures.  In 
pressing the GoE, whether in advancing our human rights and 
democratic reform objectives or advocating military and 
development programs, we must engage in a more concerted, 
deliberate, and discrete dialogue with the GoE to avert any 
unforeseen or unintended consequences. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) Meles, release of 71 political detainees last 
year, handling of the Eritrea border dispute, and debate over 
the proposed Charities and Societies Organizations (CSO) law 
have sparked debate and differences of views within the 
Central Committee.  Yet Meles has the full support of the 
Committee on issues such as greater control of the press and 
banking institutions, as well as their blessing to control 
opposition parties which has led to the effective 
neutralization of the opposition in the parliament, recent 
local elections, and in political debates.  The 78 percent 
food inflation rate and 55 percent overall inflation rate, a 
rising budget deficit, a trade deficit that has ballooned 
beyond USD 4 billion, the worst drought crisis since 2002, 
and harsh international criticism of human rights abuse in 
Somalia and the Ogaden have put the Prime Minister on the 
defensive and raised serious debate within the Central 
Committee on how to address and manage these issues.  More 
concerning has been discussion within the Committee of an 
anticipated deterioration in U.S. relations after the next 
U.S. presidential election in November as Committee members 
firmly believe the U.S. will press Ethiopia on human rights 
and democratic reforms as the centerpiece of its policy 
towards Ethiopia. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) In engaging with Ethiopian officials, whether on 
human rights or counterterrorism issues, the Ambassador has 
stressed the importance of Ethiopia as a cornerstone country 
with a broad-based and complex, yet mutually supportive, 
relationship with the U.S.  For instance, the Prime Minister 
and his government have been strong partners with the U.S. on 
counterterrorism and humanitarian relief efforts and both 
countries have discussed developmental issues with the U.S. 
focused more on trying to expand developmental assistance. 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002112  002 OF 004 
 
 
To correct misunderstandings, Prime Minister Meles and other 
senior Ethiopian officials have suggested closer 
U.S.-Ethiopian bilateral talks, similar to the ones conducted 
with China, India and Japan.  Such discussions would be 
useful as the U.S. expands activities in Ethiopia from trade 
and development support for closer information sharing and 
cooperation on counterterrorism.  Easing Ethiopian anxieties 
and highlighting our shared interests and programs will best 
achieve our core objectives and improve our bilateral 
relationship without undermining the internal stability of 
the Central Committee or ultimately Meles, political 
position.  End Summary. 
 
THE POWERFUL CENTRAL COMMITTEE: COMPROMISING DECISIONS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF) The Central Committee is composed of 225 members 
from the four regional component parties within the EPRDF 
coalition.  The Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) 
forms the main and most powerful part of the Central 
Committee.  The smaller and more important decision making 
Executive Committee or "Politburo" is composed of 36 members. 
 Prime Minister Meles clearly does not rule with unquestioned 
authority and needs to forge consensus to advance his agenda, 
which he must compromise to secure approval.  Prime Minister 
Meles, decision to release last summer 71 political 
detainees arrested after the 2005 elections was criticized by 
the Central Committee.  Meles was persuasive and secured the 
Committee's support, expending political capital in the 
process, though earning international support.  The Central 
Committee has also questioned the Prime Minister's posture on 
the Eritrean border conflict.  The Prime Minister was 
supportive of a post-UNMEE (United Nations Mission to Eritrea 
and Ethiopia) military observer mission.  However, General 
Samora was highly critical of any foreign observers and 
quickly nixed the process.  The Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister Seyoum were persuaded to shift positions and 
criticized the lack of support from the Security Council in 
changing their mind to oppose a follow-on UNMEE mission. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) The recently proposed CSO law, which had the 
support of hard-liners in the Central Committee, was delayed 
by the Prime Minister and Committee moderates in the wake of 
strong international criticism and calls for revision.  The 
delay has angered hard-liners in the Central Committee and 
divided some of its members, such as the Relief Society of 
Tigray's (REST) influential Director Teklewoini Assefa, who 
receives USAID funding and is leading efforts to revise the 
law.  In our July 30 meeting, the Prime Minister argued that 
the Central Committee's anger with CSOs/NGOs has brought the 
Central Committee into direct opposition to the aggressive 
posture of the CSOs/NGOs towards the government over the 
proposed law.  This has so politicized and "poisoned" 
discussion of the law that Meles has become the arbiter 
trying to mediate differences among those hard-liners within 
the Central Committee supportive of restrictions of CSOs/NGOs 
and other members who favor discussion. 
 
TOUGH HARD-LINERS ON THE OUTSIDE 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S/NF) General Samora, Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian 
military, is not a member of the Central Committee but holds 
a powerful position as head of the military.  General Samora 
has now become one of the most powerful figures in Ethiopian 
politics.  He has done so through his partnership with 
hard-liners in the Central Committee and his actions of 
replacing generals -- mostly Western trained and highly 
skilled non-Tigrayans -- with not necessarily qualified 
Tigrayans who are loyal to Samora.  Samora also succeeded 
through his superb bureaucratic infighting in getting one 
pro-U.S. State Minister of Defense dismissed and securing his 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002112  003 OF 004 
 
 
position as more powerful than the Minister of Defense. 
Getachew Assefa, chief of the National Intelligence and 
Security Service, is not a skilled bureaucrat nor is he liked 
by others in his own agency.  His position as head of the 
intelligence service, however, automatically makes him an 
important player.  Getachew is very much like General Samora; 
they lack the support and respect their predecessors 
commanded.  Samora and Getachew are perhaps "tougher" 
hard-liners than their hard-line supporters within the 
Central Committee. 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE HARD-LINERS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S/NF) Hard-line Central Committee members form the 
majority of the Central and Executive Committees, from people 
like Sebhat Nega, Abadi Zemo, and most of the other dominant 
Tigrayan members of the Committees.  Yet these members do not 
oppose the U.S., per se, but are fundamentally wedded to 
maintaining tight EPRDF control over the levers of power and 
influence in Ethiopia.  They seek specific benefits from the 
U.S. to meet their overall objectives.  More important, they 
share a common agenda of greater government control of 
institutions and procedures which corresponds to their views 
of "Revolutionary Democracy" (Ref. A) which asserts that 
government oversight is critical until a middle class is 
formed, under government auspices. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) Interestingly, both Samora and Getachew support 
Israel as well as China, and to a certain extent India and 
Russia, because these countries do not raise human rights in 
their dialogue with the government and they provide some 
benefits from military arms sales to low interest loans. 
Samora's outward views have become more pronounced since he 
took over his position in 2001.  A commander of moderate 
success, Samora rules the military with a heavy hand and 
never misses an opportunity to criticize the U.S. for its 
"wrong" decision of tying military assistance to human 
rights.  He is especially critical of the suspension of the 
delivery of Humvees after the 2005 national election in which 
ENDF forces used U.S. procured Humvees to quell violent 
demonstrations.  In dialogue with U.S. officials, Samora and 
other GoE officials have pointed to this event as evidence of 
the U.S. as not a completely trustworthy ally. 
 
¶9. (S/NF) Samora and Getachew have not been the most 
supportive elements for U.S. relations and have undercut some 
U.S. initiatives and opposed other U.S. programs.  General 
Samora, for instance, has prevented the United States from 
mitigating the popular lure of extremists by expelling 
CJTF-HOA civil affairs teams from the Ogaden in 2006 and has 
ended Ethiopian officers' training in the U.S., though mostly 
out of fear of his officers not returning, but he has 
nevertheless focused on training in Russia, China and India 
as a counter weight to the U.S.  Prime Minister Meles has 
used both to pass unpleasant decisions to the U.S.  For 
instance, in the wake of the AC-130 gunship strikes in 
Somalia from Ethiopian bases in early-2007 -- which Samora 
opposed and Meles supported -- the program ended as a result 
of press leaks from the U.S.  Samora was the main conveyor of 
the bad news which he always delivers with firmness and, we 
suspect, partial enjoyment.  For his part, Getachew has 
prevented FBI access to individuals of national security 
interest in Ethiopian custody (Ref. B). 
 
ADVOCATING U.S. POLICY MUST BE JUDICIOUS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (S/NF) The U.S. is important to Ethiopia and the Central 
Committee frequently discusses U.S. policy.  The Prime 
Minister has called in the Ambassador for private discussions 
on U.S. politics and delves into details of American foreign 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002112  004 OF 004 
 
 
policy issues with American visitors.  Many Central Committee 
members do not fully understand American issues or the world 
around them.  A troubling trend has been the growing belief 
that the EPRDF must brace itself for a tougher and more 
confrontational relationship with the U.S. after the next 
presidential election, as the U.S. takes on human rights and 
democratic reforms as the centerpiece of bilateral policy 
over the current cooperation on counterterrorism.  General 
Samora and Getachew are very much share this assumption, as 
do hard-liners from the Central Committee and Executive 
Committee of the EPRDF, particularly from members from the 
Tigray region, the power base of the EPRDF.  General Samora 
and hard-line Central Committee members reject the U.S. 
linking assistance and benefits and associating issues to 
human rights.  The Ambassador has explained that 
U.S.-Ethiopian relations are complex and while human rights 
and democratic reforms are a fundamental priority for U.S. 
policy, the U.S. has a wide range of issues where the U.S. 
and Ethiopia have a very positive relationship.  This 
includes counterterrorism cooperation, emergency humanitarian 
relief efforts, development assistance programs, and mutual 
concern for regional instability and other issues. 
 
MOVING FORWARD 
-------------- 
 
¶11. (S/NF) It is clear that in engaging Ethiopian officials 
in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy priorities -- particularly 
on human rights and democratic reforms -- we must carefully 
consider, and mitigate against any potential unintended 
consequences of our actions on Ethiopia's highly fluid 
internal political debate, which easily misinterprets and 
thinks the worst is yet to come.  If our actions do undercut 
the Prime Minister or yield tougher responses from hard-line 
members, we could find advocating for our position and 
achieving results more difficult and relations more 
antagonistic with the ruling party. 
 
¶12. (S/NF) The Ethiopian government has suggested convening 
close bilateral discussions with the U.S. similar to those 
handled with China, India, and Japan to help advance better 
understanding.  Such discussions would help underscore the 
importance of our bilateral posture advocating for more 
political debate over issues of concern.  Further, bilateral 
discussions will help U.S. relations with Ethiopia, as well 
as guide U.S. interlocutors in navigating issues to focus on, 
issues to avoid, approaches to delicate issues we expect to 
disagree on, and common messages to advance as we explain our 
position and the intricacies of U.S. decision making and also 
ease their anxieties and misinterpretations.  In this 
context, the Ambassador and Embassy staff have made it a 
priority to meet with and discuss issues with the Central 
Committee members, who welcome the intervention.  Further, 
only the U.S. has taken this measure, which will ultimately 
enhance our relations. 
YAMAMOTO