VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2699 2132111
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 312108Z JUL 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 082699 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL MX
SUBJECT: FOLLOWING UP WITH MEXICO ON PSI 
 
REF: A. MEXICO 01372 
     ¶B. MEXICO 01331 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND:  In advance of the May 29 
U.S.-hosted Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
Outreach Workshop in Washington, the U.S. extended 
invitations to a number of key countries that have not 
yet endorsed the PSI and also urged their endorsement. 
Washington appreciates Embassy's work in support of 
this PSI outreach effort with Mexico (refs A and B). 
Mexican SRE Assistant Director General for Security 
and Legal Issues Julian Juarez attended the PSI 
Workshop, along with Mexican Embassy Military Attache 
Jose Luis Chavez and Embassy political officials 
Jorge Colin and Fernando Gonzalez Saiffe. 
Representatives of 20 other countries that have not 
yet endorsed the PSI also attended the workshop, as 
well as most of the 92 PSI participating states. 
The workshop provided detailed information on 
the broad range of PSI activities and tools that have 
been developed for training, organizing for, and 
conducting interdictions of shipments of proliferation 
concern. 
 
¶2.  On July 17, State/ISN met with visiting CISEN 
National Authority Coordinator Jesus Mao Cervantes to 
discuss the PSI further.  Mao was receptive to the PSI, 
but said he and the Mexican interagency still have many 
questions about how the PSI functions and how PSI 
participation would benefit Mexico.  He stated that 
Mexico is interested in observing the August 11-21, 
2008 PANAMAX exercise in Panama.  PANAMAX is an annual 
exercise that SOUTHCOM conducts with Western Hemisphere 
countries. This year's exercise will include a PSI 
interdiction scenario as one of its aspects.  Mao also 
said that Mexico was interested in sending interagency 
observers to PSI exercise MARU in New Zealand September 
15-19, to the extent its resources allow.  (Mexico has 
been invited to observe both exercises.)  There was 
discussion of the U.S. possibly providing briefings on 
the PSI in Mexico City between the two exercises. 
Mao said the SRE would be able to arrange meetings in 
Mexico City to include other relevant Mexican agencies. 
 
¶3.  OBJECTIVE AND ACTION REQUEST:  Washington wishes 
to send a small team of PSI experts, led by State/ISN 
DAS Ken Staley, to Mexico City immediately following 
the PANAMAX exercise to follow up on our recent meetings 
and provide in-depth briefings for relevant Mexican 
agencies on the value of PSI participation.  Embassy is 
requested to propose such a visit and obtain host 
government's agreement and identification of acceptable 
dates.  At the same time, Embassy is requested to 
 
provide the following summary of the May 29 Outreach 
Workshop to host government and explain that it is 
for the information of officials from relevant agencies, 
such as the SRE, Ministry of Defense and military 
services, law enforcement agencies, and intelligence 
agencies. 
 
¶4.  REPORTING DEADLINE AND POINTS OF CONTACT: Embassy 
is requested to report host government's response to 
the proposed visit by COB August 6.  E-mail replies are 
acceptable.  Washington points of contact on the PSI 
are Jane Purcell, e-mail: PurcelJa@state.gov, 
202-647-6186; and Carlos Guzman, e-mail: 
GuzmanCS@state.gov, 202-647-6320. 
 
¶5.  Begin text of U.S. paper for Mexico: 
 
SUMMARY OF THE PSI FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OUTREACH WORKSHOP, 
MAY 29, 2008 
 
Patricia A. McNerney, Acting Assistant Secretary for the 
International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau of the 
U.S. Department of State, chaired a Outreach Workshop on 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on Thursday, 
May 29, 2008, which was open to all PSI countries and 
non-PSI countries.  Representatives from 21 non-PSI 
countries attended the meeting.  The workshop provided 
detailed information on the broad range of PSI 
activities, and shared best practices and tools that 
have been developed to assist countries with implementing 
the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. 
 
-- OVERVIEW OF THE PSI.  France led a panel of speakers 
from the U.S. and United Kingdom that addressed the 
origins of the PSI, the Statement of Interdiction 
Principles, and the PSI's practical implications as a 
equal and voluntary initiative that fully respects 
national and international laws.  This panel also 
presented new examples of PSI successes and the benefits 
of PSI, demonstrating how the PSI enhances the global 
nonproliferation objectives of all countries. 
 
-- CURRENT PROLIFERATION THREATS AND CHALLENGES.  The UK 
led a panel of speakers from Australia, Canada and Italy 
that discussed the challenges posed by transshipments by 
sea, land, and air and lessons learned during the last 
five years; cooperation with industry and involvement of 
industry in support of effective interdiction actions; 
and the challenges of interdicting dual-use items and 
materials. In addition, the topic of proliferation 
finance was introduced to convey how proliferators 
exploit vulnerabilities of the international financial 
system to finance the trade of proliferation-sensitive 
items, and how the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
has developed guidance to deal with this problem at 
the national and international level.  The organization 
of national customs operations to prevent and stop 
proliferation-related trafficking was also covered. 
 
-- THE PSI OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP (OEG).  The UK 
introduced the role of the OEG, emphasizing that the 
OEG works on behalf of all PSI endorsing states to 
develop operational concepts for interdiction; to explore 
related operational issues associated with the legal, 
law enforcement, customs and intelligence arenas; and to 
collaborate to develop an exercise program to increase 
partner capacity and improve national and international 
interoperability.  The presentation highlighted the 
record of the OEG in the last five years, to include 16 
meetings, over 30 live exercises, tabletop exercises, 
and workshops, and developing capacity building products 
such as the Model National Response Plan and the WMD 
Commodity Reference Manual.  The presentation concluded 
by addressing the challenges for the OEG in the areas of 
growth, sustaining momentum, and adapting to the threat 
of WMD proliferation. 
 
-- THE PSI AND INDUSTRY OUTREACH.  Denmark introduced its 
experience with industry outreach to address ways of 
conducting interdiction operations while minimizing 
impact to trade; the importance of information exchange 
between government agencies and industry; developing 
guidelines for cooperation; involving industry during 
exercises; and examples of how to conduct industry 
outreach at the national and international level. 
 
-- THE PSI EXERCISE PROGRAM.  Poland led a panel of 
speakers from the U.S., Ukraine, and Croatia that 
introduced the PSI exercise program and the history of 
PSI exercises; explained the strategy for 
current and future exercises; discussed the different 
types of exercises in the maritime, land and air 
domains, and described the different interagency 
actions involved with each area.  The presentations 
also discussed the benefits of participating in 
exercises and ideas on level of involvement and 
participation in future exercises, to include non-PSI 
countries as observers when opportunities arise. 
Ukraine and Poland offered short briefs on their 
respective experiences in hosting two recent 
PSI exercises.  Ukraine hosted PSI exercise "Eastern 
Shield" in October 2007 and Croatia hosted PSI 
exercise "Adriatic Shield" in May 2008. 
 
-- PSI LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED.  The UK and the 
Netherlands introduced a primer on legal aspects 
related to the PSI, emphasizing that all PSI activities 
are consistent with national and international laws. 
The presentations highlighted the importance of taking 
stock of existing national authorities and emphasized 
the utility of the PSI as a tool to implement UNSCR 1540. 
Additionally the issues of jurisdiction, disposition and 
liability were addressed, highlighting that these issues 
pose short-term implementation challenges in some 
instances but at the same time, demonstrate a measure of 
the success of the PSI in interdicting prohibited 
WMD-related items. 
 
-- ORGANIZING FOR THE PSI.  New Zealand provided an 
overview of the PSI Model National Response Plan, which 
provides guidance on key issues that a country needs to 
consider when developing a framework for responding to 
a PSI situation, and addresses questions and issues 
to be addressed when developing or improving national 
action plans.  A copy of the plan was distributed to 
all PSI and non-PSI countries in attendance.  Singapore 
provided a briefing on how a government can organize 
internal interagency coordination to optimize its 
ability to achieve overall PSI objectives.  It 
highlighted the creation of an Inter-Ministerial 
Committee to assess, coordinate, and advise senior 
officials on relevant agency actions related to PSI 
events, with the goal of achieving interconnectivity 
among all relevant agencies, prompt exchange and flow 
of information, and a timely response. 
 
-- WALK-THROUGH OF AN INTERDICTION SCENARIO.  A U.S. 
Naval War College professor facilitated a panel 
discussion of interdiction decision-making based on two 
hypothetical WMD trafficking interdiction scenarios. 
The panel consisted of legal, diplomatic, policy, 
military, and custom/law enforcement experts highlighting 
key issues that may arise during an interdiction 
situation.  The scenarios provided participants with 
lessons about the PSI that have been identified through 
previous PSI games, exercises, and actual interdictions. 
 
-- HOW EXPORT CONTROLS SUPPORT THE PSI.  Romania 
and Croatia presented briefings on their governments' 
experience in enacting export control laws, emphasizing 
the importance of strengthening primary export control 
legislation; taking stock of existing legislation to 
address gaps with revised and new legislation; 
highlighting the efficiency of a catch-all clause; and 
asserting that all countries, including those not a 
country of origin, face the threat of WMD proliferation 
and may provide opportunities along a proliferation 
or smuggling route. 
 
Note: Available presentation materials were distributed 
to country representatives who attended the workshop on 
May 29.  Presentation materials are available upon request. 
 
End text. 
RICE