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AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000389 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/8/2018 
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PINR PK AF
SUBJECT: FRONTIER CORPS COMMANDER ON FATA OPERATIONS, COOPERATION 
WITH US/AFGHAN FORCES 
 
REF: PESHAWAR 381 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael A. Via, Acting Principal Officer, Peshawar, DOS. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Frontier Corps Commander Khattak and 11th Corps Chief of 
Staff Aamer Riaz briefed NSC Senior Director for South and 
Central Asia Mark Webber on their strategy for the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on July 3.  Khattak and Aamer 
were on message with other Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) 
officials by stating that "successful" operations in Swat and 
Khyber as well as North and South Waziristan were aimed at 
opening the way for development.  Khattak, who remained focused 
throughout the meeting on long-term capacity building rather 
than addressing the recognized immediate and pressing terrorist 
threat in the border regions, continued to press for more U.S. 
assistance to provide personal protective gear for his troops 
and noted that collaboration with Afghan security counterparts 
is helped by U.S. participation.  Isolating militant commanders 
such as Baitullah Mehsud from "reconcilable" tribesmen will 
allow Pakistani security forces to confront these leaders 
without fear of collateral damage.  While there are encouraging 
signs of increased coordination between Governor Ghani and the 
Frontier Corps, Khattak still appears to be frustrated by 
equipment shortfalls for his troops.  End Summary. 
 
Frontier Corps Commander on FATA Strategy 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Frontier Corps Commander Major General Mohammad Alam 
Khattak noted that "undertakings" with tribesmen in Swat as well 
as North and South Waziristan are aimed at creating stability 
which will allow development to proceed.  He said that force may 
be used to enforce these "undertakings" with the tribes. 
According to the Commander, a "pure use of force is not the 
answer; rather, we need a comprehensive approach."  He stated 
that he needed "immediate employment" to give alternatives to 
the FATA's youth.  Development should take place on a "war 
footing: fast and big."  (Comment: Khattak is on message with 
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Governor Owais Ghani, who 
also intends to use peace talks to create "space" for 
development and also considers the understanding reached with 
tribal elders to be a one-sided acceptance of GOP demands, 
rather than a bilateral peace agreement.  End comment.) 
 
¶3. (C) Responding to Senior Director Webber's concern over a 
growing terrorist threat in the border regions, increased 
violence levels in Afghanistan, and growing cross-border 
violence, Khattak said that he was "confident" that his troops 
could overcome these challenges.  According to Khattak, the aim 
the current FATA strategy is to win over "the silent majority" 
and to isolate militant groups but offered no information how 
Pakistani security forces were making progress in this area. 
Khattak said that he remains concerned about inflicting 
collateral damage during military operations and remarked that 
military strikes in the border regions could be 
counterproductive and increase violence levels.  He claimed, 
however, that the public's opinion of the Frontier Corps is 
positive due to the perception that the armed services are 
"backing" the political government. 
 
¶4. (C) Like Governor Ghani, Khattak attributes growing unrest in 
the FATA and NWFP to problems in Afghanistan.  "Cross border 
movement is a problem for us too," he said.  According to 
Khattak, Afghanistan's "poppy-riddled" eastern flank is the 
"engine that drives the insurgency."  When pressed on addressing 
the short-term threat, Khattak suggested that poppy eradication 
should be the highest priority, noting Pakistan's success in 
eliminating the scourge in Pakistan.  The Commander repeated a 
request that he had previously addressed to Counselor Eliot 
Cohen (reftel) to increase the number of ISAF troops on the 
Pakistan/Afghanistan border. 
 
FATA Operations 
--------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Khattak characterized recent military operations in North 
and South Waziristan as "very successful" and said that they 
have led to decreased cross-border attacks.  The Commander said 
that operations in Khyber agency's Bara area have achieved their 
objective of increasing the security of Peshawar's perimeter 
with a "minimal" amount of force.  He claimed, however, that the 
media is "making us jump when they want us to jump."  Khattak 
stressed a need to supplement the Frontier Corps' "conventional" 
tactics with efforts to enlist the support of tribal lashkars 
(militias) in the fight against insurgents.  These grass roots 
level groups could serve as "force multipliers, as they do in 
Iraq," he said. 
 
Cooperation with the United States 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The Frontier Corps Commander provided a gloomy outlook on 
U.S. military assistance in recent years.  "For two and a half 
years, there has been a lot of talking, but very little done 
except INL funding."  He said that the 500-600 vehicles provided 
by INL have served as the "main strength of our mobility," but 
the majority of his troops remain "ill equipped."  Khattak was 
critical that more than half of the USD 30 million aid program 
had been allocated to the Warsak training center which would 
most likely not open until December.  Khattak implied that the 
construction delay was indicative of the lack of U.S. interest 
in supporting the Frontier Corps.  He said that the Pakistani 
Army had provided him tanks and artillery, but he requires 
better personal protective equipment, communications and 
mobility capabilities (reftel).  Senior Director Webber asserted 
that the Frontier Corps should not stall on implementing those 
cooperating programs which have already commenced while the 
Frontier Corps campaigns for other aid. 
 
Coordination with Afghan Security Forces 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Khattak stated that tripartite cooperation among 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States is proceeding well 
at the general headquarters level and said that officers are 
meeting frequently.  He said that border flag meetings have been 
productive but lamented that communications between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan had not progressed more rapidly.  At the 
micro-level, Webber inquired about cross border post 
communication and cooperation and whether the outposts had 
adequate communications equipment and procedures.  Chief of 
Staff to the 11th Corps Commander, Brigadier Aamer Riaz noted 
that cross-border cooperation works better with U.S. 
participation and implied that "hesitation" among posts solely 
occupied by Afghan troops may be due to long-standing grudges. 
He acknowledged more work needed to done to improve outpost 
cooperation across the border. 
 
Confronting Insurgents 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Chief of Staff Riaz stated that distinguishing between 
reconcilable and irreconcilable militants is becoming 
increasingly difficult.  Riaz believes, however, that even 
madrassa students and those who have "taken up arms" may still 
be reconcilable.  He said that a misperception among common 
Pakistanis that the Army and Frontier Corps is fighting 
"America's war" is damaging efforts to reconcile potential 
militants.  Khattak stated that the United States could assist 
in this effort by "reducing its signature and increasing 
assistance." 
 
¶9. (C) Chief of Staff Riaz stated that the Army and Frontier 
Corps must "deal with" Baitullah Mehsud, the Haqqani network, 
Mullah Omar, Hekmatyar and other militant commanders, and that 
Pakistan's security forces should not let these insurgents 
"provoke them."  Both Riaz and Khattak stated that the best way 
to do this is to "isolate" militant leaders from the tribal 
society and then carry out surgical operations against them. 
 
Assessment of FATA's Other Security Forces 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Responding to Political Counselor's query about other 
security forces operating in the FATA, Khattak said that each 
tier "has its own role and relevance."  "All should be 
employed," he said, "but we should invest in the Frontier Corps, 
police (in the settled areas), and the Khassadars."  Khattak 
believes that the investing in the Khassadars is preferable to 
assisting the Levies because tribesmen are "used to the 
Khassadars."  He said that the Levies are still new and it will 
take time for them to properly integrate into the tribal 
culture.  (Note: Khassadars are considered to represent a tribe 
and positions are usually passed from father to son.  Khassadars 
provide their own rifles and uniforms.  End note.) 
 
VIA