VZCZCXRO1268
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHC #7660/01 2001958
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 181952Z JUL 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 5933
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1655
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 7812

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 077660 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2033 
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MTCRE KSCA GM IR AEC
SUBJECT: (S) RESPONDING TO GERMAN REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 
ON THE ICS SCHNEIDER - SBIG TEST CHAMBER CASE 
 
REF: A. 05 STATE 201650 
     ¶B. 05 BERLIN 3726 
     ¶C. 05 STATE 211408 
     ¶D. 05 BERLIN 3954 
     ¶E. 06 STATE 36325 
     ¶F. 06 BERLIN 674 
     ¶G. 06 STATE 62278 
     ¶H. 06 BERLIN 1123 
     ¶I. 06 STATE 70328 
     ¶J. 06 BERLIN 1229 
     ¶K. 06 BERLIN 1550 
     ¶L. MTCR POC 201/2006 - MAY 16 2006 
     ¶M. 07 STATE 75839 
     ¶N. 07 BERLIN 1137 
     ¶O. 07 STATE 108420 
     ¶P. 07 BERLIN 2163 
     ¶Q. 07 STATE 166482 
     ¶R. 07 BERLIN 2216 
     ¶S. STATE 15220 
     ¶T. BERLIN 195 
     ¶U. BERLIN 511 
     ¶V. BERLIN 643 
     ¶W. STATE 40087 
 
Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 
1.4 (B), (D). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see 
paragraph 9. 
 
¶2.  (S) Background:  Since November 2005, we have 
worked with German authorities to prevent Iran's solid 
propellant missile developer - the Shahid Bakeri 
Industrial Group (SBIG) - from procuring environmental 
test chambers from the German firm ICS Schneider 
Messtechnik (Schneider) (Refs).  On April 24, German 
MFA Export Control Division Desk Officer Wiebke Wacker 
advised post that the German Customs Office of Criminal 
Investigation (Zollkriminalamt, or ZKA) has been 
conducting an investigation into ICS Schneider and its 
head, Andreas Schneider, on the basis of USG-provided 
information  (Ref U).  Wacker has requested information 
on two specific issues related to this case: 1) 
conversations between U.S. officials and an Iranian who 
has been working as the middleman in the ICS Schneider 
- SBIG test chamber case; and 2) evidence that 
Schneider was aware that the intended end-user of the 
test chamber was SBIG. 
 
¶3.  (S) Wacker inquired about information concerning an 
Iranian who may have been "detained" at an undisclosed 
U.S. embassy (Ref V).  The Germans believe this Iranian 
has information linking Andreas Schneider (of ICS 
Schneider Messtechnik) with Iranian procurement agents 
and said that ICS Schneider dealings with Iranian 
procurement agents went off-line when this individual 
was "arrested."  Wacker gave no further details other 
than to say that the Iranian in question had applied 
for a U.S. visa.  In subsequent meetings, Wacker 
identified the Iranian visa applicant as Abdolmajid 
Naji.  (Note: Naji represents the Iranian company 
Rakin, a firm that has been acting as an intermediary 
between Schneider and SBIG front companies in the 
environmental test chamber case.  End note.)  According 
to Wacker, Naji was confronted (and possibly detained) 
by U.S. authorities in February 2008 while applying for 
a visa in Dubai.  Wacker said that the ZKA is seeking 
evidence needed to support its investigation of 
Schneider, and is interested in information concerning 
any conversations U.S. officials had with Naji. 
 
¶4.  (S) Wacker also advised that German investigators 
are interested in knowing whether the USG has any 
information indicating that Andreas Schneider was aware 
that the Iranian firm Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group 
(SBIG) would be the actual end-user of the 
environmental test chamber. 
 
¶5.  (S) Next Steps/Naji: We want to advise German 
officials that while Abdolmajid Naji did come to the 
U.S. Consulate General in Dubai in early 2008 to apply 
for a visa, he was not detained or arrested by U.S. 
officials.  We also want to advise German officials 
that, during the visa application process, Naji was 
interviewed at AmConGen Dubai, and indicated that he 
 
STATE 00077660  002 OF 004 
 
 
planned to visit his pregnant daughter in the U.S. 
Additionally, Naji stated that he is married with four 
other children (who live in Iran), and that he owns a 
private equipment company with his wife and earns 
$1,000,000 per month.  However, on April 27, Naji 
withdrew his visa application for unknown reasons. 
 
¶6.  (S) Next Steps/Schneider:  We want to respond to 
the German request for any information indicating that 
Schneider knew that the intended end-user of the test 
equipment was SBIG.  In the substantial volume of 
information we have provided to Germany on this case, 
we have not shared any information specifically 
indicating that Schneider ever dealt directly with 
SBIG, or even knew that SBIG (or the Iranian ballistic 
missile program) was the end-user.  In an April 21, 
2008 non paper provided to German authorities, the U.S. 
identified SBIG as the actual intended end-user of the 
test chamber, but noted that SBIG had been using front 
companies (Aban Commercial and Industrial Group, Saba 
Machinery Supplying Company, and Pooya Commercial and 
Engineering) in its efforts to procure the equipment 
from Schneider (Ref W).  Moreover, Schneider's primary 
interlocutor in these procurement efforts was Rakin, 
the intermediary, and not SBIG or its front companies. 
It is therefore conceivable that Schneider never knew 
that SBIG was the actual intended end-user. 
 
¶7.  (S) However, it is clear that Schneider 
representatives were aware that they were engaged in 
questionable - if not illegal - trade.  This is 
evidenced by the fact that at least three different 
Iranian entities were identified by Rakin as the end- 
user of the test equipment.  When we first began 
discussing this case with Germany (November, 2005), the 
purported end-user was Aban Commercial and Industrial 
Group (Ref A).  By March 2006, the end-user had changed 
to Saba Machinery Supplying Company (Ref E).  Based on 
information provided by the U.S., German authorities 
denied Schneider an application to export the test 
chambers to Saba in May, 2006 (Refs K & L).  After the 
denial, Rakin began listing Pooya Commercial and 
Engineering as the end-user (Ref M).  Even if Schneider 
was unaware that Aban, Saba, and Pooya were all front 
companies used by Iran's ballistic missile program, we 
would expect that a legitimate supplier would have 
raised questions - if not terminated the deal outright 
- in a case where three different entities were listed 
as the end-user for the same equipment in such a short 
time. 
 
¶8.  (S) Moreover, after the issuance of the May 2006 
denial, Schneider began scheming with Rakin to route 
the equipment through a firm in a third country - 
eventually settling on the Croatian firm Belmet 97 - in 
order to disguise the fact that the actual end-user was 
in Iran (Ref M).  We believe that Schneider may have 
been preparing to submit another export license 
application - listing Belmet 97 as the end-user - but 
according to German authorities, Schneider never did 
so.  As of December 2007, Rakin's Naji was still 
negotiating with Schneider for the sale of the test 
chamber, so we do not believe that the equipment was 
shipped to Iran via Belmet 97 (Ref Q).  Further, as of 
January 2008, Schneider and Rakin were working to send 
the test chambers to Iran via yet another third country 
entity - the UAE's Edib Oil General Trading - while 
falsely listing an entity in Tajikistan as the end-user 
(Ref S). 
 
¶9.  (S) Action Request:  Department requests Embassy 
Berlin approach appropriate host government officials 
to deliver talking points in paragraph 10 responding to 
German MFA Export Control Division Desk Officer Wiebke 
Wacker's request for information related to the ICS 
Schneider - SBIG test chamber case.  Post should also 
request from German officials an update on the current 
status of the investigation. 
 
¶10.  (S) Begin talking points/non-paper: 
 
(SECRET//REL GERMANY) 
 
--Since November 2005, we have been discussing with 
you efforts by Iran's Rakin Ltd. to procure 
environmental and temperature shock chambers from the 
German firm ICS Schneider Messtechnik on behalf of 
Iran's missile program. 
 
--On April 24, 2008, you advised us that the German 
 
STATE 00077660  003 OF 004 
 
 
Customs Office of Criminal Investigation 
(Zollkriminalamt, or ZKA) has been conducting an 
investigation into ICS Schneider and its head, Andreas 
Schneider, on the basis of USG-provided information. 
 
--You also requested information on two specific issues 
related to this case: 1) conversations between U.S. 
officials and an Iranian who has been working as the 
middleman in the ICS Schneider - SBIG test chamber 
case; and 2) evidence that Schneider was aware that the 
intended end-user of the test chamber was the Iranian 
solid-fueled ballistic missile entity Shahid Bakeri 
Industrial Group (SBIG). 
 
--With regard to the first issue, you recently inquired 
about information concerning an Iranian who may have 
been detained by U.S. officials in Dubai, where he was 
applying for a visa. 
 
--Specifically, you indicated an interest in learning 
of any conversations U.S. officials had with Abdolmajid 
Naji, a representative of Rakin Ltd., the firm that has 
been acting as an intermediary between Schneider and 
SBIG front companies in the environmental test chamber 
case. 
 
--While Abdolmajid Naji did come to the U.S. Consulate 
General in Dubai in early 2008 to apply for a visa, he 
was not detained or arrested by U.S. officials. 
 
--During the visa application process, Naji was 
interviewed and indicated that he planned to visit his 
pregnant daughter in the U.S. 
 
--Naji also stated during the interview that he is 
married with four other children (who live in Iran), 
and that he owns a private equipment company with his 
wife and earns $1,000,000 per month. 
 
--Naji provided the following information in his visa 
application: Address: 69 Manoochehr Hossein Nia St, 12th 
Street, Kargar Shomali, Tehran, Iran.  E-mail: 
rakin@dpimail.net.  Home phone: 0098 21 88633576; work 
phone: 0098 21 88012892. 
 
--On April 27, Naji withdrew his visa application for 
unknown reasons. 
 
--Note: The information derived from Naji's visa 
application may not be further disseminated.  If you 
wish to share this information with a third party 
please make a request through the Embassy to the U.S. 
Department of State. 
 
--In response to your question about ICS Schneider 
Messtechnik's possible knowledge of the fact that SBIG 
was the actual intended end-user of the test equipment, 
we have the following to share: 
 
--We do not at this time have any information 
indicating that Schneider ever dealt directly with 
SBIG, or even knew that SBIG (or the Iranian ballistic 
missile program) was the end-user of the products ICS 
Schneider was intending to export to Iran.  Schneider's 
primary interlocutor in these procurement efforts was 
Rakin, the intermediary, and not SBIG or its front 
companies. 
 
--However, it is clear that Schneider representatives 
were aware that they were engaged in questionable - if 
not illegal - trade. 
 
--For example, at least three different Iranian 
entities were identified by Rakin as the end-user of 
the test equipment: Aban Commercial and Industrial 
Group, Saba Machinery Supplying Company, and Pooya 
Commercial and Engineering. 
 
--When we first began discussing this case with you 
(November, 2005), the purported end-user was Aban 
Commercial and Industrial Group. 
 
--By March 2006, the end-user had changed to Saba 
Machinery Supplying Company.  Based on information 
provided by the U.S., your export control authorities 
denied Schneider an application to export the test 
chambers to Saba in May 2006. 
 
--After the denial, Rakin began listing Pooya 
Commercial and Engineering as the end-user. 
 
STATE 00077660  004 OF 004 
 
 
--Even if Schneider was unaware that Aban, Saba, and 
Pooya were all front companies used by Iran's ballistic 
missile program, we would expect that a legitimate 
supplier would have raised questions - if not 
terminated the deal outright - in a case where three 
different entities were listed as the end-user for the 
same equipment in such a short time. 
 
--In addition, after the issuance of the May 2006 
denial, Schneider began scheming with Rakin to route 
the equipment through a firm in a third country - 
eventually settling on the Croatian firm Belmet 97 - in 
order to disguise the fact that the actual end-user was 
in Iran. 
 
--As of January 2008, Schneider and Rakin were working 
to send the test chambers to Iran via yet another third 
country entity, the UAE's Edib Oil General Trading, 
while falsely listing an entity in Tajikistan as the 
end-user. 
 
--Note: Please be advised that we have not told UAE 
authorities that we have shared the information about 
the UAE company with you.  If you wish to share this 
information with a third party, please make a request 
through the U.S. Embassy. 
 
--While we cannot provide you with direct evidence that 
Schneider was aware that SBIG was the end user, this 
information clearly indicates a pattern of deception 
and knowledge that the equipment's intended end-use 
would have been problematic to German export 
authorities. 
 
--We hope this information is helpful in supporting 
your investigation.  We will continue to provide 
additional information on this case as it becomes 
available. 
 
-- We look forward to future cooperation on 
nonproliferation matters and would appreciate hearing 
any updates on the progress of your investigation of 
this case. 
 
¶11.  (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann 
with any questions or follow-up related to this case 
(202-647-1430 - herrmannjp2@state.gov or 
herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov) and slug reporting on this 
issue for ISN/MTR, EUR/CE (Tom O'Keeffe) and EUR/PRA 
(Matt Hardiman). 
RICE