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C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000391 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/8/2018 
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV EAID PINR PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN'S PROSPECTS FOR CURBING MILITANCY 
 
REF: ISLAMABAD 2135 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael A. Via, Acting Principal Officer, 
Consulate Peshawar, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
Summary/Introduction 
-------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) Despite the presence of over 100,000 combined 
military/security forces in the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA) and over 50,000 in the Northwest Frontier Province 
(NWFP), the government has been losing space to militants since 
¶2002.  The pace of loss has accelerated over the past year. 
Distraction at the national level with political survival, 
policy dissonance between the federal and provincial 
governments, competition over bureaucratic turf, and fractious 
civil-military relations have translated into local governance 
that is adrift and unable to check swiftly and effectively 
opportunities for militant expansion.  Militants, meanwhile, 
have been moving toward greater coordination, particularly 
through Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan. 
 
¶2. (C) Pakistan faces significant challenges in its efforts to 
curb and roll back militancy emanating from the tribal areas. 
The threat taking shape goes deeper and well beyond a 
historically sometimes romanticized "wild West."  The 
deterioration of security in the Peshawar district that 
culminated in the launch of operations in Khyber Agency is part 
of a broader set of trends with the potential to reach beyond 
the Northwest Frontier area.  Loss of traditional community 
leaders, weak administration, ineffective law enforcement, slow 
justice, crumbling social services, a distressed economy, and 
poverty all have enhanced the militancy's strength in the FATA 
and the NWFP. 
 
¶3. (C) We are implementing long-term development programs and 
beginning to provide security training.  Given growing 
short-term challenges, however, we need a more robust, 
fast-track response to help woefully under-funded and equipped 
security and government forces extend security, governance, and 
development.  Other donors are needed through mechanisms such as 
a World Bank-led consortium (reftel).  Pakistan must also commit 
resources to this endeavor, particularly salary and benefits 
support for law enforcement.  Absent measures to contain the 
trends that are in motion in the FATA and NWFP, the insurgency 
on the border has the potential to reach elsewhere into Pakistan 
-- and it is unclear how Pakistan would cope with that 
development.  End Summary/Introduction 
 
Accelerating Loss of Space 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The government has steadily been losing control of space 
to militants since 2002 and that pace has accelerated over the 
past year.  In 2005, except for the Waziristans, Consulate's 
Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) staff building roads in the FATA 
were able to operate fairly widely with some manageable, 
primarily historical (criminal) risk in the other five agencies. 
 In 2008, the Waziristans remain nearly inaccessible, and NAS is 
no longer able to operate in most of the other five agencies. 
In Bajaur and Mohmand where we once operated freely, only small 
areas adjacent to the NWFP are now accessible.  Friendly pockets 
remain in upper Kurram, but can only be reached by air because 
of threats on the land route through Kohat and Hangu.  Orakzai 
once deemed entirely safe is now viewed as risky.  Khyber, once 
the most accessible agency, has only pockets of space where risk 
is manageable, primarily in its northern area and in communities 
not far off the Peshawar-Kabul highway. 
 
¶5.  (C)  USAID's Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI) with 
embedded partner staff in Political Agents' compounds has seen 
similar trends since it started field operations in January 
2008, primarily in Khyber, Orakzai, and Mohmand.  In the NWFP, 
southern districts and some northern districts (Swat, Dir, and 
Malakand) are now largely off limits to us.  In 2002, we were 
able to visit all of these areas.  OTI, however, is operating in 
five of the seven FATA agencies. 
 
¶6. (C) More militant and/or criminal hot spots are popping up 
than security forces, including the Pakistan army, can control. 
The collapse of the North Waziristan Agreement and the Lal 
Masjid operation in July 2007 appears to have been the take off 
point for the acceleration of violence targeted at government 
institutions and the loss of space.  The declaration of a new 
Lal Masjid in Mohmand, the capture of 250 security forces in 
South Waziristan, the open uprising of Tehrik-i Nafaz-i 
Shariat-i Mohammadi (TNSM) militants in Swat, the ambush of army 
forces in North Waziristan, the outbreak of sectarian violence 
in Kurram, the encroachment of militants into the Kohat/Darra 
Adam Khel/Orakzai area, the destabilization of Khyber because of 
criminal activity, and growing incidents of targeted violence in 
NWFP districts near Peshawar have all taken place within the 
past year.  Many of these developments occurred simultaneously 
or close in time.  At best, security forces, including the 
military, appear to have the ability to address no more than two 
major hot spots at any given moment.  The impact is that smaller 
law and order problems go unattended. 
 
¶7. (C) Militant coordination and cooperation with criminals 
appears to be growing.  The most visible example of this over 
the past year was the emergence of the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP) in December 2007 that announced an alliance among 
militants, including Baitullah Mehsud and Bajaur's TNSM leader 
Faqir Mohammad.  The degree of cooperation and control is 
difficult to assess, but we are seeing more references to TTP 
from militants in the FATA and the NWFP. 
 
¶8. (C) The criminal element poses a different dilemma. 
Criminals, according to local contacts, are operating in 
relationships of mutual convenience with militants.  Khyber's 
warlord Mangal Bagh who was the target of recent operations has 
predominantly been a criminal figure, running smuggling routes. 
Much of his criminal activity in the Peshawar environs -- 
kidnappings, control of the alcohol and drug trade -- was aimed 
at generating revenue for himself rather than attacking 
government institutions.  Figures such as Mangal Bagh, however, 
pose a longer-term danger.  In some cases, they are reportedly 
facilitating cross-border attacks and other militant activities. 
 The unchecked criminal activities also soften up the ground for 
militants by helping to establish an atmosphere of fear and 
intimidation.  Perhaps the most dangerous impact of all is that 
militants and criminals alike appear to have lost their fear of 
security forces, including the military -- a fear that was once 
critical to maintaining law and order in the FATA and the NWFP. 
 
Tribal Fabric in Distress 
------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The FATA is hemorrhaging leaders.  According to local 
estimates, 250 to 300 tribal elders have been killed, most of 
them since 2004.  The majority of the assassinations have been 
in the Waziristans, but other parts of the FATA and NWFP have 
been hit as well.  The attacks have primarily picked off tribal 
leaders in twos and threes.  More recently, a suicide attacker 
killed 50 elders in Darra Adam Khel in March, and Baitullah 
Mehsud loyalists executed 23 in Jandola in June. 
 
¶10. (C) Many of the educated and professionals -- natural 
sources of local leadership and bulwarks against extremism -- 
are leaving their communities and are unable to return even for 
brief visits.  From Bajaur to South Waziristan or places such as 
Swat, we are seeing or hearing of those who have decamped to 
adjacent NWFP districts, Peshawar, Islamabad, or Karachi -- 
mainly because of security.  The newer heros, particularly to 
young boys, are reportedly the Baitullah Mehsuds who do not come 
from particularly important local families, but who have 
acquired status through their reputations as "jihadi 
commanders." 
 
¶11. (C) In this environment, peace agreements signed and 
enforced by tribal community leaders will be difficult to 
maintain.  The deterioration of security, and particularly the 
targeting of pro-government elders, has shaken many traditional 
community leaders who do not have confidence that the government 
is able to protect them if they agree to stand up to militants. 
The government has been encouraging Political Agents to return 
to living in their agencies to counter this trend. 
 
Weakening Administration 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) Turnover among key civilian field and working-level 
officers is increasing.  Historically, Political Agents served 
at least two years in a posting.  More recently, Political 
Agents have been rotating out short of twelve months in an 
assignment and in some cases after less than six months in the 
more difficult areas such as the Waziristans.  One FATA 
Secretariat official attributed the relatively rapid turnover to 
"burnout" because of the increasing danger and pressures of the 
position. 
 
¶13. (C) The training ground for Political Agents is gone.  The 
system of positions, known as the District Management Group 
(DMG), that once groomed young civil service officers to 
administer tribal agencies and provincial districts throughout 
Pakistan was largely dismantled under President Musharraf's 
"devolution" reform in 2002.  The DMG positions once wielded 
broad authorities at the district level -- administration of 
resources, authority over the police, and magistrate powers. 
"Devolution" substantially diluted these authorities in the 
provinces, leaving a much weaker district administrator 
position, the usual starting position for most Political Agents. 
 More broadly, with the loss of prestige, the DMG is no longer 
seen as the premier civil service path.  Pakistan's best and 
brightest in the civil service are no longer choosing district 
administration at a moment when top talent in this field is 
desperately needed.  USAID's capacity building projects in the 
FATA Secretariat can help the situation but alone will not 
counteract this trend. 
 
Ineffective Law Enforcement 
--------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) FATA's paramilitary forces including Frontier Corps, and 
NWFP police are increasingly de-moralized.  They are facing 
adversaries who are reportedly better paid and equipped with 
better weaponry.  Law enforcement recruits generally make 
4,000-7,000 rupees ($50-$100) per month while militants are 
reportedly paying twice that amount.  In some cases, 
paramilitary personnel must supply their own weapons, 
ammunition, and uniform.  Training is often inconsistent.  There 
are few, if any, retirement or death benefits.  In the tribal 
areas and along the NWFP/FATA border, these forces are 
frequently deployed in remote 10-20 man posts that become the 
target of militants who are able to intimidate or overwhelm. 
ODRP reports that 11th Corps often deploys Frontier Corps as an 
infantry battalion -- a role for which they are not trained and 
consequently do not perform well. 
 
¶15. (C) There is insufficient authority in the field to direct 
law enforcement.  "Post-devolution," in practice, means that 
provincial law enforcement has no administrative or elected 
oversight at the district level, often leaving the police 
adrift.  The "devolution" reforms also destroyed the 
cross-cutting jurisdiction that gave senior administration 
officials in the field combined oversight of a tribal agency, 
frontier region, and provincial district.  That combined 
oversight and other broad authorities gave these officials the 
power to order the movement of law enforcement assets to tackle 
quickly law and order problems that straddled the NWFP/FATA 
border.  Such coordination must now be referred back to Peshawar. 
 
Justice Deferred 
---------------- 
 
¶16. (C) Militant identification with Sharia law is one of its 
most potent tools for generating local support.  The most 
frequent example of militant parallel government in the FATA and 
NWFP is administration of justice.  The call for Sharia law, 
however, is for many simply a demand for "quick justice."  Local 
dissatisfaction with the access to the courts and the pace of 
judicial decision is high.  Civil cases, particularly for 
property disputes, regularly drag on for decades.  According to 
a number of Peshawar observers, the heart of the discontent in 
Swat has been long unresolved land disputes which gave TNSM (and 
now Tehrik-I Taliban - Swat) a popular local cause.  When 
Sharia's full meaning is explained, enthusiasm for Sharia drops 
quickly. 
 
No Teachers, No Jobs, No Money 
------------------------------ 
 
¶17. (C) While the FATA has been identified as a long neglected 
area for development, mainstream Pakistan, as ostensibly 
represented by many parts of the NWFP appears only marginally 
better off - and may not be well enough to ward off the 
pressures of militancy and extremism.  On travels to outlying 
NWFP districts that have been possible, lack of social services, 
particularly health and education, surface quickly in 
conversations with local residents.  The closing of schools for 
lack of teachers and the falling standards of qualifications for 
teachers are a source of frustration.  The lack of local 
employment opportunities and rising prices of energy and 
commodities is a source of anger.  Local militants have not yet 
shown a serious interest or capability in parallel government 
function that would deliver basic services a la the Hezbollah 
model.  However, signs of such a development would spell even 
greater danger for the FATA, NWFP, and potentially the rest of 
Pakistan. 
 
VIA