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FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
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INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
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RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2785
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 4102
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0315
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RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0582
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0454
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0599
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 4308
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2600
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0621
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7474
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RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC 0165
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0014

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000764 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR INL ANDREW BUHLER 
ANKARA FOR DEA MARK DESTITO 
ISLAMABAD FOR DEA MIKE MARSAC 
DUSHANBE FOR DEA PAUL HACKETT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON MCAP KCRM AF UZ
SUBJECT: STRATEGIC TERMEZ RIVER PORT PLAYS QUIET ROLE IN 
AFGHAN-UZBEK COMMERCE 
 
REF: A. TASHKENT 561 
     ¶B. TASHKENT 400 
     ¶C. TASHKENT 113 
     ¶D. 07 TASHKENT 1900 
     ¶E. 07 TASHKENT 2177 
     ¶F. 07 TASHKENT 2162 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On June 27 the Ambassador and emboffs made a 
rare visit to the Termez City River Port on the southern 
border with Afghanistan.  Barges at the Soviet-era facility 
transfer goods from road and rail links to the upstream 
Afghan town of Hayraton, returning with agricultural produce. 
 Port Director Kayum Jumaev noted that lower port fees make 
barge transfers a cheaper alternative than shipments on rail 
cars via the Friendship Bridge 12 kilometers upstream.  He 
also added that disaggregated cargo on river barges is much 
easier and quicker to inspect.  Some supplies for 
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan, such as drinking water from the Uzbekistan 
bottling plant in Namangan, are often transshipped via the 
river port, and it could play a more significant future role 
in a northern ground supply route if a Dubai-based shipping 
company proceeds with planned upgrades and investments. 
 
¶2. (C) An INL-funded project implemented by the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) will soon provide 
much-needed upgrades to counter-narcotic interdiction 
capabilities.  Kamol Dusmetov, the top Uzbek drug official, 
welcomed greater U.S. Government counter-narcotics 
cooperation but said mil-to-mil proposals need to be properly 
coordinated with GOU agencies since the Ministry of Defense 
by itself does not have the proper mandate.  He also said 
proposed DEA reengagement should, under his direction, 
encompass more entities than just the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs.  Building effective counter-narcotics cooperation 
will hinge on improving coordination between our governments 
and encouraging Uzbek officials to put turf issues and 
bureaucratic rigidity aside -- we have our work cut out for 
us.  End summary. 
 
A Rare Visit to the Sensitive River Port 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador and emboffs made a rare visit on June 27 to 
the Termez River Port, which the Government of Uzbekistan 
(GOU) considers a restricted, sensitive zone.  Permission to 
visit was granted in conjunction with the initial assessment 
of an INL-funded, UNODC-implemented assistance project to 
enhance interdiction capabilities.  The Soviet-era port 
facility is equipped with four large cranes for transferring 
cargo between barges and rail and road junctions.  Jumaev 
proudly pointed out a Soviet-legacy fumigation device used to 
treat agricultural goods arriving from Afghanistan, which he 
said is unique in the world for its ability to accommodate an 
entire rail car.  A residential neighborhood abuts the 
western side of the facility with almost no setback between 
private yards and the security fence.  Jumaev informed 
emboffs that a Dubai-based shipping company has expressed 
serious interest in making investments to upgrade the port 
facilities, which the GOU is reportedly excited about. 
 
¶4. (C) During the time of our visit there two large barges 
moored at the port along with a support vessel.  One barge 
 
contained a large cargo of roots from Afghanistan that was 
reportedly bound for China as an ingredient in medicines. 
The dock was piled high with boxes of raisins from 
Afghanistan, and Jumaev added that Afghan dates are also a 
common export.  Despite the cargoes there was no sign of any 
workers processing the goods.  Jumaev said there used to be 
regularly scheduled commercial vessels plying the waters of 
the Amu Daryo River between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan until 1994, when the security situation 
deteriorated.  Strained relations between the former Soviet 
republics did not help, he added.  (Comment:  Encouraging the 
neighboring countries to restore their historic maritime ties 
- the river was also an important artery in ancient times 
when it was known as the Oxus - could eventually expand 
commercial links and development.  For now, however, there 
are not even air links between the capitals of Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan due to the sour relationship.  End comment.) 
 
River Crossing Cheaper than Rail? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Jumaev insisted that it is more economical to ship 
goods across the river on barges rather than via the 
Friendship Bridge (the only fixed link between Uzbekistan and 
Afghanistan), which accommodates both road and rail traffic 
approximately 12 kilometers upstream from Termez at the 
Ayratom-Hayraton crossing.  Even though it involves an extra 
step, Jumaev said the assessed fees are lower.  He smiled and 
added that "the river port fees will always be lower," 
regardless of whether rail fees are adjusted.  In a July 1 
follow up inquiry, the State Agency for River Transport 
informed us that port fees are USD 7-8 per ton of cargo, 
which includes fees for loading, unloading, storing, and 
transportation.  The fees for the rail bridge are USD 180 per 
rail car, according to the same agency.  Jumaev also noted 
that the disaggregated cargo spread out on open-bed barges 
allows customs officials to inspect goods more quickly and 
efficiently than at the rail crossing, which saves time and 
money.  (Comment:  The rail track ends shortly after crossing 
the bridge into Afghanistan, so cargoes need to be offloaded 
from trains, anyway, but the short barge trip still 
represents an extra mode of transport in getting goods 
across.  Both the bridge and the port are state-operated, 
which is the main reason it can be more economical to add a 
barge segment into the logistical mix when road and rail 
segments are already necessary.  End Comment.) 
 
Military Supplies to Afghanistan 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Jumaev noted that bottled drinking water from 
Uzbekistan (the Nestle factory in the Ferghana Valley city of 
Namangan) and paper products are often shipped through the 
Termez river port en route to Afghanistan.  This is an 
important supply for U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan and 
an example of the strategic role that Uzbekistan's 
infrastructure already plays in a northern ground supply 
route.  The seemingly obscure Termez River Port, along with 
the more well-known Friendship Bridge, may become even more 
important to U.S. interests in Afghanistan as military 
planners seek to expand a stable and secure ground line of 
communication (GLOC) via Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. 
 
Helping Afghan Farmers 
---------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) Dusmetov stated that the Termez River Port is already 
serving to expand opportunities for Afghan farmers to access 
new markets in Central Asia and beyond, as the boxes of 
raisins and dates lining the wharf attest.  Yet UNODC 
officials also noted that production of narcotics in 
Afghanistan is soaring, so the trick is to fine-tune a 
balance between facilitating commerce on one hand and 
stronger interdiction efforts on the other.  (Comment:  It 
was refreshing to hear an Uzbek official commenting about the 
importance of facilitating the development of the 
agricultural sector in Afghanistan, which contrasts with the 
long-held view that the southern river border should be a 
fortress.  End comment.) 
 
Upgrading Interdiction Capabilities 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The U.S. is the only sponsor (through State 
Department's INL Bureau) of a new UNODC-implemented project 
to enhance the interdiction capabilities and security of the 
Termez River Port.  While much investment has been made to 
upgrade the road and rail crossing at Ayratom-Hayraton, which 
also included U.S. assistance from INL (ref F), there have 
been no upgrades to the river port facility since Soviet 
times.  Customs and Border Guard officials present for the 
assessment visit provided a wish list of equipment upgrades, 
which includes advanced x-ray machines, scales, additional 
canines, floodlights, and a network of CCTV cameras.  There 
is currently only one canine available to assist customs 
officers with inspections, compared with 10 at the recently 
completed Ayratom-Hayraton crossing. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment:  Mysteriously, the recording mechanism in the 
network of 56 advanced CCTV cameras at the modern 
Ayratom-Hayraton checkpoint malfunctioned very quickly and 
has never been repaired by the Government of Uzbekistan 
despite UNODC's work to put them in touch with the 
appropriate contractors (ref E).  This limits the utility of 
the network for investigative purposes and raises eyebrows 
about whether some customs and border guard officials have a 
vested interest in preventing the establishment of a digital 
record of cross-border activity (ref C).  We will follow up 
with the Uzbeks about this and will not recommend any similar 
equipment investment until the issue has been satisfactorily 
resolved.  There is also an issue with truck scales which 
have been broken for more than six months without corrective 
action by the Uzbeks, who are now responsible for the 
repairs, according to UNODC.  Ambassador and emboffs also 
visited the impressive Ayratom-Hayraton facility on June 26. 
End comment. 
 
Bureaucratic Turf Thwarts Mil-to-Mil Counter-Narcotics Plans 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶10. (C) In a casual chat along the wharf, Dusmetov noted that 
recent mil-to-mil meetings focusing on counter-narcotics 
cooperation were welcome by the Government of Uzbekistan (ref 
A), but he stated "don't expect a response any time soon." 
He elaborated that counter-narcotics work "is outside the 
competency area" of the Uzbek military and the Ministry of 
Defense therefore is not authorized to take the lead on such 
matters, even if it involves a primarily mil-to-mil with a 
counter-narcotics element.  It's not like your system," 
Dusmetov continued, "and such proposals should be directed to 
 
my office since we are responsible for counter-narcotics 
affairs."  (Comment:  Dusmetov wanted to convey that the 
dialogue to date, including formal diplomatic notes, on 
possible U.S. Department of Defense counter-narcotics 
assistance has not included the right people.  Dusmetov has 
two titles:  he is the Director of the National Center for 
Drug Control and the Deputy Chairman of the State Commission 
of Drug Control of the Cabinet of Ministers.  The Chairman of 
the latter is the Prime Minister, which makes Dusmetov the 
highest-ranking dedicated official on counter-narcotics 
issues.  Dusmetov conceded that the ultimate decision still 
"goes to the top," that is, to President Karimov, but the 
path it takes to his desk matters.  End comment.) 
 
DEA Should Seek Wider Range of Interlocutors 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Dusmetov similarly explained that his entity, the 
State Commission on Drug Control, must be at the center of 
the decision to approve DEA's request to return to Uzbekistan 
(ref B), but they have thus far not been the primary 
interlocutor.  (Note:  Per ref D, it was Dusmetov himself who 
first hinted to poloff in late 2007 that the GOU would 
welcome DEA's return.  End note).  He also criticized DEA's 
previous work in Uzbekistan as being too focused on the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, under which the Sensitive 
Investigative Unit operates.  Rather, "DEA should also be 
working with a much broader group of stakeholders, including 
my office, the National Security Service (which includes the 
Border Guards), Customs, and the military." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) The often overlooked Termez City River Port already 
plays an active role in the transit of goods on this 
strategic north-south corridor, as does the more well-known 
Friendship Bridge.  Together, this infrastructure is central 
to our interests in Afghanistan, specifically in developing 
stable supply routes to ISAF troops; stemming the northward 
flow of narcotics; and expanding economic links with 
neighboring Central Asian countries.  However, we learned 
that we need to redouble our efforts to link the planned 
participation of several U.S. Government agencies in 
counter-narcotics assistance with the appropriate 
corresponding Uzbek entity.  Proposals seem to get misrouted 
or stalled in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which lacks 
the clout to move proposals efficiently through the system. 
This coordination challenge is formidable, especially since 
there are turf issues between Uzbek government entities as 
well as stifling bureaucracy.  As a result, we may need to 
repackage our counter-narcotics proposals from the Department 
of Defense and the DEA to get them on the right and fast 
track. 
 
NORLAND