VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTG #0615/01 1831138
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011138Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8376

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000615 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL AND WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2018 
TAGS: PREL PINS PTER SNAR KCRM HO
SUBJECT: MERIDA IS APPROVED: NOW WHAT? 
 
REF: TEGUCIGALPA 01336 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles Ford, reasons 1.4 (b & d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Now that the Merida Initiative has been 
signed by the President, the embassy team has put together an 
update to the critical security sector needs in Honduras, the 
current political situation that may affect our efforts, and 
our recommendations for areas of focus within the Merida 
framework.  Political will at the highest level is currently 
lacking and the red-hot issue of the 2009 general election 
will be security.  In this political climate, strict USG 
control over programs and funding will be necessary to ensure 
successful outcomes.  Drug trafficking is the number one 
security issue in Honduras.  This is the opinion of the 
Honduran people in general, as well as our most trusted 
Government of Honduras (GOH) partners and our own law 
enforcement agencies.  Closely related to drug trafficking 
are the problems of criminal gangs and other organized crime. 
 We need to develop a comprehensive plan to ensure effective 
and efficient use of funds.  Focus should be on boosting 
intelligence efforts, tackling the lack of control in the 
prison system, providing basic criminal investigation and 
anti-corruption training, assisting with the 
professionalization of the police force, promoting 
cooperation between police and prosecutors, and helping civil 
society organizations to prevent youth violence.  At the same 
time we must continue to work with our bilateral and 
multilateral partners in Honduras to ensure coordination and 
avoid duplication of efforts.  Finally, Soto Cano is an 
important resource for regional intelligence, training and 
operations and must be a part of any serious anti-drug 
effort.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Reftel detailed a summary of GOH equipment needs in 
the framework of the Merida Initiative.  At the Merida 
Validation meeting in El Salvador on January 17-18, 2008, the 
GOH further coordinated its own self-evaluation and produced 
an updated list of requirements, with input from the Ministry 
of Public Security (police), Attorney General's Office, and 
the Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF).  The list of equipment 
needs has not changed since then, however, the embassy team 
would like to provide an update on the general political and 
security situation in Honduras and our thoughts on how it may 
affect Merida implementation. 
 
¶3. (C) Buy-in from each country is necessary for Merida 
implementation, but Honduras does not currently have the 
honest leadership to come up with an overall plan that will 
serve common interests for the region.  For Merida to be 
successful, the USG will need to develop a specific plan for 
the use of funds and then get host country agreement.  For 
example, we believe that assistance to the Ministry of 
Security and the Attorney General's Office on 
counternarcotics, money laundering, gangs, and investigation 
in general is a necessary step towards institution building. 
The Administration (both President and Ministry of Security) 
is at odds with the Attorney General's Office, and therefore, 
an effort should be made to strengthen both institutions but 
with close control of the funds and programs.  Oscar Alvarez, 
ex-Minister of Security under the former administration of 
Nationalist President Ricardo Maduro will perhaps get the nod 
as Vice-Presidential candidate and running mate of National 
Party leader Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo in the next elections 
(primaries are scheduled for November 2008 and general 
elections November 2009), which will put the security issue 
even more in the spotlight than it currently is.  The fact 
that security will be the red-hot political theme of the 
campaign is all the more reason why we need to strictly 
control the funds. 
 
¶4. (C) The embassy team identified the following as the most 
pressing problems that must be addressed to improve the 
security situation in Honduras: 
 
(a) Drug trafficking: Of all the security issues, this is the 
one that poses the greatest threat to regional security and 
U.S. national security.  From the large cities to the remote 
jungle areas, lawlessness is increasingly overtaking the 
country.  Corruption continues to bring Honduras closer to 
the status of a narco-state.  The criminal justice system is 
broken and there are no consequences for crimes committed if 
one has money and/or connections. Problems connected to drug 
trafficking, such as criminal gangs, money laundering, human 
trafficking and other organized crime, are contributing to 
the chaos, but the drug transit zone along the north coast 
consistently takes the brunt of the heat and has become more 
and more violent. 
 
(b) Gangs and prisons: The prison system is fully controlled 
by the prisoners, more specifically gang and other organized 
crime leaders. Additionally, organized crime is easily 
organized and directed from within the prisons. There is 
currently political will at the level of the Minister of 
Security to attack this problem head on, and with INL funding 
we have already begun assistance in this area.  Now is a good 
time to reinforce this program.  It is also important to note 
that the responsibility for the prison system will most 
likely soon be transferred from the Ministry of Security to 
the Ministry of Justice.  We are not sure of the extent of 
political will in that Ministry to tackle this difficult 
problem.  The other side to addressing this problem is 
prevention.  At this time GOH programs to prevent youth 
violence are practically non-existent. 
 
(c) Organized crime in general: Investigation is the weakest 
link in the criminal justice system.  Police and prosecutors 
do not work together and are lacking in basic criminal 
investigation skills.  The largely inaccessible and 
ungoverned areas of northern and eastern Honduras are where 
organized crime has free reign.  The Honduran police and 
military lack the communication equipment and training 
necessary to gain control over this problem. 
 
¶5. (C) For an effective and efficient use of Merida funds, 
the embassy team suggests a focus on the following: 
 
(a) Law enforcement:  Police education and basic police 
training with a strong anti-corruption component; assistance 
in the professionalization of the police force (currently we 
have an INL expert acting as police academy advisor but more 
must be done); and strengthening the Ministry of Security's 
Internal Affairs unit.  In June the Honduran Congress passed 
a new organic police reform law which is a step in the right 
direction towards improving the police force.  One of its 
most important articles elevates the Internal Affairs Unit to 
the level of Directorate, giving it more autonomy and its own 
budget.  The embassy team recommends that Merida money be 
concentrated on boosting this new Directorate.  We also 
recommend that interdiction funds be focused on supporting 
combined naval-police operations along the coast. Also, the 
GOH already has a police intelligence unit that generally 
functions well, is trusted by embassy law enforcement 
agencies, but needs assistance in strengthening and expanding 
its realm of action.  It was created years ago, with USG 
support, to specifically address drug trafficking but has 
taken on all forms of organized crime, including gangs. 
 
(b) Rule of law: Basic criminal justice training with a 
strong anti-corruption component; programs promoting 
cooperation between police and prosecutors.  A new draft law 
that will be debated by the Honduran Congress after it 
returns from recess on July 15 would transfer responsibility 
for investigating organized crime over to the Attorney 
General's Office and leave only the investigation of common 
crime with the General Directorate of Criminal Investigation 
(DGIC--police).  The investigation function was under the 
authority of the Attorney General's Office until 1998 when, 
as a response to the lack of results, it was moved over to 
the Ministry of Security.  After a decade of equally poor 
performance, lawmakers have proposed that the investigative 
functions be divided as described above.  Embassy team 
believes that the investigative unit under the Ministry of 
Security, which comes under the political authority and 
manipulation of the presidency, is becoming dysfunctional. 
We would want to focus our funding on a new, more independent 
investigative unit in the Attorney General's Office. 
 
(c) Prevention:  Support to NGOs' successful programs to 
prevent youth violence and assistance to the community police 
to augment and improve their gang prevention program. 
Communities generally do not trust the police and it is 
essential to help build that trust and equip the police with 
the skills and materials needed to meet communities' needs. 
Additionally, there are several NGOs that do commendable work 
directly with youth, parents, and community leaders. The 
Zelaya Administration has made it clear through its inaction 
that gang prevention is low priority.  Apart from the 
community police gang prevention unit, our recommendation is 
to focus the bulk of prevention efforts on assisting already 
well-established NGO programs. 
 
It is important to reiterate that education and training 
should be a large component of our assistance: for the 
police, military, prosecutors and judges.  This will be 
necessary to achieve a long-term impact. It is also necessary 
for us to formulate a comprehensive plan that ensures the 
full participation of all GOH agencies that make up the 
criminal justice system, as well as civil society 
organizations. 
 
¶6. (SBU) It is important not to lose track of the work other 
donors are doing in the security sector.  Embassy Tegucigalpa 
conducted an assessment of our partners' programs and is in 
frequent communication with them to coordinate efforts and 
avoid duplication. This saves resources, strengthens projects 
and sends a strong message to the GOH that we have shared 
goals. We must continue to work closely with our colleagues 
from bilateral and multilateral missions in the framework of 
Merida. Finally, the potential of Soto Cano Air Force Base as 
a facility for regional intelligence, training and operations 
must not be overlooked, both for police and military, for any 
serious anti-drug effort in Honduras. 
FORD