VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0373/01 1851323
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031323Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8154
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0068

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000373 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/RA AND ISN/NESS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2018 
TAGS: AORC PARM MNUC TGRY KNPP KN SY IR
SUBJECT: IAEA: U/S BURNS DISCUSSIONS WITH DG ELBARADEI 
 
REF: PAPPAS-VONBEHREN EMAIL 6/19 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  IAEA DG ElBaradei told U/S Burns June 23 
that he would encourage Iran to take advantage of the P5 1 
offer.  ElBaradei focused almost exclusively on the freeze 
element of the P5 1 way forward paper, in the hope that it 
would help re-start negotiations.  U/S Burns cautioned that 
the freeze was time limited and tied to suspension. 
ElBaradei observed that Iran had been shocked by the May DG 
report and said the onus is on Iran to come clean.  ElBaradei 
was not optimistic about inspector access in Syria and noted 
that the IAEA lacked information related to nuclear material. 
 On DPRK, the DG sought to continue the Agency's verification 
role on an ad hoc basis.  He also raised Reliable Access to 
Nuclear Fuel (RANF) as a priority issue and assessed that 
Pakistan was the main hold-out among the G-77.  He asked the 
U.S. to help move the Russian proposal forward and agreed to 
share a non-paper, provided to the EU, on the NTI-IAEA fuel 
bank.  The DG saw these proposals as complementary, including 
the German proposal for a multi-lateral fuel center.  End 
Summary. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶2. (S) U/S Burns noted that he was in Vienna to attend the 
Nahr al-Barid reconstruction conference.  ElBaradei observed 
that many Arab countries are sitting on the fence with regard 
to pledges to help rebuild the camp, and also in terms of 
pressuring Iran.  Turning to the P5 1 offer, he assessed it 
was a good offer; recalling that he had advocated a freeze 
for three years, he was pleased that the P5 1 are now 
considering the option.  U/S Burns clarified that the concept 
of the freeze was time-limited to six weeks and intended to 
lead directly to suspension.  This point did not resonate 
with the DG who considered that the freeze could provide 
flexibility and a means for Iran to save face if negotiations 
begin. ElBaradei advised that he had told Iran's Ambassador 
to UN organizations in Vienna that Iran should accept the 
freeze for freeze approach, which he estimated presented few 
risks to Iran; he also anticipated relaying this message to 
AEOI President Aqazadeh. 
 
¶3. (S) U/S Burns mentioned that the P5 1 awaited Iran's 
response and ElBaradei expressed the view that given the 
upcoming domestic elections in the US, Iran may wait out the 
Administration which he believed was not a good 
idea.ElBaradei was uncertain that sanctions were having a 
demonstrable effect in Iran because it was difficult to 
attribute Iran's deteriorating economy to either directly to 
sanctions or to the regime's economic mismanagement.   U/S 
Burns complimented ElBaradei on the professionalism of the 
last report on Iran.  ElBaradei stressed that the ball was in 
Iran's court to resolve the outstanding questions, noting 
that that the Agency had no hidden agenda.  The Secretariat 
had given Iran the benefit of the doubt and guided the 
process along, he noted, but it was now Iran's turn to move 
it forward.  Asked whether the report had struck a chord in 
Iran, the DG admitted that the Iranians had been a bit 
shocked.  He had made it clear that Iran cannot expect a 
clean bill of health, which the Agency does not give in any 
case, and cannot expect to be in the clear. 
 
¶6. (S) ElBaradei further complained, as he has previously, 
that with departure of Larijani from the nuclear file the 
Iranian government lacked a focal point on nuclear issues. 
He continues to communicate with Aqazadeh, who has direct 
contact with Supreme Leader Khamenei, as a channel and 
indicated that he would call him to get a better sense of the 
Iranian reaction to the P5 1 offer. 
 
Syria 
----- 
 
¶7. (S) With the IAEA inspection team on the ground in Syria, 
ElBaradei was expressed doubts about the inspection team's 
access to additional sites beyond Al-Kibar.  He fully 
expected that they Syrians would continue to claim these were 
military installations.  The DG also noted that the Agency 
was at a disadvantage sinceit lacked information about the 
presence of nuclear material at these sites. ElBaradei 
wondered whether the Syrian-Israeli talks would change the 
dynamic in Damascus and encourage it to be more forthcoming. 
He informed the group that had also encouraged UK Foreign 
Secretary Miliband to speak to the Syrians on the margins of 
an upcoming Euro-Med Ministerial.  To get the Syrians to come 
clean, he thought it was important to give them some 
assurance that they would not be in the doghouse for too 
long. 
 
DPRK 
---- 
 
¶9. (S) ElBaradei noted the recent developments on the 
DPRKwhich could have implications for a renewed IAEA role. 
He was surprised by the announcement of the public demolition 
of the reactor cooling tower later this week The DG confided 
that he agreed with the US position on the DPRK's withdrawal 
from the NPT>    He said that the European stance (i.e. that 
DPRK had not withdrawn) as based on a political judgment 
rather than legal views. (Comment:  This is a welcome change 
from the DG's oral remarks to the June Board in which he 
asked for clarification of the DPRK's NPT status. End 
comment). 
 
Reliable Access 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (S) The DG raised Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF) 
as an important Agency priority.  Without RANF, he feared 
that more countries would pursue domestic enrichment.  U/S 
Burns cited U.S. 123 Agreement with Russia and with Gulf 
countries.  The DG sought to move the Russian proposal for an 
IAEA fuel reserve at Angarsk forward as something "concrete" 
on RANF.  He believed DFM Kislyak was the sticking point on 
this issue and asked the U.S. to intervene.  U/S Burns noted 
that RosAtom transitions also complicated matters. 
 
¶11. (C) The DG mentioned that he was speaking to German FM 
Steinmeier about the NTI fuel bank.  Ambassador Schulte noted 
that Berlin may be mistakenly concerned about the impact of 
the NTI-IAEA fuel bank on the multilateral German proposal. 
He encouraged the Agency to develop a concept for the fuel 
bank.  ElBaradei observed that all of these proposals were 
complementary and the establishment of fuel bank only 
addressed the first phase of assured supply.  The Secretariat 
had presented a non-paper laying out the concept of the NTI 
fuel bank to the EU, and at Ambassador Schulte's request, 
agreed to share it with the U.S. in strict confidence.  The 
DG is concerned about media leaks and G-77 reaction if these 
proposals are made public. 
 
¶12. (C) The DG claimed to have given the G-77 a "piece of his 
mind" on RANF at a lunch the previous week.  He stressed to 
the G-77 that no state was being asked to forgo the right to 
pursue peaceful nuclear energy and told the group that they 
could not sit on the fence.  The DG identified Pakistan as 
the main hold-out among the G-77.  Ambassador Schulte noted 
that Pakistan is concerned about multi-lateral enrichment 
mechanisms, even though the current proposals only discuss 
establishing fuel reserves under Phase 1.  EXPO official Rauf 
added that even Phase 2 relates to multi-lateralizing 
commercial enrichment, not military facilities that are 
Pakistan's concern. 
 
India 
----- 
 
¶13. (C) The DG had nothing new on India.  He did not believe 
the Indian government was prepared to take on the risks to 
advance the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement and 
Safeguards agreement forward.  The Communists seem to have 
dug in their heels and made this a psychological standoff 
over ties to the U.S.  Rauf noted that the Indian Mission had 
called the Secretariat a few days before to ask that they 
start preparing paperwork to move forward.  He also asked 
about the days remaining in the legislative season.  U/S 
Burns responded that it would be hard but not impossible to 
do before Congress recessed. 
 
¶14. (U) This cable has been cleared by P staff. 
 
 
SCHULTE