VZCZCXRO5590
PP RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0194/01 2061622
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241622Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5855
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0563
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1118
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1062
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD/XPXC//
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5-T/ECPLAD/ECCS//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-E/DDPMA-IN/CAC//
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000194 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA 
JCS FOR J5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR DOWLEY 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2009 
TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE XG
SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC: 23 JULY PLENARY: NAVAL CSBMS--ALLIES 
VERY SKEPTICAL, STOP SHORT OF OUTRIGHT "NO" TO RUSSIA 
 
REF: STATE 73257 
 
Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour, 
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The final meeting of the OSCE,s Forum for 
Security Cooperation (FSC) of the winter/spring session 
included a presentation by Ireland on the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions (Dublin agreement).  Russia Also led a 
discussion under Security Dialogue on its Naval CSBM 
proposal.  Britain, Canada, Italy, Greece, France, Germany, 
Ukraine, Latvia, Finland and Sweden joined the U.S. in 
expressing various levels of skepticism over Russia's 
proposal.  None supported it.  Citing CFE suspension, Canada 
also rejected it outright. 
 
¶2. (U) Reports were also provided by the Chef de File for the 
FSC contribution to the ASRC and by Chairperson of the 
Informal Group of Friends on SALW on the recent biennial 
meeting of states on the UN program of action on SALW.  The 
Chair (Estonia) ended the session by reporting on the work 
accomplished during Estonia's chairmanship. End summary. 
 
Russia Promotes Its Naval CSBM Proposal 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Russia (Ulyanov) provided a presentation on Russia's 
Naval CSBM proposal, first distributed 4 July under 
FSC.DEL/120/08.  Ulyanov stressed that he wanted to engage in 
a dialogue and welcomed all comments, "both pro and con."  He 
began by attempting to address some of the criticism he 
expected to receive. He pointed out that the proposal is 
meant to improve transparency on a significant military 
capability not currently covered by a CSBM. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ulyanov noted that pS always ask the question, "Does 
Russia perceive a threat that this CSBM would address?"  In 
response, he said that each pS has the right to raise issues 
not only concerning their own security, but also issues 
affecting pan-European security.  The Russian proposal would 
add to, not detract from, transparency and security. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ulyanov referenced Ukraine's work in the Black Sea 
sub-regional CSBM as a positive, if limited example.  On the 
pan-European level, we have only one minor reference to naval 
forces in the Global Exchange of Military Information, and 
that refers to aggregate naval force levels. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ulyanov then said the in Russia's view the following 
are Pros: 
 
-- Since three out of four sides of Europe are surrounded by 
seas, it is only logical to cover those areas with CSBMs. 
The proposal only applies to the seas bordering pS. 
 
-- Russia's proposals are modest and similar to those 
employed for land forces. 
 
-- The proposal does not impact current law of the sea 
because they only apply to planned exercises. 
 
¶7. (SBU) He then proceeded to describe what Russia viewed as 
legitimate but surmountable concerns. 
 
-- There are those who say the measure lacks reciprocity as 
not all pS have naval assets, we can dismiss this but could, 
 
USOSCE 00000194  002 OF 005 
 
 
hypothetically, overcome this issue under Chapter X, with an 
agreement only among those pS with navies. However, we would 
rather not segregate sP into groups. Not all pS have 
territory in Europe or have armed forces, but all pS enjoy 
the same rights and privileges. 
 
-- Some pS require verifiability. Russia believes that 
National technical Means is sufficient for this, however, if 
other want verifiable measures, we can discuss it. 
 
-- Some argue that there will be an added cost. Transparency 
has a price, and in this case it is minimal and related to 
visits.  But if the added cost is beyond resources of some 
pS, we can look at non-standard solutions, such as requiring 
the requesting pS to bear the cost of the visit. 
 
-- The measure has been tabled twice before--once in the days 
of the cold war and once in the late 90's--and it was 
rejected twice.  We think this measure might be a good test 
to see if the old block mentality as changed. 
 
Skepticism of Russian Proposal 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) In all, twelve pS, including the U.S., responded to 
Russia's presentation.  Most noted that their comments were 
preliminary, and half remarked that Russia's proposal would 
require some time to thoroughly study.  None suggested a time 
when they would finish their "study."  The majority 
registered skepticism, noting that nothing had changed in the 
proposal since the last time it was rejected in 1999, and 
that even Russia conceded in the proposal that there is no 
current security concern posed by naval forces in the zone of 
application.  Others touched on more technical aspects such 
as the definition of the "zone of application," "combat 
vessels"...etc but most offered to at least consider the 
proposal.  Canada (Gosal) was particularly critical, stating 
that more should be done to ensure current CSBMs are being 
fully implemented before considering new CSBMs.  Canada was 
also the only pS to publicly link its pessimism to Russia's 
suspension of its obligations under CFE. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Without rejecting Russia's proposal outright, the 
U.S. (Neighbour) pointed out that the U.S. sees no added 
value in discussing the proposal because there is no 
recognized security concern to be addressed with a CSBM. 
Naval CSBMs were discussed and dismissed before in the OSCE, 
including long after the Cold War ended.  Neighbour concluded 
that in the absence of a concern to address, the U.S. did not 
see how it would be productive to discuss measures which do 
not provide any collective benefit to OSCE states. 
 
¶10. (SBU) To counter Russia's point that transparency is 
important even in the absence of a specific security concern, 
the UK (Gare) said that the UK is in favor of transparency, 
but it should shed light on areas where others are concerned. 
 She emphasized the difference between the need for CSBMs on 
land which is sovereign territory, and at sea, i.e., 
international waters where anyone can go at will.  Gare 
added, "There is no transparency with the Forum regarding the 
layout of my dining room furniture, but there is also no 
concern.  I would be happy to invite the Forum to my home to 
let them view the layout of my dining room furniture if there 
was a concern. Transparency for transparency's sake is not a 
security benefit." (Note: Shortly after the FSC meeting the 
Spanish Mission sent an official Note Verbale to the United 
 
USOSCE 00000194  003 OF 005 
 
 
Kingdom requesting permission to inspect Gare's dining room 
for "furniture of mass destruction." End note.) 
 
¶11. (SBU) Additional interventions expressing various degrees 
of skepticism were made by Italy, Greece, France, Germany, 
Ukraine, Latvia, Finland and Sweden.  To Ulyanov's 
discomfort, Italy pointed out that Russia,s proposal would 
cover Allied ships operating in the Persian Gulf.  Finland 
and Sweden both observed that the tonnage threshold was set 
so high and their naval ships today are so small, that that 
not a single one of their naval units would be covered by the 
CSBM. 
 
Deaf to Hints, Russia Ignores Skepticism 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Ignoring the trend, Ulyanov responded by thanking all 
pS for the constructive comments and noted with pleasure that 
the proposal had generated a great deal of discussion.  He 
confirmed that the current proposal had not changed from 
previous proposals, explaining that Russia understands that 
there is no consensus on Naval CSBMs, and therefore a bolder 
proposal would be pointless.  He also noted that Russia had 
no special reason for tabling this proposal now other than to 
respond in part to the Madrid Ministerial decision requesting 
that the FSC review CSBMs. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Ulyanov pushed back against Canada's comments, 
stating that there is no reason that the FSC can not improve 
the implementation of existing CSBMs while working on new 
measures, and flatly rejected any connection between CFE and 
Russia's current naval proposal.  Russia concluded by stating 
that the Russian proposal is not a "take it or leave it 
proposal" and that Russia is open to discussion on any aspect 
of the proposal.  Ulyanov said Russia looked forward to 
further discussion, and said he would like to see another 
discussion on the plenary, followed by more technical 
discussions in the appropriate Working Groups. 
 
¶14. (C) Afterwards, Ulyanov privately told USDel (Neighbour) 
that irrespective of skepticism expressed, he was pleased 
with the discussion, that there had been a lot of engagement. 
 When USDel reminded him that nobody had favored, and that 
while the U.S. had not slammed the door shut, the view of the 
U.S. and many was that discussing a naval CSBM would not be 
productive, Ulyanov said that was not a problem.  He then 
launched into an attack on Canada and questioned Ottawa's 
right to have a voice in the OSCE. 
 
¶15. (C) Note: In a separate conversation on the margins with 
USDel (Meyer) the incoming FSC Chair, (Finland, Kangaste) 
opined that Russia may have tabled a decision they know will 
fail in order to build a case for submitting a negative 
report on CSBMs to Ministers in Helsinki, with the objective 
of reporting that the CSBM regime is broken. Both Finland and 
Germany (in previous discussions) opined on a link between 
Russia's recent actions in the FSC regarding CSBMs and 
Medvedev's Pan-European Security initiative. End Note. 
 
Cluster Munitions Convention 
---------------------------- 
 
¶16. (U) Lieutenant Colonel J. Burke from Ireland's Defense 
Forces also provided the Security Dialogue with a 
presentation on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which 
was agreed in Dublin on May 30, 2008.  LTC Burke touched on 
 
USOSCE 00000194  004 OF 005 
 
 
the basic characteristics of cluster munitions, concerns 
countries have with their use, the evolution of discussions 
from small group of like-minded states in 2002 to a consensus 
on the convention by 111 states in Dublin this year.  While 
pleased with the results from Dublin, Burke noted that 90 
percent of current stockpiles of these munitions are held by 
non States Parties to the convention. (LTC Burke's briefing 
has been distributed as FSC.DEL/134.08) 
 
¶17. (U) France (Simonet) reported on its parallel work on the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva, 
the goal of which is to bring in other states that are not 
signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.  France, 
and the United Kingdom (Gare) asked Burke to comment on 
efforts to bring others into the fold.  Spain recounted its 
recent decision to emplace a unilateral ban on the 
production, trade and use of such munitions. 
 
¶18. (U) The U.S. (Neighbour) reported on recent change to 
U.S. Department of Defense policy on cluster munitions. 
Drawing from Reftel, Neighbour explained the new U.S. policy 
objectives, timelines and efforts toward clearing areas 
affected by such munitions. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Following the U.S. statement, Burke noted that 
while the U.S. policy does not go as far as the convention, 
it does represent a welcome significant step.  To reinforce 
this point, Burke noted that unexploded munitions which were 
rendered safe through a self-destruct or self-disarming 
mechanism did not count toward the U.S. one percent 
acceptable failure rate, giving the U.S. an even more 
rigorous standard.  He also said the new U.S. standard was to 
be measured in a natural environment, not under ideal 
laboratory conditions.  Burke's largely helpful comments 
reinforced the U.S. position. 
 
Reports and other Business 
-------------------------- 
 
¶20. (U) Following Security Dialogue, the Chef de File for the 
FSC, (Finland, Kangaste) presented a brief report on the FSC 
contribution to the 2008 ASRC.  The Chairperson for the 
Informal Group of friends on SALW (Belarus, Pavlov) followed 
with a report on the Third Biennial Meeting of States on the 
2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate 
the Illicit trade in SALW in All its Aspects.  The reports 
have been issued under FSC.DEL/139/08, and SEC.GAL/125/08 
respectively. 
 
¶21. (U) Under any other business, Ireland reported it had 
endorsed the statement of principles to the Global Initiative 
to Combat the Spread of Nuclear terrorism and had notified 
the Russian and U.S. embassies in Dublin.  Colonel Huub 
Vellinghs, Dutch Royal Army, introduced himself as the new 
Senior Military Representative to the Netherlands. The U.S. 
(Neighbour) introduced two new U.S. del members, Joe Porto 
and Colonel J.C. Crownover, and noted that Jon Claus would 
soon return to Washington. 
 
¶22. (U) The Chair wrapped up with a comprehensive report on 
the work accomplished during Estonia's Chairmanship 
(FSC.DEL/140/08), followed by a brief introduction of the 
Finish agenda for fall, which was released under 
(FSC.INF/11/08). The next FSC plenary and Working Group 
meetings will take place on 10 September. 
 
 
USOSCE 00000194  005 OF 005 
 
 
¶23. (U) USDel will note septel unfinished FSC working group 
and other items that will be taken up again in September. 
SCOTT