O P 111220Z JUL 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY VALLETTA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 074485 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2033 
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC EWWT MT
 
SUBJECT: (S) FOLLOW-UP TO OUR REQUEST TO BOARD 
MALTESE-FLAGGED  M/V FIFTH OCEAN ON JUNE 8, 2008 
 
Classified By: ISN Acting DAS Ken Staley, 
Reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d) 
 
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ACTION REQUEST 
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¶1.  (S//REL Malta) Post is requested to approach 
appropriate-level host nation officials regarding our request 
over the weekend of June 7-8 concerning the Maltese-flagged 
vessel M/V FIFTH OCEAN.  Post may draw from background, 
objectives, and talking points/non-paper below, as 
appropriate.  As appropriate, Post should coordinate this 
demarche with the Defense Attach office. 
 
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OBJECTIVES 
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¶2.  (S//REL Malta) Post should: 
 
-- Explain our rationale for not invoking our bilateral PSI 
shipboarding agreement; 
 
-- Re-assure Maltese officials of the value we place in our 
bilateral ship-boarding agreement; 
 
 
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BACKGROUND 
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¶3.  (S//NF) The M/V FIFTH OCEAN, a Maltese-flagged vessel 
operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines 
(IRISL), was carrying a cargo of North Korean-origin steel 
consigned to Syria's Mechanical Construction Factory (MCF). 
According to our information, MCF has been associated with 
Syria's weapons development programs, making the shipment of 
proliferation concern. 
 
¶4.  (S//NF) The vessel made scheduled port calls in 
Marsaloxx, Malta; Valencia and Barcelona, Spain; and Genoa, 
Italy.  We had initially approached Spanish and Italian 
authorities and requested that they inspect the vessel and 
its containerized cargo to determine whether the steel in 
question was controlled under any nonproliferation export 
control regime, or if it had any WMD, ballistic missile, or 
other military applications.  Spanish authorities deferred to 
their Italian colleagues.  Italy, however, declined to 
off-load and inspect the relevant containers, citing the 
difficulty of inspecting containers located so deep in the 
vessel's cargo hold.  Accordingly, while the vessel was in 
Genoa, Italian officials conducted only a cursory inspection 
of the ship and its documentation. 
 
¶5.  (S//NF)  In order to gather more information regarding 
the shipment, US European Command (EUCOM) proposed conducting 
a compliant boarding of the vessel to inspect its cargo.  The 
Interagency agreed to this course of action and decided not 
to invoke the US-Malta PSI Ship-Boarding Agreement (SBA), 
given uncertainties about the nature of the cargo.  We 
understand that EUCOM then contacted the DATT and asked him 
to approach Maltese authorities via Defense Attach channels 
to request a compliant boarding. Since Malta agreed to allow 
the boarding only if the PSI Ship-Boarding Agreement was 
invoked, and since EUCOM had been granted authority to 
conduct the boarding only without invoking the agreement, the 
boarding was not conducted.  The FIFTH OCEAN proceeded to the 
Egyptian port of Damietta, where it off-loaded the cargo for 
transshipment to Syria. 
 
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TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER: 
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¶4.  (S//REL Malta) Begin talking points/non-paper: 
 
-- We would like to follow up with you regarding our 
rationale for requesting your permission to board the M/V 
FIFTH OCEAN. 
 
-- We had received information that the M/V FIFTH OCEAN was 
transporting 12 containers, whose contents were described as 
&steel materials for construction.8 
 
-- Our information indicated that the consignee for this 
shipment was Mechanical Construction Factory (MCF) in 
Damascus, Syria.  MCF is an entity associated with Syria's 
weapons development program.  The shipper of this cargo was 
the Chinese shipping company COSCO Logistics (Dalian) 
Company.  Our information also indicated that the DPRK's 
Korean Foreign Transportation Corporation was also probably 
involved in this shipment. 
 
-- Due to the consignee's past involvement in activities 
related to Syria's weapons programs, we wanted to board the 
vessel to investigate this shipment and gather additional 
information regarding the cargo and possibly determine 
whether it involved any items of proliferation concern. 
 
-- Uncertainty about whether this cargo was related to a WMD 
or delivery system program influenced our decision not to 
invoke the PSI shipboarding agreement with Malta. 
 
-- Upon further review of this situation, we believe there 
was a reasonable basis for a compliant boarding pursuant to 
the Shipboarding Agreement. 
 
-  We place great value on the Shipboarding Agreement and 
believe it will continue to be an important means of 
achieving our shared goal to prevent the proliferation of WMD 
and ballistic missiles.  The lessons learned in this case 
will help ensure that if we need to invoke the Shipboarding 
Agreement in the future, it will be done in an efficient 
manner. 
 
END POINTS. 
 
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POINT OF CONTACT AND REPORTING REQUIREMENT 
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¶5.  (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up is Mark 
Felipe, ISN/CPI, (202) 647-5376, felipem2@state.sgov.gov. 
 
¶6.  (U) Please report delivery of points and any immediate 
response by 30 June. 
 
¶7.  (U) Washington thanks posts for assistance.  Please slug 
responses for EUR, ISN, and T. 
RICE 
 
 
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