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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000187 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL XG FSC
SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC: JULY 16, CZECHS - U.S. COUNTER RUSSIA ON 
MISSILE DEFENSE 
 
REF: A. USOSCE 00176 
     ¶B. DUCCESCHI-NEIGHBOUR E-MAIL 15 JULY 
     ¶C. STATE 65190 
     ¶D. FALLON MEYER E-MAIL 15 JULY 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The Czech Republic and the U.S. responded 
strongly to last week's intervention by Russia that 
inaccurately portrayed the U.S.-Czech agreement on missile 
defense radar.  Drawing on material from President Medvedev's 
July 15 speech to the Russian MFA, Russia replied with claims 
that missile defense threatens Russia and repeated threats to 
take necessary measures to ensure Russia's security. 
Separately, the U.S. stated that U.S. troops now in Georgia 
are there with full host nation consent for a long-planned 
exercise that is completely unrelated to tensions elsewhere 
in the region. 
 
¶2. (SBU) FSC.DD/07/08/Rev.2 on updating categories of weapons 
and equipment was adopted, after which the U.S. noted its 
intention to revisit potential duplication of effort. Germany 
introduced a new Food for Thought (FFT) on landmines and 
Russia asked delegations to prepare for discussion of 
Russia's Naval CSBM next week in the plenary.  Japan provided 
a well-received briefing to the Forum on Japan's ongoing 
counter terrorism efforts. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Meanwhile, feedback in Working Group (WG) B to 
Estonia's FFT on cyber security was positive.  Consensus was 
not reached in WG A on end user certificates or destabilizing 
transfer of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) by air. 
Further discussion of these drafts, as well as the FFT on 
updating the code of conduct questionnaire, will resume in 
September.  End summary. 
 
Czechs, U.S. Respond to Russia on Missile Defense 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶4. (SBU) Under General Statements, the Czech Republic 
(Reinohlova) replied to last week's harsh comments by Russia 
regarding the recent U.S.-Czech radar agreement (Ref A).  She 
questioned Russia's motives for raising this topic in the FSC 
since the Czech Republic has been discussing all aspects of 
the missile defense radar with Russia in bilateral, as well 
as multilateral formats.  She stressed that the radar poses 
no threat to Russian security and that the construction of 
the missile defense radar represents a significant 
contribution to the security of the European continent. 
Reinhlova characterized Russia's threat to "take appropriate 
technical military measures" as absolutely inappropriate and 
at odds with the spirit of collective security. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Per Ref B, the U.S. (Neighbour) followed by noting 
that recent developments make it appropriate to update the 
FSC on missile defense and correct the inaccurate impression 
left by Russia's statement the previous week.  Neighbour 
emphasized that recent Iranian missile tests only reinforce 
the fact that the ballistic missile threat to deployed U.S. 
forces, allies and friends is real and growing.  Noting 
NATO's recognition of this threat and the contribution U.S. 
missile defense assets will have on European security at the 
Bucharest Summit, he stated that the agreement between the 
U.S. and the Czech Republic signed last week is an important 
step in countering the emerging threat. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Neighbour also reiterated that the proposed system's 
location and limited capabilities pose no threat to Russia's 
strategic deterrent force, and that the U.S. is attempting to 
work cooperatively with Russia to assuage Russia's concerns. 
He ended by reporting that the U.S. has also proposed that 
Russia join the U.S. and NATO in developing joint, regional 
missile defense architecture. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) rebutted the Czech Republic's 
comments, noting that the bilateral and multilateral 
discussions had failed to achieve any positive results. 
Ulyanov remarked that anyone with any knowledge of strategic 
 
USOSCE 00000187  002 OF 005 
 
 
defense would realize that placement of a missile defense 
radar on the border of Russia would weaken Russia's strategic 
deterrence.  Reading from Russian President Medvedev's speech 
of 15 June to the Russian MFA, Ulyanov quoted: 
 
"...We firmly declare that deploying elements of U.S. global 
missile defense in Eastern Europe only aggravates the 
situation. As I have already said, we will be forced to react 
appropriately to this. Our American and European partners 
have also been warned accordingly. 
 
We realize that national security cannot rely on someone's 
word of honor. This also applies to Russian-U.S. ties in the 
sphere of strategic stability. This common legacy obviously 
cannot survive if one of the sides selectively destroys 
individual elements of this strategic structure...." 
 
U.S. Notes Multinational PfP Exercise in Georgia 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8. (SBU) Noting that he had been asked about it, the U.S. 
(Neighbour) briefly noted a joint Partnership for Peace 
exercise involving troops from the U.S., Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia and Ukraine, was currently under way in Georgia. 
Highlighted were the location and purpose of the exercise. 
The U.S. emphasized that the troops were in Georgia with full 
host nation consent, that the exercise had been planned 
long-ago, and that it was completely unrelated to tensions 
elsewhere in the region. (Note: This intervention was made 
following a number of informal queries/comments on the 
margins.  Information provided was compiled from U.S. Army 
Europe press releases. End Note) 
 
Spain Bans Cluster Munitions 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9. (SBU) Spain (Mor Sola) announced that on July 11 Spain's 
Council of Ministers had approved an agreement ordering a 
unilateral moratorium on cluster munitions.  According to the 
Spanish statement (FSC.DEL/127/08), the moratorium is 
intended as a step toward ratification of the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, and includes a prohibition on their use, 
destruction of current stockpiles, and prohibition on the 
import, export or shipping of such munitions. 
 
Japan Briefs on its Counter Terrorism Efforts 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (SBU) In Security Dialogue, Mr. H. Sakamoto, Minister of 
the Embassy of Japan in Austria, made a presentation entitled 
"Major Efforts and Actions of Japan on the Fight Against 
Terrorism."  Sakamoto reported on Japan's Counter Terrorism 
(CT) principles, current CT programs and Japan's plans for 
strengthening CT efforts in the future.  He also touched on 
Japan's international cooperation including, inter alia, 
Japan's participation in the Proliferation Security 
Initiative and Japan's contribution to Operation Enduring 
Freedom's Maritime Interdiction Operation (OEF-MIO). 
 
¶11. (SBU) Sakamoto's presentation was well received, drawing 
positive interventions from the U.S., Austria, and Germany. 
Japanese reps thanked the U.S. afterwards for its 
intervention. Of particular interest was Japan's work on 
cyber security.  Turkey (Begec) congratulated Sakamoto for a 
fine presentation, but also asked if his reference to a war 
on "Islamic" terrorism was a change in Japan's policy as, 
according to Turkey, Japan has not used this term before. 
Turkey's question went unanswered. 
 
Bosnia Praises OSCE Mission 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12. (SBU) Bosnia and Herzegovina provided an overview of the 
positive work of the OSCE mission to BiH's Department for 
Security and Cooperation (DSC).  He praised the DSC for its 
 
USOSCE 00000187  003 OF 005 
 
 
work in support of Dayton arms control and regional 
stabilization including, inter alia, SALW and stockpiles 
management, assistance in preparing data for Dayton and 
Vienna Document (VD) 99 exchanges, and organizing seminars on 
legal aspects of defense management. 
 
Agreement on CAT Categories Update 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13. (SBU) The draft decision (FSC.DD/07/08/Rev.2) on updating 
reporting categories of weapons and equipment systems subject 
to the information exchange on Conventional Arms Transfers 
(CAT) was adopted. It has been issued as FSC.DEC/8/08.  Per 
instructions (Ref C), after the decision was adopted, the 
U.S. announced its intention prior to the next data exchange 
on CAT to revisit the potential redundancy in exchanging the 
same report on CAT in the UN and OSCE. 
 
Landmines, Russia's Naval CSBM, Kyrgyzstan Stockpiles 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶14. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) introduced a new Food for 
Thought (FFT) paper, issued under FSC.DEL/126/08, on a more 
active role of the OSCE in addressing the problem of 
landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).  The joint 
proposal from Germany, France and Slovenia drew positive 
interventions from the Czech Republic and Ireland, the latter 
offering to serve as a co-sponsor. Germany requested comments 
on the FFT as soon as possible and welcomed additional pS to 
sign up as co-sponsors. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Russia reminded delegations that Russia's FFT on a 
Naval CSBM will be included on the plenary agenda for July 
¶23.  Ulyanov said that Russia was looking forward to a 
discussion on both the pros and cons of the proposal so that 
Russia could make appropriate modifications to the proposal 
over the summer break. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Kyrgyzstan, reporting on its recent data 
submissions, noted that Kyrgyzstan welcomed any assistance 
from the OSCE to ensure the security of its stockpiles. 
 
WG B Discusses Estonian Proposal on Cyber Security 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶17. (SBU) Estonia, speaking in a national capacity, 
introduced their FFT on Cyber Security, which envisages a one 
off exchange of information on national experience and best 
practices as well as holding a seminar or workshop within 12 
months. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Ten pS, including the U.S. (Meyer), made supportive 
interventions.  There was no outright opposition.  Austria 
(Eischer) noted that the scope of information to be exchanged 
would have to be more focused, while Luxembourg (Pilot) 
suggested that it might be wise to hold the workshop first to 
determine the scope and follow up with an information 
exchange.  Canada (Gosal) reported that the 2008 OSCE Police 
Security Meeting is scheduled to address Cyber crime, but 
that the FSC that both could be held without duplicating 
efforts.  Despite Estonia's emphasis on military aspects of 
Cyber Security, several pS noted that  that any decision 
would have to include both criminal and military aspects of 
Cyber Security. 
 
No Consensus on EUCs in WG A 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶19. (SBU) At the Chair's request, the U.S. (Meyer) introduced 
its proposed changes to FSC.DD/9/08 on exchanging sample End 
Use Certificates (EUC).  Drawing from Ref C, the U.S. 
outlined its edits, which included adding references to 
verification procedures in Op para 1 and changing Op para 2 
having EUC's provided by pS posted on the OSCE restricted web 
site.  Meyer also pointed out that U.S. proposed changes 
 
USOSCE 00000187  004 OF 005 
 
 
would add practical value by including verification text and 
would avoid tasking the CPC to assess implementation.  Given 
the extent of U.S. comments and lacking printed text, most 
delegations refrained from making specific comments. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Poland also submitted an additional edit and 
reported that Poland does not have a sample EUC.  The Chair 
will redistribute this DD with proposed changes and 
discussion will resume following the summer recess. 
 
¶21. (SBU) In a one-on-one discussion following the WG, 
Germany (Schweizer) said that he could see the U.S. point on 
implementation, but called it a weak argument.  He said 
Germany agreed that implementation was a pS prerogative, but 
that the intent of the proposed overview in Op para 2 is to 
compile data so that pS can make their own assessment. 
 
Nor on Destabilizing Transfers of SALW by Air 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶22. (SBU) The U.S. reported that it had dropped all but one 
of its recommended edits on FSC.DD/10/08, that the U.S. was 
flexible on the text, but that it could not accept the 
phrasing "adopting best practices."  Germany said it insisted 
on maintaining the stronger verb "to adopt" but could not 
commit immediately to an alternative to the term "best 
practices." 
 
¶23. (SBU) France was markedly upset that the group would not 
come to consensus, making it all but inevitable that the 
decision would be put off until the autumn session. (Note: 
France lobbied the U.S., Germany, Belarus and the Chair hard 
individually prior to the meeting, presumably telling each 
that the others agreed to the proposed text. End note.) 
Canada also expected to reach consensus and urged pS to 
accept the phrase "endorse best practices" as a compromise. 
 
¶24. (SBU) In a quick side bar, Germany asked whether the U.S. 
would agree that "endorsed best practices" would be 
politically binding.  The U.S. responded that it could not 
consider "best practices" normative in the OSCE. As a result, 
Germany reported that it could not accept Canada's proposal. 
 
¶25. (SBU) The Chair ended discussion on this topic by 
offering to hold an extraordinary session before the plenary 
if pS could reach agreement in the interim.  On July 17 the 
Chair followed up by proposing an informal meeting. 
Appearing to take some offense at the notion that Germany was 
holding up the decision, Schwiezer replied that Germany was 
not the one that brought in changes late and did not feel 
pressured to get a response before next week.  Without 
Germany's support for a meeting, the Chair pushed further 
discussion to the autumn session. 
 
¶26. (SBU) (Note: Germany's comment is a direct inference to 
the fact that the U.S. interjected significant edits to the 
EUC and SALW documents after the documents had been issued as 
Chairman's DDs.  Several pS including Germany believed that 
both decisions would be adopted this session.  In separate 
conversions, however, Germany conceded that the EUC document 
was rushed through the WG, and another pS lamented that more 
time should have been spent initially in informal groups to 
negotiate precise language. End Note.) 
 
¶27. (SBU) The Code of Conduct Coordinator (Austria, Eischer) 
summarized the work accomplished this session on the 
questionnaire update. In the absence of comments from pS, 
Eischer called on pS to forward additional comments as soon 
as available. 
 
Spain Announces a VD99 Visit 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶28. (SBU) Spain announced that it has scheduled a VD 99 
visits (Airbase and Unit) and a possible new weapons 
 
USOSCE 00000187  005 OF 005 
 
 
demonstration for pS scheduled for May 4-7, 2009. Alternative 
dates are May 18-21.  Invitations will be forthcoming. 
 
¶29. (SBU) The next FSC Plenary is scheduled for July 23. 
This is the last plenary planned under Estonia's able 
chairmanship.  The working groups are not scheduled to meet 
again until the next FSC session begins in September under 
the Chairmanship of Finland. 
FINLEY