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C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000195 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM, 
NSC FOR DOWLEY, JCS FOR J5/NORWOOD/CAMPBELL, 
OSD FOR ISA/PERENYI 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (ADDED SIPDIS CAPTION) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2009 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG - END OF WINTER/SPRING ROUND: RUSSIAN VIEW 
GAINING TRACTION ON PACE OF FRIED-ANTONOV MEETINGS 
 
Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour, 
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  During the course of the JCG's January-July 
session with 20 weekly meetings, Allies led by the U.S. 
repeatedly criticized Russia's instances of noncompliance, 
underscored the importance of Russia negotiating seriously on 
the basis of the parallel actions package, called on Russia 
to return to full implementation of the CFE Treaty, and 
supported U.S. negotiating strategies and leadership.  While 
the Allies most inclined to criticize Russia were Germany, 
Britain, Romania and Turkey, the USDel often encouraged a 
half dozen or so states to pile on with criticism of Russia 
each week, depending on the topic under discussion.  For its 
part, Russia complained about the European security landscape 
status quo, blamed Allies (the U.S. in particular) for the 
current crisis, and defended Putin's decision to suspend CFE 
implementation. 
 
¶2. (C) As the session wore on, Russia increasingly took shots 
at the U.S. over the pace of talks, saying there have been 
only two U.S.-Russia meetings for negotiations since 
late-November 2007.  Claiming it has always been ready to 
hold talks at more regular intervals, Russia called for 
supplementary meetings at lower levels--bilateral and/or with 
concerned treaty partners, in Vienna, Brussels, and/or 
elsewhere--to support the Fried-Antonov channel.  This 
culminated in July, with Russia introducing a key topic from 
the parallel actions package which does not belong in the 
JCG, i.e., Russia's proposed definition of "substantial 
combat forces." 
 
¶3. (C) The U.S. delegation accomplished all JCG-related tasks 
assigned.  Inter alia, Allied solidarity held publicly in the 
JCG, motivated by Allied reporting of Russian non-compliance 
and the Allies' program of "focused dialogue" for the JCG, 
both buttressed by the 28 March NAC Statement on CFE.  At the 
same time, seen from the Vienna perspective, Allies privately 
are becoming clearly apprehensive over the pace and format of 
bilateral negotiations, i.e., they are increasingly 
understanding of Russia's unfair allegation that the U.S. is 
not negotiating seriously with Russia as evidenced by the 
number of meetings.  The end of round finds Allies still 
solidly in support of the parallel actions package concept, 
if unsure of its details.  Nonetheless, many Allies, even 
Britain, are concerned about Russia's prospects of successful 
wedge driving using the pace of the Fried-Antonov talks, and 
that some Allies may be tempted to freelance and/or assert a 
leadership role in the fall, speculate on what will follow 
CFE, or show interest in Medvedev's pan-European security 
initiative.  Moreover, many Allies are decidedly more 
sympathetic to Russia's siren call to draw the U.S. and/or 
Allies into "supportive" discussions at lower levels on 
elements of the package.  End summary. 
 
Opening of Round--Vienna's Supporting Role 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4. (C) The winter round of the JCG opened following Russia's 
suspension of implementation of CFE on December 12, 2007, 
with the U.S. negotiating the parallel actions package on 
behalf of Allies, bilaterally with Russia at the 
Fried-Antonov level.  The HLTF remained the primary forum for 
coordination of Alliance CFE policy, while the JCG assumed a 
supporting role, providing a useful venue for highlighting 
Russian compliance failures while the U.S. continued 
negotiation efforts elsewhere.  Specifically, the U.S. 
Mission to the OSCE was charged with: 
 
-- Calling Russia out on all acts of non-compliance. 
-- Reaffirming the importance of all State Parties to fully 
implement the Treaty while urging Russia to reverse its 
suspension. 
-- Dissuading others from following Russia's example. 
-- Maintaining Allied solidarity in support of U.S. 
negotiating strategies. 
-- Sustaining previously discussed Allied position on 
Russia's concerns. 
-- Sustaining U.S. positions on the Treaty Operations 
Implementation Working Group. 
 
-- Discussing acts of non-compliance with others (e.g., 
Azerbaijan's exceeding TLE limits.) 
 
The Mission accomplished all of the tasks assigned. 
 
Alliance Solidarity Holds, for Now 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5. (C) Throughout the session, Allied support of U.S. 
strategy to resolve the CFE crisis remained steadfast in the 
JCG.  At the same time, public solidarity belied private 
misgivings by some Allies over the lack of progress in the 
U.S.-Russian bilateral format.  From the outset of the 
session Allies remained lockstep, publicly in the JCG, with 
the U.S. over core concepts such as the value of CFE, the 
importance of Russia returning to full implementation, and 
that the parallel actions plan represented the only option 
for achieving ratification of ACFE.  Allies also consistently 
stepped forward to call out Russia for failing to fulfill 
their Treaty obligations and in each case, Allies underlined 
the importance of the Treaty, to support the parallel actions 
package and to urge Russia to return to full implementation 
of the CFE Treaty. 
 
¶6. (C) At the same time, as early as January, Allied 
reservations over the format and progress of bilateral 
negotiations surfaced in the JCG-T. These misgivings 
increased during the course of the session. Germany 
(Richter)--as has been the case for two years--was 
particularly vocal, lobbying Allies to increase the intensity 
of dialogue in Vienna.  German attitudes were fueled by 
repeated Russian claims in the JCG that the bilateral process 
was all but stalled and that supplementary technical 
discussions in Brussels or Vienna would support bilateral 
negotiations. 
 
¶7. (C) Occasional Russian compliments on Germany's 
willingness to engage in professional dialogue also 
encouraged Germany to push the edge of the envelope while 
others held a tighter line.  Still, Russian rhetoric drew 
others into the debate from time to time including 
Luxembourg, France and Greece.  Acting without instructions, 
Luxemburg (Pilot) made an especially unhelpful intervention 
in a February JCG-T, recommending that Allies begin to 
discuss post-CFE alternatives.  While Allied anxiety never 
reached unmanageable levels, USDel, the United Kingdom, 
Netherlands and others at times had to remind Allies to 
withstand the temptation to disaggregate the package by 
getting drawn into discussions on specifics. 
 
Calling Out Russia on its non-Compliance 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8. (C) The reservations expressed by some Allies in Vienna at 
following a policy of "active patience"--a termed coined by 
the United Kingdom (Ford) at the 6 May HLTF--was mitigated, 
in part, by consistent Allied reporting of Russian 
noncompliance, the energy generated by an orchestrated 
program of "focused dialogue," and the endorsement of the 28 
March NAC statement by Heads of States and Governments in 
Bucharest.  Allies were quick to take up the cause of calling 
out Russia for its compliance failures.  The U.S. took the 
lead on this process 8 February, followed by GE, US, GE, HU, 
BE, TU, GR, GE, RO and NL and with FR, CA, CZ, GR, IT and SP 
also actively participating. 
 
¶9. (C) By the end of round, Russia had refused 14 
inspections, and had failed to provide the 2008 annual data, 
quarterly data on Kushchevskaya, and the July "flank" data. 
USDel often encouraged a half dozen or more states each week, 
depending on the topic under discussion, to pile on with 
criticism of Russia.  At each infraction, Allies coordinated 
a unified response in the JCG-T for the JCG, which consisted 
of a primary intervention from the affected party followed by 
one or more supportive statements. 
 
"Focused dialogue" and NAC Statement 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (C)  Allies also developed a program of "focused 
 
dialogue" to serve as a vehicle to address Russian calls for 
dialogue in Vienna through discussion of relevant CFE/ACFE 
topics, while avoiding negotiations on package elements.  In 
all, five Allies (UK, CA, RO, HU and GE) made six 
presentations, which were intended to assuage Russian 
concerns and support the Allied positions.  Predictably, 
Germany, the most vocal of Allies in its calls for more 
intensive discussions in Vienna, made two presentations and 
also the most technical and detailed.  However, if Germany 
and other Allies hoped to draw Russia back into 
implementation through their persuasive arguments, then the 
Allies came up short, as most of these presentations failed 
to strike a cord with the Russian delegation. 
 
¶11. (C) The NAC Statement of 28 March on CFE had an 
immediate, but temporary, positive impact on Allied 
solidarity, and dissension subsided in the JCG-T as Germany 
focused on the fact that NATO now had an approved proposal. 
The decision and its subsequent endorsement in Bucharest also 
focused negative attention on Russia's failure to provide an 
official response to the offer, a point GE pressed repeatedly 
from April on. 
 
Russia's calls for dialogue on package specifics 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12. (C) Nevertheless, the Mission assesses that Russia's 
calls for substantive dialogue on package specifics will 
increasingly resonate with Allies in the absence of 
noticeable progress in bilateral talks.  The prospect of 
taking Russia to task for every infraction is becoming stale 
and some have advocated skipping repetitive statements in the 
JCG in favor of simply noting an inspection refusal or 
missing data as a routine entry for record.  In act, as 
early as April, Belgium required pressurefrom the U.S. even 
to make an intervention aboutthe refusal of their 
inspection.  Without a clear understanding of how continued 
reporting will ipact negotiations, taking Russia to task 
will loe much of its initial appeal. 
 
¶13. (C) Likewise, llies see few ways to extend the agenda on 
focusd dialogue without becoming repetitive and have ha 
little appetite to do so.  Some have argued that Allies could 
reduce the frequency of meetings without sacrificing the 
Allied objective of reporting Russia's non-compliance, 
although Germany strongly wants to keep the full schedule of 
weekly meetings intact.  Finally, Russia at times has told 
Mission and others that it is waiting until after he U.S. 
election, at least, to see how much more it can get.  Most 
Allies also perceive that the ucoming U.S. presidential 
election season followe by a transition and an initial 
period of policyreview will further delay progress. 
 
Russia's Cosistent Drum Beat on its "Big 3" 
- - -  - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶14. (C) The Russian delegation to the JCG, ld by Head of 
Military Security and Arms Control delegation, Mikhail 
Ulyaov, remained on point and hammered away with a 
consistent message throughout the session.  Russia's 
underlying objective from the beginning of the session seemed 
to be that of bringing negotiations on the parallel actions 
package to Vienna.  Russia has attempted to "disaggregate" 
the parallel actions package and has tried to tempt Allies 
into dissecting the parallel actions package as early as 
February.  Russia consistently deconstructed Allied 
statements in hope of fleshing out the issues surrounding 
various pieces of the package text. 
 
¶15. (C) Perhaps in an attempt to test the waters, Belarus 
introduced a decision on Provisional Application 
(JCG.DEL/02/08) of the adapted Treaty in early February. 
Russia strongly supported the proposal, noting that while it 
would not be a panacea, it should be part of the package and 
could, after agreement, lead to Russia returning to Treaty 
implementation.  After initial discussions, Russia attempted 
to bait Allies by characterizing he positions as "coming 
closer," and then attemping to show how Allied objections to 
provisional pplication could be overcome.  Allies failed to 
ite and in the face of intense Allied opposition Russia 
 
finally dropped discussion of provisional application, 
turning its attention toward specific elements of the 
package. 
 
¶16. (C) Beginning in April Russia began a constant chant that 
the JCG should take up discussions on the definition of 
"substantial combat forces," criteria for accession by NATO 
members that are not States Parties, and lowering NATO's 
"collective ceilings."  While other points came and went, 
these "big three" remained on Russia's wish list.  Russia has 
focused most of its attention on pinning down a definition 
for "substantial combat forces," and by the end of round 
Russia had tabled a proposed definition. 
 
¶17. (C) Russia also attempted, with little success, to begin 
discussions now on terms for immediate accession of the 
Baltic States, hoping to hold them to agreed numbers later 
during the accession process.  Ulyanov noted in his final 
statement of the round that Russia had adjusted their 
position from wanting to discuss accession of these States to 
CFE, in favor of discussing their accession to ACFE. Finally, 
Russia wanted to address the changed European security 
landscape by "restoring the military balance."  Ulyanov 
called for all current States Parties belonging to NATO to 
reduce their individual current and future (under ACFE) 
ceilings so as not to exceed the level prescribed for the 
Western Group of States Parties in the current Treaty. 
Russia would prefer this to being allowed to increase its own 
ceilings.  While a consistent talking point, Russia did not 
push this issue during the last couple months of the session. 
 
 
¶18. (C) The intensity of Russia'a lobbying for discussion on 
the big three in Vienna increased as the session wore on. 
Finally, in July, Russia tabled its own proposed definition 
of "substantial combat forces" and had their proposal added 
as an agenda item for the final session.  During the last 
meeting, Ulyanov drew on the number of Allied interventions 
regarding their proposal, while disregarding Allies' general 
negative tone, to conclude that initial discussions had been 
productive.  On the margins Ulyanov remarked to USDel that it 
could expect more of the same in the future. 
 
¶19. (C) Supporting Ulyanov's bid to move negotiations to 
Vienna were Russia's now familiar talking points, inter alia: 
 
 
--  NATO and the U.S. are responsible for Russia's moratorium. 
--  Russia has fulfilled its Istanbul commitments long ago. 
--  The moratorium is consistent with international law. 
--  ACFE is discriminatory toward Russia, especially on 
flanks. 
--  The U.S. is not negotiating seriously, as evidenced by 
the small number of meetings. 
--  Russia sees the parallel actions package as Russian 
actions for NATO promises. 
 
Russia's changing tactics 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶20. (C) While Russia's message remained constant, its tactics 
evolved somewhat through the session.  At the outset in 
January, Russia called for more substantive discussion in the 
JCG.  As noted above, Russia initially used Belarus as a 
surrogate to propose provisional application.  In April, 
Russia refocused its attention on the big three and increased 
its calls for active dialogue in Vienna. By May Russia was 
actively lobbing individual Allies, attempting to sow 
discontent with U.S. leadership and its resistance to holding 
discussions in a more inclusive format.  Germany seemed to be 
Russia's preferred conduit, being the first to warn Allies in 
a June JCG-T that Russia will likely present concrete 
proposals in the JCG on the "secondary issues that risen to 
the forefront." 
 
¶21. (C)  Russia also tried to create a sense of urgency in 
the JCG when its Ulyanov opted out of three consecutive 
meetings in June--a tactic that Russia likely thought would 
draw concern from the other States Parties.  However, the 
impact of his absence was negligible and it had no bearing on 
 
the substance of discussions in the JCG.  Finally, Russia has 
attempted to increase pressure by submitting specific 
proposal on a definition of substantial combat forces, again, 
noting they intend to table more in the future. 
 
Russia Remains Defiant 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶22. (C) Russia's initial reaction to Allied statements of 
Russian non-compliance was one of feigned confusion, surprise 
and several times, unpleasant sarcasm.  Russia noted 
President Putin signed Russia's suspension into law, and that 
it should not surprise Allies if Russia did exactly as called 
for under Russian law.  On July 9, a day following the JCG 
Plenary in which States Parties criticized the eleventh 
inspection refusal of Russia, Ulyanov told the USDel that 
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov was "very angry" with the 
U.S. for continuing this tactic of making an issue out of 
each act of non-compliance.  By the end of the round, Russia 
seemed resigned to the fact that they would be criticized for 
every refused inspection and missed data exchange.  When the 
U.S. called out Russia on 22 July over a missed inspection, 
the Russian delegation listened silently. 
 
¶23. (C) As the session closes, the Russian Federation 
continues to push for discussions on the definition of 
"substantial combat forces," accession of the Baltic States 
and Slovenia, and the lowering ceilings of all NATO States 
Parties.  Indeed, a written Russian proposal "Defining 
Substantial combat Forces" was presented by Russia (Ulyanov) 
on July 15. 
 
¶24. (C) Throughout the session the vast majority of debate 
occurred between Allies and Russia. With the exception of 
moderate support from Belarus, no other SP fell in on the 
side of Russia.  Kazakhstan never took the floor.  While two 
meetings witnessed Azerbaijan and Armenia square off over 
Nogorno-Kharabakh, there was no indication during the session 
that any non NATO SP was considering suspension. 
 
The Azerbaijani Wildcard 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶25. (SBU) Azerbaijan, however, remains a wildcard. 
Azerbaijani reps have told us that they do not believe that 
Azerbaijan will be able to ratify ACFE with the current TLE 
limits.  USDel has repeatedly heard that Azerbaijan's 
National and Territorial Ceilings in ACFE are insufficient 
and its reps are worried about U.S. and NATO statements that 
ACFE will only be reviewed after its entry into force. 
Azerbaijan has made several interventions (the first back 
during the Third Review Conference) that it considers itself 
in a state of "force-majeure" regarding the Treaty.  It 
regularly complains about the imbalance of its forces in 
comparison to Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. 
 
Broken TOI's 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶26. (C) The outgoing Chair (Fardellotti, Italy) held several 
informal sessions, and two "official" sessions.  Russia 
(Solomenko) argued (rebutted by the U.S.) that future TOI 
work should focus only on ACFE issues.  The only item 
discussed in any detail, and agreed, was that the POET Chair 
(Linteau, Canada) would become the next TOI Chair.  USDel 
provided significant expertise and advice to both working 
group chairs, mainly to discourage bad ideas from surfacing 
in a vacuum.  USDel coached both chairs on current 
negotiations, historical disagreements, and a way forward, to 
include some of the tasks that will be required to bring ACFE 
entry into force. 
 
Conclusion/Expectations -- Restless Allies 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶27. (C) Allies will remain on board initially, but with 
continuing growing apprehension in the absence of clear 
signals that progress is forthcoming.  From a Vienna 
perspective, it all depends on perceived progress and efforts 
made, especially by the U.S., in the Fried-Antonov talks. 
 
Any perceived further loss of momentum seen to be caused by 
upcoming U.S. elections and administration transition will 
put pressure on Allied solidarity.  In the absence of any 
progress toward an agreement on the parallel actions plan, 
more Allies may begin to echo Luxemburg's question, i.e., 
what will follow CFE; and Medvedev's pan-European security 
initiative will provide at a minimum, some curiosity. 
 
¶28. (C) Russia will continue to press for dialogue up to and 
including negotiation of elements of the parallel action plan 
in Vienna, Brussels or elsewhere, to "support" the 
higher-level bilat talks.  It will continue to hammer the 
U.S. for the pace of negotiations and is almost certain to 
continue to criticize U.S. leadership privately to individual 
Allies.  USDel also expects Russia to table additional 
papers/proposals this fall in an attempt to draw out 
discussion on accession and "collective ceilings." 
 
¶29. (C) Seen from the Vienna perspective, Allies privately 
are becoming clearly more apprehensive over the pace and 
format of bilateral negotiations.  Nonetheless, Allies will 
remain on board as long as support holds in the HLTF.  It 
will become very hard, however, to encourage Allied 
interventions in the JCG critical of Russia in the manner of 
the session that just ended.  Lack of momentum, moreover, 
will motivate Germany and others to seek policy changes in 
capitals, especially if they perceive that local negotiations 
on specific technical points can support continued bilateral 
negotiations. 
SCOTT