VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKV #1257/01 1831146
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011146Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5920
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 001257 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/UMB AND EUR/PRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2018 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL PARM NATO PINR US UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: BILATERAL COOPERATION ON MAN-PORTABLE AIR 
DEFENSE SYSTEM (MANPADS) 
 
REF: A. KYIV 782 (NOTAL) 
     ¶B. STATE 37937 
     ¶C. STATE 30482 
 
Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Special Envoy for MANPADS Threat Reduction, 
Ambassador Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., visited Kyiv June 
17-19.  During his visit, Bloomfield explained the special 
concern with which the U.S. Government regards trade in 
MANPADS and urged Ukraine to strengthen its cooperation with 
the U.S. to reduce the MANPADS threat.  He delivered this 
message in meetings with Defense Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, 
First Deputy Foreign Minister Volodymyr Khandohiy, National 
Security and Defense Council First Deputy Secretary Stepan 
Gavrysh, Presidential Secretariat Deputy Chief of Staff 
Oleksandr Chaliy, and UKRSPETSEXPORT Director General Sergiy 
Bondarchuk.  His interlocutors, with the exception of 
Bondarchuk, were cautiously receptive; Yekhanurov and Gavrysh 
were interested in receiving a written follow-up proposal. 
Over dinner, Parliamentary Deputy (and former Foreign 
Minister) Boris Tarasyuk and Deputy Head of the MOD Main 
Intelligence Directorate Andrii Taran also described the 
general political environment and Ukrainian historical 
concerns.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Ambassador accompanied Bloomfield to his meetings with 
Yekhanurov, Gavrysh, and Chaliy.  Embassy Kyiv DATT sat in on 
the Yekhanurov  and Bondarchuk meetings.  Polmiloff and 
Political Military Bureau Office of Weapons Reduction and 
Abatement (PM/WRA) Deputy Director Steve Costner were present 
at all of Bloomfield's meetings. 
 
The Message 
----------- 
 
¶3. (C) Bloomfield stressed with his interlocutors that he was 
making his visit not because Ukraine was a problem, but 
because Ukraine was a friend to the U.S.  The U.S. was 
principally concerned with areas such as the Horn of Africa, 
the Middle East, and South Asia, but he had been encouraged 
by Ukraine's desire for a closer partnership with NATO and 
U.S. high level support for Ukraine at the NATO Bucharest 
Summit.  In the run-up to the NATO Foreign Ministerial in 
December, Ukraine could send a good message by entering into 
a dialogue with the U.S. on ways to cooperate to reduce the 
MANPADS threat.  This cooperation could begin with a 
military-to-military information exchange on the types and 
numbers of MANPADS that Ukraine held and a consultation on 
what was required for Ukraine's security.  If Ukraine were to 
determine that some MANPADS were excess, the U.S. would 
welcome a Ukrainian offer to eliminate the excess and could 
possibly provide financial assistance to meet Ukraine's other 
priority needs, in particular the destruction of excess and 
potentially hazardous large-caliber munitions. 
 
¶4. (C) Bloomfield also urged his interlocutors to consolidate 
MANPADS stock in one or two storage locations and offered 
U.S. help in improving stockpile management, accountability, 
and security.  He recommended that Ukraine forswear future 
production of MANPADS and urged Ukrainian officials to agree 
to carry out prior consultations with the U.S. regarding any 
future sales of MANPADS or MANPADS components.  Bloomfield 
noted that Ukrainian officials needed to make decisions 
rapidly, since his authority would end when the current 
Administration leaves office. 
 
Yekhanurov's Assurances 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Yekhanurov said that he agreed MANPADS ease of use and 
portability made them a special concern and welcomed 
Bloomfield's desire to improve bilateral transparency between 
the U.S. and Ukraine.  Steps to reduce MANPADS stockpiles 
were a sensitive issue, however, given the lack of agreed 
demarcation of Ukraine's eastern and northern borders.  He 
also did not want to repeat the missteps made during 
Ukraine's nuclear disarmament.  Recalling January 1, 2006, 
when Russia halted its natural gas deliveries while he was 
Prime Minister, Yekhanurov said he had been forcefully 
reminded of the strategic importance of Ukraine's defense 
capabilities.  The Ukrainian military's main MANPADS were the 
Strela and Igla missiles.  The military had determined that 
eight units each of Strela and Igla (note: presumably 16 
 
missiles altogether) had exceeded their operational life and 
so, not being usable, would be eliminated.  Yekhanurov 
assured Bloomfield that Ukraine would provide prior 
notification to the U.S. of future MANPADS sales to third 
countries.  While Ukraine exercised strict control over its 
MANPADS sales, it might consider such sales to Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, which had particular security requirements and a 
close relationship with Ukraine.  Finally, Yekhanurov invited 
the United States Government officials to visit MANPADS 
stockpile sites in Ukraine. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In addition to Yekhanurov, First Deputy Defense 
Minister Valeriy Ivashchenko, MOD Utilization Department 
Director Anatoliy Sosnovsky, and Ukrainian Armed Forces 
Logistics Directorate Central Rocket Artillery Armament 
Division Chief Colonel Artyushenko were also present. 
 
Positive Foreign Policy Impact 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Both Khandohiy and Gavrysh were enthusiastic and 
supportive of Bloomfield's proposals, but both also noted 
that the Ministry of Defense (MoD) would be the principal 
decision-maker on the issue.  Khandohiy assured Bloomfield 
"our policy support is there."  He had "heard the message" 
and could say "let's keep working on this."  Gavrysh noted 
that SecDef Gates' strong support for Ukraine had eased his 
own recent visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels.  He noted 
Ukrainian concern regarding the NATO Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) Trust Fund project's lack of progress in destroying 
munitions and said he believed the Cabinet of Ministers would 
make the appropriate decision in the near future to resume 
destruction of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW).  Gavrysh 
said he believed that there was a good prospect for 
additional cooperation on MANPADS and looked forward to 
working together with U.S. experts. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Chaliy echoed the MFA and NSDC officials' support 
and promised Presidential Secretariat assistance in 
coordinating the effort and overcoming any Ukrainian 
opposition.  He urged the U.S. to select a local partner with 
a proven track record and its own financial resources when 
executing a program to eliminate MANPADS and suggested that 
Urkoboronservice would be such a partner.  Chaliy commented 
that internal squabbling could prevent Ukraine from being 
able to accept offers of assistance, recalling that, in 2000, 
the Canadian government had withdrawn a $10 million offer of 
assistance in landmine elimination for just this reason. 
 
MANPADS Sales History 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Bondarchuk stressed that UKRSPETSEXPORT was 
particularly vigilant with regard to MANPADS sales.  In his 
three years as director general, UKRSPETSEXPORT had declined 
three requests to sell MANPADS due to the inability to 
confirm the buyers' intentions, but, when pressed, refused to 
provide further details regarding his firm's concerns or the 
countries involved.  Deputy Director General Kablov noted 
that, in fact, UKRSPETSEXPORT's largest MANPADS customer was 
the U.S. Government; since 2005, UKRSPETSEXPORT's sales of 
MANPADS to the U.S. were worth $51.5 million (sic). 
 
¶10. (U) Ambassador Bloomfield cleared on this cable. 
 
¶11. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. 
TAYLOR