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C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000381 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/1/2018 
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PINR PK AF
SUBJECT: FRONTIER CORPS COMMANDER ON JUNE 10 MOHMAND INCIDENT, 
CURRENT CHALLENGES 
 
REF: PESHAWAR 359 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne M. Tracy, Principal Officer, Consulate 
Peshawar, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Inspector General of the Frontier Corps, Major General 
Alam Khattak told the Counselor of the Department of State, Dr. 
Eliot Cohen and Peshawar PO on June 26 that the morale of his 
troops had been badly shaken in the wake of the June 10 incident 
on the Mohmand Agency/Afghanistan border that left 11 of his 
troops dead.  He requested that the United States assist the 
families of the dead and noted that his troops remain woefully 
under-equipped.  He described the Frontier Corps' struggle to 
keep up with evolving militant tactics and was frustrated by his 
failure to win public support through the media.  Two weeks 
after the June 10 incident, Khattak was serious and cordial but 
visibly emotional and genuinely questioned whether the strike 
was intentional.  Counselor noted the importance of the joint 
investigation taking place and the need to improve cooperation. 
Khattak agreed but declared that rebuilding trust will be 
required first.  End Summary. 
 
Khattak on the June 10 Mohmand Incident 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Inspector General of the Frontier Corps (IGFC) Major 
General Alam Khattak told Counselor and Peshawar PO on June 26 
that the June 10 Mohmand Incident (reftel) had shaken the morale 
of his troops.  He cited a running tally of 316 troops killed in 
action, and over 600 wounded as evidence of the Frontier Corps' 
commitment to the war on terror.  Khattak said that it is "hard 
to explain our strategy to the families of these men" in the 
wake of the June 10 attack.  He said that it will take time to 
"reestablish trust" between the United States and GOP security 
forces. 
 
¶3. (C) Khattak offered a similar version of the events on June 
10 as provided by Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Governor 
Ghani to Ambassador (reftel).  According to Khattak, Afghan 
National Army (ANA)/NATO forces were discussing the 
establishment of a border post and had later fallen back inside 
Afghanistan.  Khattak was later informed that the ANA/NATO 
forces had been ambushed within Afghanistan while Frontier Corps 
troops were engaged nearby with militants in a separate 
incident.  The IGFC pointedly asked why his post was bombed "so 
far back from the border; we take that this was done on purpose." 
 
¶4. (C) Referring to the traditional black shalwar kamis uniform 
of the Frontier Corps, Khattak conceded that "everyone in the 
tribal areas can look like one of us."  He requested, however, 
that the USG should "do something for the families of these 
men."  The IGFC stated that doing so would be a welcome and 
important gesture.  Counselor emphasized the need for joint 
postings with U.S. and Frontier Corps troops, such as at Border 
Coordination Centers, as an important tool for helping soldiers 
bond as well as for tactical coordination.  Responding to a 
query by Counselor regarding the lack of Pakistani participation 
at Border Coordination Centers, Khattak stated that "he had 
raised the issue with senior military officials." 
 
Keeping Up With Evolving Militant Tactics 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Khattak said that the Frontier Corps' operations had 
"become reactive because the Taliban [and local militants] have 
the initiative."  "Fighting them is like chasing a moving 
shadow," he said.  He characterized the militants as "well 
integrated" and claimed that the thread of al-Qai'da "runs 
through everything," particularly in the south where Mullah 
Omar's influence was concentrated.  Militants, he said, "have 
gone from using improvised explosive devices, to suicide bombers 
and, now they are threatening our cities."  Khattak stated the 
militants "come out with a new tactic every six months." 
Khattak said that the Frontier Corps needed to evolve and adapt 
as well. 
 
¶6. (C) "This is an infantry war," he said, and the United States 
needs to increase its troop presence on the Durand Line in order 
to stop cross-border attacks.  He said that the Frontier Corps 
had 10 border posts for every one ANA post on the border. 
Khattak believed that having sufficient numbers of troops on 
either side of the border would simplify a commander's task to 
"defending his territory."  He said that a lack of troops has 
led both sides to blame the other.  The IGFC admitted, however, 
that increased troop presence would not be able to stop 
cross-border movements altogether.  Referring to a number of 
tribes that straddle the Durand Line, he asked "how can you stop 
the movement of a river with a stick?"  Instead, the IGFC 
reasoned, coalition and Pakistani forces must work together to 
regulate the flow of cross-border travelers (he did not offer 
specifics on how this could be accomplished). 
 
¶7. (C) Khattak said that his efforts had been further frustrated 
by equipment shortages.  He said only 8 percent of his men had 
personal protective gear and only one third of the Frontier 
Corps' 12 new wings have their basic equipment.  He described 
the U.S. assistance program as a "trickle effect" and criticized 
the Warsak Training Center as occupying a "lower" position on 
the Frontier Corps' list of priorities.  Increased ground 
mobility, additional weaponry, communications equipment, 
improved medical services and personal protective equipment were 
of greater urgency, he said, to carry out properly his mandate. 
He acknowledged with gratitude past INL assistance. 
 
Frontier Corps Losing the Media War 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Khattak expressed his frustration with media "noise" by 
handing Counselor a copy of a June 22 article from The Observer 
entitled "Pakistan troops 'aid' Taliban."  The article alleged 
that the Frontier Corps is "heavily infiltrated and influenced 
by Taliban militants who sometimes join in attacks on coalition 
forces."  The article stated that "box loads" of classified U.S. 
"after action reports" corroborate this accusation.  With no 
public affairs/communications staff, Khattak noted that 
responding to these sort of allegations was extremely difficult. 
 
 
Taking Cues from the "Political Government" 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The IGFC stated that the military is a "tool to be used 
to create an environment for other tools to work" and that the 
political government's "policy of engagement" will, in turn, 
assist the Frontier Corps when force is required again. 
According to Khattak, peace deals undertaken by the political 
government should be aimed at "isolating insurgents, so the next 
time we go into battle we have the support of the people." 
Khattak's troops have already noted several violations of the 
peace deals such as cross border movement, but he stated that he 
was waiting for "direction" from the elected government. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Khattak was cordial but solemn in the wake of the June 
10 incident in Mohmand.  He was clearly disturbed by the deaths 
of his soldiers.  Khattak was equally affected by the negative 
press reporting directed at the Frontier Corps that was spawned 
by a recent DOD-funded RAND report on counter-insurgency in 
Afghanistan, alleging Frontier Corps was aiding the Taliban.  We 
note that the report offered no evidence beyond citing press 
articles, nearly all of which did not even mention Frontier 
Corps.  The door still appears to be open for cooperation with 
Frontier Corps -- a force that will remain an important 
component of the tribal areas complex security arrangements. 
The outcome of the joint investigation remains the key starting 
point to rebuilding trust between forces on the border. 
 
TRACY