VZCZCXRO0918
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0276/01 1891217
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071217Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6312
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1700
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1513

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000276 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, STATE FOR AF/C, AF/SPG, 
AF/RSA, AND IO OFFICES 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPKO PREF PHUM UN EU SUDAN LY CT CD
SUBJECT: SRSG SEEKS CHANGES TO MINURCAT MANDATE TO PREPARE -- FOR 
EXPANDED UN PKO TO REPLACE EUFOR IN CHAD, CAR. 
 
REF:  08 NDJAMENA 163 
 
NDJAMENA 00000276  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE:  SEE PARA 10. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  SRSG Victor Angelo briefed UNSC member Chiefs of 
Mission July 3 on the upcoming report of the UNSYG on the UN Mission 
to Chad and CAR.  He requested that UNSC member Chiefs of Mission 
alert capitals and PermReps of the changes he is requesting to 
MINURCAT's mandate.  He would like (a) to see the number of Chadian 
gendarmes trained doubled to 1700; (b) that the SRSG play a more 
active role in the Dakar Accord implementation process, and (c) to 
replace EUFOR with an expanded UN PKO composed of three elements, a 
military element of 2,000, a "Formed Police Unit" element of 1,200, 
and a Chadian gendarme element of 1,700; and that the MINURCAT role 
in CAR not be ignored or reduced.  He also objected to what he 
called inaccurate mention of the JEM in the text of the report. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) We think all four of the SRSG's recommendations deserve 
USG consideration and support. SRSG understanding of Chadian 
realities has enabled him to provide exemplary leadership to 
MINURCAT and to collaborate usefully and productively with both the 
GOC and EUFOR on the ground in Chad. He has been particularly 
effective at building confidence within the Government of Chad 
regarding the international community's peacekeeping and 
humanitarian efforts in Chad. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶4. (SBU) SRSG Victor Angelo briefed UNSC member Chiefs of Mission 
July 3 on the upcoming "report of the Secretary General on the 
United Nation's Mission in Chad and the Northeastern Central African 
Republic."  Present were COMs of the United States, France, China, 
Libya, and South Africa.  He said that he was seeking changes in 
MINURCAT's mandate, which will be coming up for renewal soon, to 
enable MINURCAT to become an expanded UN PKO capable of replacing 
EUFOR when its mandate ends in early 2009. He described the 
Mission's progress as generally satisfactory, especially regarding 
its relationships with the Chadian government and with EUFOR. 
 
¶5. (SBU) SRSG identified four areas in which he would like to see 
changes to the MINURCAT mandate.  First, he would like to double the 
number of Chadian gendarmes and police trained and mentored to 
1,700.  Second, he would like to be authorized to play a more active 
role in the implementation process of the Dakar Accord.  Third, he 
would like to see EUFOR replaced (when its mandate ends in March 
2009) by a UN peacekeeping mission that would have three elements: a 
military element numbering about 2,000; a "Formed Police Unit" 
element numbering about 1,200, and a Chadian gendarme element of 
1,700.  Fourth, he was concerned that MINURCAT's role in the CAR not 
be reduced or altered.  SRSG also mentioned that he wanted to remove 
what he considered erroneous mention of the JEM involvement in the 
June Chadian armed rebel attack on eastern Chad. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) SRSG explained that the "Formed Police Unit" was an 
essential element in an expanded UN PKO to succeed EUFOR in eastern 
Chad.  The current EU-UN joint PKO effort lacked this element, which 
would provide an expanded UN PKO with a "flexible response" 
capability, permitting it to better calibrate is response to threats 
of different degrees of menace.  He cited the recent incident at Goz 
Beida in which EUFOR troops acted to protect humanitarian workers 
from armed rebel depredations as an example of a situation in which 
a heavily armed gendarme presence might have obviated a military 
response. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) During the course of the briefing, the French Ambassador 
mentioned that he understood that the CEMAC had decided to ask the 
UN to authorize MINURCAT to include   military observers along the 
Chadian-Sudanese border in MINURCAT's renewed mandate. Neither the 
French Ambassador nor the SRSG had any further information on any 
possible CEMAC action in this regard. SRSG has long maintained that 
he believes that MINURCAT could implement a military observation 
operation along the troubled Chad-Sudan border, if provided with 
adequate additional resources (See REFTEL). 
 
¶8.  (SBU) COMMENT: We think all four of the SRSG's recommendations 
have merit and deserve USG consideration and support.  We continue 
to believe that Angelo's understanding of Chadian realities has 
enabled him to provide exemplary leadership to MINURCAT and to 
collaborate usefully and productively with EUFOR on the ground in 
Chad. He has been particularly effective at building confidence 
within the Government of Chad regarding the international 
community's peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts in Chad. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) We are particularly concerned that there be a follow-on UN 
PKO to replace EUFOR after the latter's departure, which is foreseen 
to begin in early 2009 and we think that such a force should be 
structured along the lines SRSG proposes, composed of three 
different security elements, which reflects the realities on the 
ground in Chad.  Finally, we share SRSG's concern that the report 
 
NDJAMENA 00000276  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
not address contentious political issues based on limited knowledge 
of political terrain here and we agree that what both Angelo and we 
regard as inaccurate mention of JEM in the report may undermine 
MINURCAT's credibility with the GOC and jeopardize GOC future 
support for an expanded UN PKO to replace EUFOR. END COMMENT. 
 
¶10. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  That the Department and USUN consider 
supporting changes to MINURCAT's mandate along the lines of the four 
provisions SRSG discussed and support removal of mention of JEM from 
the report. 
 
NIGRO