O 081036Z JUL 08
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C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000390 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/8/2018 
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PINR PK AF
SUBJECT: NWFP GOVERNOR ON KHYBER OPERATION, FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND 
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE TALKS 
 
REF: A) PESHAWAR 389, B) PESHAWAR 382, C) PESHAWAR 370, D) PESHAWAR 360 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael A. Via, Acting Principal Officer, 
Consulate Peshawar, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Governor Owais Ghani 
briefed NSC Senior Director for South and Central Asia Mark 
Webber on the status of current operations in Khyber Agency 
during a July 3 meeting.  While the Governor would like to 
expand operations to other parts of Khyber agency, he is limited 
by security forces which are "stretched."  Uzbeks and Arabs are 
still present in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 
but Ghani assured Senior Director Webber that his forces would 
go after militant commanders.  Cooperation with political 
leadership at the provincial level is good, but the Governor is 
not receiving all of the support he has requested from 
Islamabad.  Repatriating Afghan refugees is still a challenge 
due to ongoing turmoil in Afghanistan.  While over 100 
"militants" have been arrested and dozens of militant hideouts 
demolished in the current Khyber operation thus far, it is 
unclear whether the GOP speaks from a position of authority yet 
in a tribal agency wracked by growing lawlessness and criminal 
activity.  End Summary. 
 
Khyber Operation 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Governor stated that he had planned to carry out the 
operation in Khyber agency's Bara area in April/May after a 
skirmish with Mangal Bagh in Khyber's Jamrud area but had "been 
too busy on other fronts to do so."  Responding to a question 
about potentially expanding operations into the Tirah Valley, 
the Governor said that his forces were "stretched."  According 
to Ghani, he had initially requested four wings of Frontier 
Corps, but was only given two.  The Governor said he had needed 
at least two wings to keep in reserve because the troops are 
"getting tired."  He also received only 27 of the 32 Frontier 
Constabulary platoons that he had requested.  (Note: A wing 
consists of 400-650 soldiers.  A platoon is approximately 30 
troops.  End note.) 
 
¶3. (C) Ghani said that the operation in Bara had met with no 
resistance due to four months of "political spadework."  He 
claimed that the operation had the support of the people and 
that common individuals had assisted security forces in 
identifying over 100 suspected militants who had since been 
arrested.  The Governor predicted that the operation would 
continue for another seven to ten days and claimed that the 
operation's objective of reducing the immediate threat to 
Peshawar had been met.  Ghani said that he is currently unable 
to venture out of Bara because he does not have the manpower to 
do so.  He claimed, however, that Bara is now "weapons-free" and 
that troops are confiscating militant arms. 
 
Foreign Fighters 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Responding to Senior Director Webber's question about the 
presence of foreign fighters in the FATA, Ghani said that both 
Uzbeks and Arabs "are still there."  Despite the killing of 
"hundreds" of Uzbeks during military operations in 2007, the 
Governor did not see their numbers diminishing, but rather noted 
a steady "trickle" of incoming Uzbek fighters.  The Governor 
also claimed that Arabs, who first "stage" in Afghanistan's 
Helmand province, are coming into the tribal areas.  The 
Governor asked for the United States to "keep them busy in Iraq, 
while we sort out our problems here."  Ghani acknowledged that 
cross-border movement has increased over recent months but noted 
that recent peace talks in South Waziristan included provisions 
specifically prohibiting this movement. 
 
¶5. (C) Moving to the topic of confronting militant leaders such 
as Baitullah Mehsud, the Haqqani network and Hekmatyar, the 
Governor described these militants as the "center of gravity" 
and urged that "we need to get them."  He said that "we have no 
reservations about going after them" and cited a shortage of 
night fighting capability as a reason why Frontier Corps and 
Army soldiers have been unable to follow through on capturing or 
killing these commanders.  The Governor said that he had 
approached Chief of Army Staff General Kayani for this support 
but has not yet received any material assistance.  Webber 
affirmed that the United States is prepared to help and 
emphasized that staffing border coordination centers and 
training sites would be a good step toward increased 
U.S./Pakistan cooperation. 
 
Cooperation with Political Leadership 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Governor Ghani described his "FATA Policy Committee" as 
evidence that he is consulting the political leadership in the 
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).  The Committee consists of 
himself, NWFP Chief Minister Haider Hoti, Awami National Party 
provincial president Afrasiab Khattak (in his new capacity as 
"Peace Envoy"), the 11th Corps and Frontier Corps Commanders, 
the NWFP Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and the FATA Additional 
Chief Secretary (ref. C).  He claimed that ANP leader Asfundyar 
Wali Khan is "very much involved" in formulating FATA policy and 
said that he had discussed the Bara operation with ANP's 
leadership over a month ago.  According to the Governor, ANP had 
pressured Prime Minister Gilani to extract Frontier Constabulary 
troopers from Balochistan to be used in the NWFP and FATA. 
Ghani claimed that Pakistan's newly elected government is "still 
having problems settling down" and commented that he was 
somewhat concerned that Nawaz Sharif had not been consulted 
about carrying out operations in Bara. 
 
Refugees 
-------- 
 
¶7. (C) Responding to Senior Director Webber's concern that 
refugee camps can serve as centers of gravity for militancy in 
Pakistan's northwest, Ghani replied that two major camps had 
recently been "cleaned out."  The Governor said that Peshawar's 
Kachagari and Nowshera's Jalozai camps had been emptied, but he 
was concerned about "destabilizing what little government is 
left in Afghanistan."  He said that he would like to push the 
refugees back across the border because they are an "economic 
and social drain" on his province, but they "need to have 
something to go back to." 
 
Fence the Border? 
----------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Governor described his strategy of fencing and mining 
the Pakistan/Afghanistan border and building approximately 25 
biometric crossing points.  He attributed his failure to 
successfully carry out this initiative to Afghan "interference." 
 Ghani claimed that during his tenure as Governor of 
Balochistan, a Governor from an adjacent province in Afghanistan 
(NFI) led a procession and stoned a prototype border crossing 
point that Ghani had established in the Chama Nagh area of 
Balochistan.  Ghani claimed that the Afghans were against 
fencing the border because it would "inhibit the flow of 
narcotics."  He acknowledged the possibility of international 
concern with mines, but requested that the United States find 
out why the Afghans are against fencing and mining the border 
and encouraged Webber to convince Afghanistan to participate. 
(Note: In Ref A, Frontier Corps Commander Khattak did not 
consider fencing, and particularly mining, to be a productive 
use of resources in stopping cross-border attacks.  End note.) 
 
Militant Funding 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Governor Ghani repeated his suspicion that Russia is 
involved in funding militants in Afghanistan.  (Note: Ghani 
conveyed this theory to NIO Peter Lavoy on June 26 - ref C.  End 
note.)  He claimed that successful attacks such as the July 2 
downing of a helicopter in Afghanistan's Logar province are 
evidence that Russian operatives are injecting high quality 
arms, such as Stinger missiles, in "small, unnoticeable 
quantities" into Afghanistan.  According to the Governor, "the 
Russians' greatest success lies in the fact that we have not yet 
been able to discern their involvement."  While Ghani conceded 
that he did not have proof of this interference, he claimed that 
an investigation would be necessary. 
 
The Governor's FATA Policy 
-------------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (C) NWFP Governor Owais Ghani described his policy in the 
FATA in similar terms to those relayed to Counselor Eliot Cohen, 
National Intelligence Officer Peter Lavoy and Ambassador on June 
12, 18, and 26 (refs. B, C, and D).  He described his strategy 
of conducting peace talks with tribal elders as a means to carry 
out development work in the FATA as quickly as possible.  He 
acknowledged that the accords - or "undertakings" - were not 
long-term agreements and would not hold indefinitely.  When 
Senior Director Webber raised concerns that a lack of adequate 
enforcement would enable the already increasing threat to grow 
stronger, he acknowledged the need for continued security 
operations to deal with violations of the agreements.  However, 
effective enforcement to the Governor means having military and 
paramilitary troops ready to move in within a few hours and 
noted that soldiers are present in North Waziristan's Miramshah, 
Razmak, Dattakhel and Shawal areas.  Ghani stated that he did 
not wish to make the text of the South Waziristan agreement 
public until it was finalized in order to prevent any negative 
reaction in the press. 
 
VIA