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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000176 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL XG
SUBJECT: FSC JULY 9: U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY PRESENTATION 
HIGHLIGHT; U.S. ISOLATED IN WORKING GROUP A. 
 
REF: A. STATE 65190 
     ¶B. FALLON-MEYER EMAIL 07/07/08 
     ¶C. STATE 70638 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: During the July 9 Forum for Security 
Cooperation, Russia (Ulyanov) read a Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) statement that sharply criticized the 
recent U.S.-Czech Missile Defense (MD) agreement.  The U.S. 
did not respond.  In Security dialogue, U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Homeland Security McHale 
discussed the U.S. Military's transition to meet 21st century 
threats to homeland security and to respond to natural and 
man-made disasters.  His presentation was very well received. 
Croatian MFA advisor, Dr. Dijana Plestina, outlined current 
demining activities in Croatia. 
2 (SBU) In Working Group A, Participating States (pS) agreed 
to move to the plenary for adoption the decision on updating 
reporting categories of weapons and equipment systems subject 
to the information exchange on Conventional Arms Transfers 
(CAT).  Decisions on preventing destabilizing transfers of 
SALW by air, and on an exchange of End User Certificates 
(EUC)s, stalled following U.S. interventions.  Several 
states, including Allies, chided the U.S. requesting basic 
clarifications and proposing fundamental changes so late in 
the process. Inter alia, the U.S. is isolated on 
FSC.DD/98/08/Rev.3 regarding changes to Annex I and stands 
alone with Belarus in opposition to "adopting" best 
practices.  Washington see guidance request in para 19. 
 
Russia's Delegation Mourns the Loss of a Long-time Delegate 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Estonia as Chair began the session by offering 
condolences to Russia on behalf of the FSC on the passing of 
long-time delegate, Alexander Ivanov, who was recently 
diagnosed with cancer.  Russia thanked the Chair for its 
sentiments, noting that Ivanov's death was a severe blow to 
the Russian delegation. 
 
Russia Sharply Criticizes U.S.-Czech Agreement on Missile 
Defense 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) read a Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
statement issued the previous day, July 8, 2008, in response 
to the U.S.-Czech agreement on missile defense. In brief, the 
statement noted that the U.S.-Czech agreement, which is based 
on an alleged minor threat from Iranian missiles, and which 
is highly controversial within Czech society, will not 
provide the Czech Republic with additional security. The 
Russian opposition to missile defense is well known and 
Russian alternatives have been ignored. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ulyanov went on to say that if the agreement is 
ratified by the Czech parliament and the U.S. is deployed, 
"...we shall be forced to respond not by diplomatic methods 
but through military means of a technical nature." Despite 
continued U.S. guarantees that the system poses no threat to 
the Russian Federation there has been little progress, and 
proposals for transparency measures suggested by Russia have 
also been ignored. The decision to move forward with this 
program undermines the principles of the Sochi Decision. 
Russia will continue to closely monitor developments in 
missile defense and the general strategic setting. Text of 
the Russian Federation's statement was published as an annex 
to FSC.JOUR/558. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The U.S. delegation did not respond. 
 
Civil-Military Emergency Planning 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Security, opened the Security Dialogue 
by speaking on the transition of the U.S. Military post 9-11 
 
USOSCE 00000176  002 OF 003 
 
 
to meet demands of homeland defense. AS McHale described the 
U.S. military's support of homeland security through new 
war-fighting roles in the land, air, sea and cyber domains. 
AS McHale spoke of updating mission sets and strategies to 
address 21st century threats while emphasizing the continuing 
importance of the rule of law and civilian control over armed 
forces. 
 
¶8. (SBU) AS McHale then transitioned to the new consequence 
management role the military will play, under direction of 
the Department of Homeland Security, following natural or 
man-made disasters.  Noting lessons learned following 
Hurricane Katrina, he emphasized the importance integrating 
military and civilian planning for a variety of potential 
scenarios down to the tactical level. In conclusion, AS 
McHale postulated that the OSCE could play a role in 
encouraging pS to develop national plans and by assisting 
with the integration of military and civilian capabilities 
across the OSCE area. 
 
¶9. (SBU) There were some six plus questions centering on the 
role of maritime security, challenges of transition, and the 
decision making process in joint civil-military command 
structure. Spain, which advocated the special CMEP session in 
September 07, showed particular enthusiasm for AS McHale's 
brief and, in all, the presentation was very well received. 
 
Mine Action in Croatia 
---------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Following AS McHale, Dr. Dijana Plestina, Advisor 
to the Foreign Minister of Croatia, briefed the forum on 
status of demining in Croatia and the work of the Croatian 
Mine Action Center (CROMAC).  Current estimates place the 
number of landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) 
within an area in Croatia of approximately 997 square 
kilometers at approximately 110,000 and 60,000 respectively. 
GOC revenues provide over half of the current 340 million 
Euro budget for demining, followed by public company 
contributions (19 percent), private donations (17 percent) 
and World Bank loans (8 percent).  Despite significant 
progress (the number of injuries from mines and ERWs fell 
from 88 in 1998 to only 4 to date in 2008), Croatia requires 
another 650 million Euro over the next ten years to 
completely clear remaining ordinance. Dr. Plestina 
specifically noted USG contributions to Croatia's efforts 
several times. She ended by calling for more OSCE involvement 
in eliminating weapons sets which, in her words, pose a 
greater threat to innocent civilians than they do to military 
personnel. 
 
¶11. (SBU) During Q and A, Germany, referencing the forum's 
special mine action meeting in January, postulated that 
enough potential remains in this area to consider holding 
another special session on demining. France, Austria, Ireland 
and Turkey posed questions, respectively, on the provision of 
minefield locations by former belligerents, the role of 
public awareness in decreasing incidents, budgetary 
challenges and the accessibility of a new mine victims center 
to non-Croatian victims. 
 
CAT Update 
---------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) FSC.DD/7/08/Rev.2 was agreed in WG A and will be 
added to the July 16 Plenary agenda. Mission is prepared to 
make a statement upon adoption per REFTEL. 
 
EUCs 
---- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Per ref email, Mission noted the U.S. would provide 
comment on FSC.DD/9/08 shortly, and requested clarification 
on the intent of OP para 2. After a brief attempt to answer 
the question, the drafting pS, Belarus, indicated they would 
 
USOSCE 00000176  003 OF 003 
 
 
contact Mission separately to discuss our concerns. 
 
¶14. (SBU) In a particularly sharp admonishment, GE 
(Schwitzer) expressed surprise that the U.S. was only now 
asking for a fundamental clarification. He noted that further 
bilateral consultations could likely kill any chance for an 
agreement this session. Regarding Mission's question, Germany 
offered that the purpose conducting an overview of EUCs 
exchanged by pS as envisaged in OP para 2 was to create an 
exemplar that could be posted on the restricted OSCE website. 
Germany views this decision as a logical follow-on to OP para 
5 of FSC.DEC/05/04, on Standard Elements of End-User 
Certificates and Verification Procedures for SALW Exports. 
Germany emphasized that the intent of the current draft 
decision was not to compare national practices. Like OP para 
2 of FSC.DEC/11/07 on brokering, the overview would be 
limited to the provision of statistical data related to 
implementation. Supporting Germany, Spain also noted that 
timing was tight if the FSC was to adopt this decision before 
the summer break. 
 
SALW Transfers by Air 
--------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Turkey opened discussion on FSC.DD/98/08/Rev.3 by 
noting that it was still awaiting instructions. Belarus 
followed, noting that it objected to the use of the term 
"adopt" to refer to a Best Practice Document. Germany 
countered that others had made similar arguments in earlier 
drafts, and that the term "guide" had been removed for this 
reason. What was left was the original Wasennaar Arrangement 
language "Best Practices," and adopting best practices was, 
in Germany's view, appropriate.  In follow-on discussions, 
Germany made it clear that it was looking for a politically 
binding decision that would adopt best practices. 
 
¶16. (SBU) As coordinated with the Chair and the drafters 
(France and Belgium) in a pre-session meeting, Mission noted 
that it was working with the Chair to resolve U.S. concerns 
over possible redundancy between the draft decision and work 
in other fora.  In response, Germany requested an explanation 
U.S. concerns, and at the request of the Chair, Mission 
summarized the U.S. position as outlined in REF C. As before, 
Germany retorted that it was disappointed to see the U.S. 
submitting fundamental changes to the DD so late in the 
process. Italy also chided the U.S. for coming in so late, 
and complained that such changes would delay any decision 
until next session. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Germany, France, Italy and Switzerland among 
others, argued that the U.S. proposal to exchange the actual 
Wassenaar Arrangement Decision on SALW Shipments by Air for 
the current Annex I would set a precedent in the FSC. All 
argued that, with the exception of UN documents, the FSC does 
not reference decisions from other bodies.  Switzerland 
offered that the FSC decision on 1540 was a similar case 
where the FSC created its own decision using existing text 
from another forum's document.  As not all OSCE members are 
members of Wassenaar, it would be difficult for non-Wassenaar 
states to rubber stamp a Wassenaar decision. 
 
¶18. SBU) The United Kingdom offered a compromise to reference 
the work of Wassenaar in the preamble, a suggestion that 
Finland supported. Cypress stated that it would not support 
the reference to Wassenaar in Annex I, but that it could live 
with the reference in the preamble. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Mission assesses that the U.S. is isolated on the 
issue of substituting the Wassenaar Decision on Best 
Practices for Annex I. Also, the U.S. appears to stand alone 
with Belarus in opposition to the term "adopt" in OP para 1. 
Mission requests further guidance on how to proceed. 
FINLEY