VZCZCXYZ0029
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0385/01 1921539
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 101539Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8169
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE 0033
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0015
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0071
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0019
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0070
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0020
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0180
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0023

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000385 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/RA, IO/T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2018 
TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL AORC IAEA KZ SY
SUBJECT: IAEA/BOARD: KAZAKHS NERVOUS ABOUT CONTESTING SYRIA 
FOR MESA SEAT 
 
REF: UNVIE 314 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L.Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
 ¶1. (S) Summary:  Kazakh Ambassador Abdrakhmanov expressed 
some reluctance in a discussion with Ambassador Schulte on 
July 7 to contest the Syrian candidacy for the open MESA seat 
at the Board of Governors.  He reported that Syria was 
adamant about its candidacy, and claimed Arab/MESA support, 
including Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. 
Kazakhstan wanted 100 percent assurance of success if it is 
to put itself forward as a candidate but would make a final 
decision by July 20.  Ambassador Schulte encouraged 
Kazakhstan to submit its candidacy and call Syria's bluff 
even if it came to a GC vote, though convincing Syria to back 
down and settling the issue within MESA would be optimal. 
Ambassador Schulte agreed to approach Arab counterparts to 
underline U.S. opposition to Syria's candidacy.  However, 
Abdrakhmanov indicated that Kazakhstan did not want direct 
U.S. lobbying on its behalf.  In follow-up discussions, 
Algerian Ambassador advised that the U.S. could influence 
Arab states in MESA despite an Arab League decision earlier 
in the year to support Syria.  When approached on July 7, UAE 
and Qatar Ambassadors were non-committal the Kuwaiti 
Ambassador was inclined toward Syria. Mission recommends 
demarches in key MESA/Arab group capitals to influence Syria 
to withdraw or support an alternative.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S) Kazakh Ambassador Abdrakhmanov expressed some 
reluctance to contest Syria's Board candidacy for the MESA 
group in a discussion with Ambassador Schulte on July 7.  He 
had just returned from consultations in Astana.  Abdrakhmanov 
related that in a June 25 meeting Syrian Ambassador Khattab 
had been adamant about Syria's Board candidacy.  Given this, 
he feared Kazakhstan was not in a position to fight if Syria 
continues to pursue a Board seat.  Khattab was surprised by 
Kazakhstan's approach, insisted that Syria had put forward 
its candidacy first, and would fight for a Board seat. Syria 
claimed to have the support of the UAE, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Qatar and Lebanon, as well as that of the Arab 
League.  Other MESA members were neutral, including MESA 
Chair India and Pakistan.  Central Asian support was assured 
but not sufficient, and the MESA group could be split in two. 
 Abdrakhmanov also assessed that the final decision may lie 
not with the MESA group but with the GC, where a Plenary vote 
would require broader support. 
 
¶3. (S) If Kazakhstan puts its candidacy forward, it wants to 
be confident of success, he explained.  Abdrakhmanov gave an 
informal deadline of July 20 for a decision, stipulating that 
a Kazakh candidacy should be announced at least two months 
prior to the General Conference.  However, Kazakhstan would 
not do so unless 100 percent sure of success.  He cited 
Kazakhstan's positive record of achievement in the nuclear 
field, including recent joint ventures with French and 
Japanese firms.  In light of this record, Kazakhstan "cannot 
allow itself to be defeated."  Abdrakhmanov also mentioned 
that Kazakhstan reserved the option of running for the Board 
in 2009-2010, presumably when it would be easier. 
 
¶4. (S) Abdrakhmanov sought Ambassador Schulte's advice on 
tactics, particularly if a message could be sent to Damascus. 
 Ambassador Schulte agreed that the best outcome would be for 
Syria to step aside.  If Syria insisted, there would be a 
vote in the General Conference.  Syria's clandestine nuclear 
activities would be an agenda item in the September Board and 
the U.S. and others think it would be inappropriate to have a 
country under investigation sitting on the Board. 
Abdrakhmanov asked about the results of the safeguards 
investigation, which Ambassador Schulte noted would take 
time.  Ambassador Schulte further advised that Syria had to 
understand its candidacy would draw more negative attention 
while it was under investigation, and that it would lose a GC 
vote.  He added that Syria could save face, having recently 
served on the Board, by stepping aside to give another MESA 
group member a chance. 
 
¶5. (S) Ambassador Schulte encouraged Kazakhstan to soon put 
forward its candidacy in MESA and to call Syria's potential 
bluff.  He offered to assist with individual MESA group 
members, and noted that the French EU Presidency and Japan 
could also be helpful in this regard.  Abdrakhmanov 
 
acknowledged that he could not accept Syrian claims of Arab 
support on face value and planned to consult with Algerian 
Ambassador Feroukhi (who is expected to become Board Chair) 
and the Moroccan Ambassador as chairman of the Arab Group. 
However, Abdrakhmanov underlined the fact that Kazakhstan did 
not want to appear unduly influenced by external powers (i.e. 
the U.S.) and noted unhelpful rumors that the U.S. had 
approached two MESA group members to encourage their 
candidacy for the Board.  Ambassador Schulte agreed that any 
approach to MESA and Arab Group members would focus on 
Syria's candidacy (rather than U.S. advocacy of Kazakhstan). 
Abdrakhmanov still hoped that Syria could be persuaded to 
withdraw, and would indicate to Khattab that Kazakhstan was 
preparing to put forward its candidacy. 
 
¶6. (C) In follow-up discussions with Ambassador Schulte on 
July 7, MESA/Arab Group Ambassadors were non-committal on 
support for Syria.  Feroukhi acknowledged U.S. concerns and 
said she had tried unsuccessfully to talk Khattab out of 
running, but he was adamant. The Kazak Ambassador had also 
told her on July 7 that Kazakhstan would present its 
candidacy.  Feroukhi confirmed to Ambassador Schulte that the 
Arab League had endorsed Syria's candidacy earlier in the 
year.  However, she suggested the U.S. could influence the 
positions of MESA countries like UAE, Kuwait and Iraq and 
advised resolving this issue within the MESA group rather 
than at the GC, where Arab countries would be more likely to 
back Syria as a block.  In a separate discussion, the 
Moroccan Ambassador and current Arab Group Chair denied that 
Syria had Arab group support.  Ambassador Schulte also spoke 
with counterparts from Kuwait, UAE and Qatar on July 7.  The 
Kuwaiti Ambassador insisted that "nothing was proven" against 
Syria and it would be hard to object to Syria's candidacy, 
but would report U.S. views to capital.  The UAE Ambassador 
said he was not aware of his country's support for Syria. 
Qatar also would check with capital. 
 
¶7. (S) Ambassador Schulte subsequently consulted with the 
Russian Charge, who agreed that Kazakhstan would be a good 
candidate but wanted to keep out of MESA deliberations. 
 
¶8. (S) Comment: Although there is no formal deadline within 
MESA, and the Indian Chair has no immediate plans to call a 
meeting, time is not on our side.  All other regional groups 
have announced their Board candidates, and the longer Syria 
remains unopposed, the more entrenched their position. 
Kazakhstan is nervous and is consulting with everyone under 
the sun, including the Secretariat which counseled them to go 
ahead.  We will continue to urge Kazakhstan to announce their 
candidacy and to advise the Arab Group against blind support 
for Syria.  We cannot give Kazakhstan 100 percent assurance, 
but MESA group members should welcome this alternative. 
Mission recommends demarches to MESA group/ Arab capitals to 
underline U.S. opposition to Syria's candidacy and to 
encourage Damascus to withdraw its MESA candidacy (without 
mentioning or advocating the Kazakh alternative.)  Convincing 
Syria that it is not in its interest to pursue a Board 
candidacy would be the best outcome.  We can also enlist 
like-minded countries, particularly the UK and French EU 
Presidency, in this effort.  End Comment. 
SCHULTE