VZCZCXRO0741
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #2353/01 2132244
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 312244Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2787
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USNORTHCOM
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 002353 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2028 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MX
SUBJECT: SUBJECT:  MILITARY JUSTICE -- AND JUSTICE REFORM-- 
GRIND SLOWLY 
 
REF: A. (A) MEXICO 2112 
     ¶B. (B) MEXICO 2337 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Stung like most Mexicans by the U.S. 
Senate's (now abandoned) dictate that it divest itself of 
prosecutorial authority over soldiers accused of human rights 
abuses, Mexico's military remains reluctant to cede this 
territory to civilian prosecutors.   Procedures are in place 
to investigate and prosecute soldiers convicted of crimes 
against civilians, which will hopefully be strengthened by 
the military's new Human Rights Directorate.  Current 
practices make for slow going in investigating and 
prosecuting soldiers, however.  There are good arguments for 
updating the military's code of justice and sharing 
prosecutorial authority with civilians, and civilian and 
military officials are slowly contemplating how best to do 
so.  End Summary 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  By its own account, SEDENA acts aggressively when 
a high profile allegation surfaces, locking down the unit 
involved, sending in a team of investigators and making 
arrests when appropriate.   Both SEDENA and Mexico's National 
Human Rights Commission (CNDH) conduct parallel 
investigations of allegations against soldiers, say officers 
who have briefed the Embassy' Defense AttachQ's Office.  Both 
determine whether a case merits further action.  For CNDH, 
this takes the form of official recommendations, which, if 
accepted by SEDENA legally bind it to pursue a case.  SEDENA 
forwards serious cases to a military magistrate who initiates 
a formal criminal investigation and prosecution, as 
appropriate. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In practice, however, military cases tend to 
proceed slowly.  The military code of justice says that 
prosecutors have 128 days to bring an investigation and 
prosecution to conclusion.  This is more often than not 
honored in the breach.  For example, 19 soldiers were 
detained nearly a year ago after a family of five was killed 
in at a military checkpoint in Sinaloa.  The case has yet to 
be tried.  Similarly, no discernible progress has been made 
in the investigation into abuse allegations related to May 
2007 military operations in Michoac n to which the military 
committed itself last fall.  Combined with a lack of 
transparency (as noted in Mexico 2337), the protracted period 
between the time a case is raised with the military and 
resolved contributes to the widespread belief here that 
soldiers are not held accountable by their officers for 
criminal activities they may commit. 
¶4.  (U) The military's leading role in carrying out President 
Calderon's counter narcotics strategy has put this issue in 
high relief, both domestically and internationally.  In 
February 2008, during a visit to Mexico, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, argued, "If the 
Mexican Army carries out civil or police functions, it should 
be held accountable to a civil authority."  Arbour did not 
specify what she meant by "accountable." 
 
Reforms in the Offing? 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Even before the U.S. Senate weighed in, there had 
been calls in recent months for the military to turn over 
prosecutions of soldiers accused of crimes involving 
civilians.  Leftist opposition legislators in both houses of 
Mexico's congress offered bills this past year to allow 
civilian courts to prosecute soldiers in human rights cases. 
The proponents of such reforms cite Mexico's 1917 
constitution which states that "whenever a civilian is 
implicated in a military crime or violation, the respective 
civil authority shall deal with the case."   (However, legal 
experts tell us this clause was looked at twice in the 1930s 
and 1940s by Mexico's Supreme Court, which issued 
contradictory rulings.) 
 
¶6.  (C) Neither initiative is likely to go far under the 
present circumstances.  Congressional staff contacts say both 
measures were stalled earlier this year.  Even opposition PRD 
legislators who support the legislation told us they believe 
the public outcry here over the U.S. Senate's Merida 
Initiative language calling for the military to transfer 
prosecutorial authority in human rights cases set back their 
party's efforts to reform military justice. 
 
¶7.  (C) SEDENA told our DATT that it already has the 
discretion to transfer cases to a civilian judge if they "are 
extremely severe or involve offenses by soldiers in off-duty 
status."   It did so in one high profile 2006 case involving 
20 members of the Mexican Army who allegedly raped 13 women 
in Coahuila.  Three soldiers were prosecuted in a civilian 
 
MEXICO 00002353  002 OF 002 
 
 
court and sentenced to between 21 and 41 years in prison.  A 
military tribunal found six other soldiers criminally 
responsible for abandoning their post, and handed down 
sentences ranging from 1.5 to two years in prison. 
 
¶8.   (C)  SRE's Undersecretary for North America, Carlos 
Rico, told WHA/MEX Office Director that Secretary of Defense 
Galvan Galvan had agreed to allow civilian courts to try 
military personnel accused of human rights violation -- 
regardless of whether they had been committed on or off duty. 
 Rico maintained that many cases had already been 
transferred.  Rico emphasized that Galvan Galvan was 
exercising discretionary authority he had to order such 
transfers but that a future Secretary of Defense could decide 
not to exercise this authority.  (Comment:  we have asked 
contacts in the Attorney General's office, as well as 
independent security analysts how many cases the military has 
turned over to civilians; they believe very few have.  End 
comment.) 
 
¶9.  (C)  The military is reluctant to divest itself of 
prosecutions because it believes the present civilian system 
is less efficient and more corrupt than its own.  Carlos Rico 
cited the widespread concern that civilian courts often 
proved more lenient than the military courts when it came to 
sentencing.  Senior officers have told Embassy contacts that 
if the military maintains its current high-profile counter 
narcotics role, it is particularly reluctant to turn senior 
military officials accused of corruption or collusion with 
the cartels.  It believes such officers would be better able 
manipulate civilian courts and circumvent justice. 
 
10  (C) Sigrid Arzt, Technical Secretary of the National 
Security Council (protect), remarked that the presidency was 
looking at institutionalizing an automatic transfer of 
military personnel to civilian courts in human rights cases 
but said this possibility was still only in the deliberative 
phase. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Comment  If military justice grinds slowly, the 
same can be said of Mexico's civilian justice system.  The 
civilian criminal code calls for a maximum of six months 
between the time an individual is charged and detained for 
serious offenses and his or her trial concludes.  In fact, 
many serious crimes such as homicide can take five to six 
years to resolve.  Inefficient Mexican justice is an endemic 
problem and not confined to the military.   However, SEDENA's 
reluctance to engage the public on rights issues and 
meaningfully discuss the status of cases lends to the 
perception that soldiers remain uniquely above the law here. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) On June 17, President Calderon signed into law 
major justice reform legislation that will, among other 
things, move Mexico to a system of oral trials and help 
expedite and improve the administration of justice here 
overall.  As the performance bar is raised across the board, 
military men will likely become more confident in civilian 
courts, may consider updates to the military code of justice 
and ultimately establish a division of labor that is more in 
line with international norms.  This will likely be a slow 
process, as will the opening up of the institution to 
dialogue with civil society on human rights.   In the 
meantime, further incidents will undoubtedly occur and the 
military will remain the focus of the intense scrutiny within 
the local and international human rights community.  End 
Comment. 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
BASSETT