VZCZCXRO9598
PP RUEHAST RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0171/01 1851713
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031713Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5809
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0550
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1104
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1049
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD/XPXC//
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5-T/ECPLAD/ECCS//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-E/DDPMA-IN/CAC//
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000171 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA 
JCS FOR J5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR DOWLEY 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE XG
SUBJECT: ASRC WORKING SESSION II, JULY 2: ARMS CONTROL AND 
CSBMS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The keynote speakers at the 2008 Annual 
Security Review Conference (ASRC) arms control and CSBMs 
working session expressed concern over the CFE impasse caused 
by Russia's suspension.  Alyson Bailes said the underlying 
cause was a "globalization of the security agendas" of the 
expanded NATO and EU.  Adam Kobieracki agreed the security 
environment had changed, and said any follow-on to CFE, 
although based on it, would need to reflect the changed 
conditions.  Russia blamed NATO "expansion" and U.S.-backed 
European missile defense for destroying OSCE unity on arms 
control.  Russia said the U.S. must stop talking and 
immediately ratify Adapted CFE if it wants to preserve the 
European security regime.  The U.S. insisted that Russia 
needs to again implement its CFE obligations and fulfill 
other conditions before ratification will occur.  Germany, 
Turkey, and the Czech Republic offered varying degrees of 
support for the U.S. position.  Russia concluded by 
announcing a new proposal for naval confidence- and 
security-building measures that parallel existing provisions 
in the Vienna Document 1999.  End summary. 
 
A Return to Europe 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) Alyson Bailes, a retired British diplomat and 
formerly the director of SIPRI, identified the enlargement of 
NATO and the EU as among the underlying causes of present 
impasses in conventional arms control.  Bailes said this 
enlargement can be viewed as a "strategic act" that appears 
to threaten "some" states, instead of an expression of the 
transformation and desire of individual countries.  She also 
said the "globalization of the security agendas" of NATO and 
the EU, including "military actions on a huge scale outside 
the OSCE area" contributed to the weakening of the OSCE arms 
control acquis.  Alluding to the U.S., she said a "philosophy 
of action" had replaced risk-limitation and self-restraint. 
A return to Europe, in order to "guard the rear," might be 
the means to restore unity to the OSCE region and would 
include the "rescue" or preservation of OSCE arms control and 
confidence-and-stability building. 
 
CFE II 
------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) Adam Kobieracki, of the Polish MFA emphasizing he 
was speaking personally, said the CFE regime was an integral 
part of the OSCE arms control framework but was  near 
collapse.  Its information exchange and verification 
mechanisms were not functioning and the Adapted Treaty was 
still not in force.  Although there was no immediate military 
threat to European security, except perhaps on its "southern 
flank," the CFE crises had serious political implications. 
Kobieracki said "principles of modern arms control," 
reflecting changes in the security environment since the 
negotiation of the original treaty, should shape any 
follow-on agreement to the existing CFE regime.  This would 
include: arms control measures based on the CFE Treaty but 
more cooperative than restrictive; provisions for 
predictability, transparency, and greater flexibility; more 
confidence-building measures than previously; and limits not 
based on the "out-dated" numerical balance of forces between 
groups of states. 
 
Russia: Outlook Bleak, But We're Ready to Talk 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
USOSCE 00000171  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) said the outlook for arms control 
was far from positive as he rhetorically rambled using old 
statements to prove his point.  NATO enlargement had 
destroyed the balance and CFE no longer had any connection to 
reality.  The Adapted Treaty had not entered into force 
because it has been artificially connected to other issues. 
For some states, arms control was less important than the 
withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from Transnistria 
or the "expulsion of Russian military pensioners" from 
Georgia.  Some states cavalierly disregard the OSCE principle 
that states should not purchase their security as the 
expenses of other states.  Kosovo's unilateral declaration of 
independence was "legal nihilism" and has set a dangerous 
precedent that will be used by separatist movements 
everywhere.  Existing multilateral forums, like the FSC, were 
not equal to these challenges. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Despite these problems, Russia was ready and open to 
serious dialogue in Vienna to escape the impasse over CFE and 
other arms control issues, as evidenced by its recent 
proposal for a new European security treaty.  Russia has 
tried to solve these problems in the JCG and NATO-Russia 
Council Arms Control Experts, but other states have removed 
themselves from arms control.  Solutions will require the 
joint efforts of all involved states, as occurred several 
years ago with the negotiation of the Adaptation Agreement. 
Russia was ready to work with its "main partner," the United 
States, and others. 
 
Allies Defend CFE 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Germany (Foreign Office Deputy Political Director 
Pohl) called for a return to full implementation of CFE, 
followed quickly by entry into force of the Adapted Treaty. 
Although acknowledging that the security landscape in the 
OSCE had changed since CFE was negotiated and holding were 
far below thresholds, the Treaty still had application in a 
time of asymmetric threats.  Further changes to the CFE 
regime, beyond those found in the Adapted Treaty, were not 
necessarily good, although some of the ideas raised at the 
October 2007 FSC meeting on the future of arms control should 
be explored. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Czech Republic (Pocuch), echoing Kobieracki, 
said that doing nothing about the impasse over CFE was not an 
option, and described Russia's suspension as a catalyst for 
the continued erosion of European security. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Turkey said its position was reflected in the 
Bucharest NATO-Russia Council statement.  Entry into force of 
the Adapted CFE would allow a review of all provisions. 
Turkey was never insensitive to the security concerns of its 
partners and expected they would show the same consideration 
to Turkey's needs.  Russia's suspension undermined the 
benefits of the CFE regime for regional and sub-regional 
security. 
 
Belarus: New Mechanisms, Like Naval CSBMs 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Belarus (Pavlov) agreed that the FSC should be used 
for intensive dialogue: it had been created for this.  As the 
OSCE's political-military instruments were not working 
 
USOSCE 00000171  003 OF 004 
 
 
efficiently, they need to be updated to reflect changing 
military organization, doctrine, and technology.  Pavlov 
recommended considering the additional measures, including 
naval CSBMs, contained in the non-consensual annex to the 
1994 Lisbon Document. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Switzerland said participating States need to 
continue to implement the OSCE principles and norms.  The 
FSC, as Russia had said, was the forum to discuss 
implementation and new measures like those raised in the 
Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting and the special FSC 
meeting in 2007 on the future of arms control.  Continued 
efforts at outreach and awareness-raising for the Code of 
Conduct were also important, e.g., the Code seminar for OSCE 
Partners in Almaty planned for September. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Armenia (Tabibian) in his initial intervention 
called for all participating States that have agreed to arms 
control agreements to live up to their obligations and not 
unilaterally refrain from fulfillment of distasteful 
commitments and obligations.  He noted that doing so creates 
mistrust and instability with neighbors. 
 
U.S. Urges Russia to Resume CFE Implementation 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶12. (SBU) The U.S. (DASD Daniel Fata) said if the OSCE wants 
to build on the CFE, then it needs a CFE in force.  Russia 
needs to return to compliance and fulfill those conditions 
prerequisite to the ratification of the Adapted Treaty by the 
other States Parties.  Fata said two large questions still 
remain. First, how do the States Parties get to the stage 
where changes to the Adapted Treaty would be possible? 
Second, how would it be possible to negotiate a treaty that 
all 30 States Parties would benefit from? 
 
¶13. (SBU) Fata said the portrayal of Russia as the aggrieved 
party because of NATO enlargement and missile defense may be 
good political theater, but not good policy.  Russia's 
security is enhanced by stable, secure neighbors.  No state 
was building up its forces because of Russia or had declared 
Russia an enemy. 
 
Even Russia Will Benefit from Missile Defense 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) On missile defense, Fata said the NATO communique 
at Bucharest made clear that the system proposed offered all 
Europe a response to the common threat of long-range 
ballistic missiles.  Russia itself had privately acknowledged 
concern over this threat.  The U.S. and its European partners 
want relations with Russia based on mutual security. 
 
Russia Wants Actions, Not Words 
------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) said if the U.S. wants to save CFE 
it needs to start ratification immediately.  Russia was ready 
to work with its partners in Vienna, but it needs actions, 
not just words. 
 
Russia Proposes Naval CSBMs 
--------------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Ulyanov added that the OSCE needs to improve the 
 
USOSCE 00000171  004 OF 004 
 
 
European CSBM regime.  Naval forces have traditionally been 
outside that regime but Russia was now distributing a 
food-for-thought paper that proposed naval CSBMS 
(FSC.DEL/120/08).  Ulyanov said there was nothing outrageous 
in them and suggested discussion of them should begin at the 
July 23 FSC under the rubric of "CSBMs in the maritime field: 
arguments for and against." 
 
¶17. (SBU) The naval CSBMs would include: an information 
exchange on personnel and major equipment of naval forces; 
prior notification and observation of naval activities; 
annual exchange of naval plans; a list of naval contacts. 
Much of the language of these provisions is borrowed from the 
corresponding sections in the Vienna Document 1999.  As in 
the Vienna Document, the area of application is defined only 
as "the waters adjacent to the region of the OSCE." 
 
¶18. (U) A complete readout of the ASRC, including the other 
working sessions and the address by SACEUR General John 
Craddock, will be provided septel. 
FINLEY