VZCZCXRO1560
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHRH #1114/01 2010943
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 190943Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8818
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0229
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHRMAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001114 
 
SIPDIS 
 
P FOR U/S WBURNS 
NEA FOR DAS GGRAY 
DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KKOLEVAR, MWILLIAMSON, GPERSON, 
AND JHART 
S/CT FOR GFEIERSTEIN, SUSAN BURK, GAIL ROBERTSON, AND 
BAVERILL 
DS/ATA FOR KMALOY 
TREASURY PASS TO A/S CLOWERY 
DHS PASS TO TWARRICK AND DGRANT 
CIA PASS TO TCOYNE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2018 
TAGS: KCIP EPET ENERG PTER ASEC SA
SUBJECT: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WORK PROGRESSES IN RIYADH 
 
REF: SECSTATE 70793 
 
Classified By: DCM Michael Gfoeller for 
reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U)  This cable has been cleared by 
DOE A/S Kevin Kolevar. 
 
¶2.  (S)  During a July 8 visit to Riyadh, DOE A/S Kevin 
Kolevar met with Ministry of Interior representatives 
Joint Working Group (JWG) on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) Co-Chair Dr. Saud A-Semari and Dr. 
Khalid Al-Ageel, Manager, High Commission on Industrial 
Security.  The U.S. JWG Co-Chair Economic Counselor 
Robert Murphy participated, as did a delegation from 
DOE and the Embassy.  Major  outcomes of the 
discussions included: 
 
--------------------------------- 
Abqaiq Assessment to Move Forward 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S)  Dr. Al-Semari told us the Saudis are 
now ready to move forward with a complete 
Vulnerability Assessment (VA) of Saudi Aramco's 
Abqaiq Plants.  We are scheduling a visit by DOE 
and Sandia Lab personnel for early August to 
conduct the VA.  This is a key win for the Joint 
Working Group.  DOE's Office of Electricity 
Delivery and Energy Reliability is able to finance 
the VA, as we meanwhile work to finalize procedures 
for future Saudi financing of bilateral CIP efforts 
under the May 2008 Technical Cooperation Agreement 
signed by Secretary Rice. 
 
--Background to Abqaiq Plants:  Abqaiq is the 
world's single largest petroleum processing 
and de-sulphurization facility.  About 70% of 
Saudi crude production passes through Abqaiq 
for processing.  The facility is critical to 
the world's petroleum markets. It has a through 
-put capacity of 7 million-plus barrel per day 
(bpd) capacity, of which 6.3 mbpd are routinely 
utilized. 
 
--The VA is an in-depth, technical review of 
the facility's operational and security systems. 
The VA includes a 2-week on-site data collection 
and discussion period, followed by a month-long 
data analysis period.  A Sandia National Labs 
team will analyze Abqaiq data utilizing its VA 
computer models.  The Saudi MOI would receive VA 
results and recommendations within about one month 
after completion of the on-site data collection. 
JWG members regard successful completion of the VA 
as one of our highest priorities, and a template 
for facility-based work in the future. 
 
--We are particularly concerned to identify Abqaiq 
components which were custom-manufactured several 
decades ago, in the 1970s, and for which Saudi 
Aramco may have no replacements or spare parts. 
Such single-point failures would be of grave concern. 
Saudi Aramco personnel have not been able to provide 
a clear picture of these vulnerabilities during past 
short visits to Abqaiq by JWG personnel.  An in-depth 
analysis of Abqaiq's engineering plans and drawings, 
along with extended access to and discussion with 
key technical personnel, are required to better 
understand the plant's specific vulnerabilities. 
 
--The VA also will help us to better advise the 
MOI and Saudi Aramco on how to design security 
systems to protect Abqaiq, and for contingency 
planning to prepare for any possible attack on 
the facility.  Such planning would allow Saudi 
Aramco and the MOI to better mitigate long-term 
damage, ensure maximum possible continuity of 
operations, and respond and recover as 
swiftly as possible. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
MOI Requests Threat Warning System Assistance 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4.  (C)  The MOI had expressed an interest in 
adopting a national threat warning system, and 
had requested a briefing on systems in use in 
the U.S.  During the July 8 meeting, DOE 
Infrastructure System Analyst VanderMey therefore 
presented on U.S. threat warning systems, 
including DHS's Homeland Security Advisory 
System and the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Security 
System (MARSEC).  Our MOI interlocutors were 
particularly impressed to learn how the USG works 
with industry in implementing the threat warning 
system, sharing information on an as-needed basis, 
and even sponsoring some industry personnel for 
security clearances so that information could be 
better shared.  The group also discussed the 
utility of restricting a specific threat warning 
to a given region, city, or industrial sector. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Dr. Saud-Al Semari requested the USG make 
available one employee who is familiar with the U.S. 
threat warning systems for a 6-12 month period to 
assist the MOI in implementing a  similar system 
for Saudi Arabia.  A/S Kolevar stated that he 
believed he could work with DHS or DOE 
to make such a person available, although 
perhaps for a shorter, more focused period 
of time. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
MOI Proposes Intelligence Liaison 
Offices with Key Sectoral Ministries 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S)  Dr. Al Semari then steered the 
discussion towards how the USG structured 
its intelligence-sharing and liaison 
functions for agencies such as DHS and 
DOE.  A/S Kolevar explained that the Department 
of Energy had its own intelligence division, 
but that it largely played a liaison role with 
the larger intelligence services.  He, Economic 
Counselor Murphy, and Energy Analyst Burke also 
explored the frequent practice of seconding 
personnel between departments, offices, and 
functions to allow for better intelligence sharing. 
 
¶7.  (S)  Dr. Al-Semari stated it would be useful 
for the MOI to establish a liaison office within 
MOI to better communicate with key sectoral ministries 
such as the Ministry of Petroleum (MinPet) and 
Transportation,or alternately, seek to establish 
liaison offices within these  ministries.  He noted 
that while the High Commission on Industrial Security 
(which oversees security and safety issues at 
parastatals such as Saudi Aramco and SABIC) had 
deepened ties with industry, the MOI still has no 
clear mechanism for working easily with other 
ministries.  Dr. Al Semari concurred with Econ Off 
that having liaison personnel imbedded in 
a ministry would establish a more effective, on-going 
relationship, which could help ensure key counterpart 
ministers address security issues with appropriate 
understanding and seriousness. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Regarding reftel A, Economic Counselor 
Robert Murphy hand-delivered the letter from 
U/S Burns to HRH Assistant Minister of Interior 
for Security Affairs Prince Mohammed bin Nayif 
on July 7.  2 
 
-------- 
Comment 
-------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  The Mission was pleased -- on two levels 
-- to hear Dr. Al-Semari initiate the idea of 
establishing an MOI intelligence liaison to improve 
communication with other ministries.  First, it will 
help the MOI function and communicate better with 
other key ministries who require security 
information to address their sector's challenges. 
Additionally, this is the first time within the JWG 
that the MOI has proposed a systemic change to 
improve its communication with other organizations. 
We have spent the last two years working closely with 
the MOI, encouraging them to coordinate and communicate 
with other parts of the government and industry on 
security issues.  The MOI now appears to be thinking 
deeply and independently about how to apply these 
lessons to its own environment in a manner appropriate 
to Saudi norms.  This is a small but we hope 
significant harbinger of progress to come. 
 
FRAKER