VZCZCXRO6933
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0966/01 1830530
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 010530Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1195
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0257
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000966 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR 
BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: DISSECTING UNSCR 1769 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. As renewal of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1769 (2007) approaches on July 31, it is time to take 
stock of what this resolution has accomplished during the first year 
of its existence, and more critically what it has failed to do. 
Identifying its shortcomings, however, should not be used as an 
exercise in easy UNAMID vilification.  Rather, this back-to-basics 
dissection of the resolution that provides the mandate for the 
Darfur peacekeeping operation should be done to reveal and rectify 
areas of misinterpretation and misunderstanding, particularly in the 
application of the Chapter VII elements of the mandate.  UNSCR 1769 
renewal presents a golden opportunity to focus on the clear 
definition of UNAMID mandate terms at the operational level so that 
all personnel in the Mission, from the Joint Special Representative 
on down, are clear on the goals of the operation and the means at 
their disposal to accomplish it. We believe it would be a mistake to 
waste time "expanding the mandate," which in reality would only mean 
giving UNAMID more tasks it cannot implement or comprehend.  UNAMID 
has already been given all the marching orders it needs to do its 
job in Darfur; it just needs to be shown how to use them.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
TOP-DOWN CHAPTER VII IGNORANCE 
------------------------------ 
¶2. (SBU) The biggest failing of the United Nations-African Union 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is arguably that neither its forces nor 
its leadership know what their mandate actually is.  They do not 
understand UNSCR 1769 (2007) and accordingly have no idea how to 
implement it.  This inability was made unwittingly yet abundantly 
clear in a recent op-ed piece written by the UNAMID Joint Special 
Representative (JSR) Rodolphe Adada himself, in which he 
characterized the peacekeeping operation as "having the resolution 
to succeed." 
 
¶3. (SBU) UNAMID may have the resolution, but it does not have the 
know-how to implement it, which will forever keep the mission from 
being effective.  For example, Adada alleged that UNAMID as a 
peacekeeping force could not intervene more forcefully with 
belligerents in Darfur.  This statement shows a lack of 
understanding of the Chapter VII element of UNAMID's mandate, which 
allows the force to take the necessary action to prevent armed 
attacks.  At another point in his commentary, Adada claimed that 
UNAMID continued to protect civilians and engage all parties in West 
Darfur.  On June 18 a UNAMID civilian police officer was assaulted 
within a hundred meters of UNAMID Sector West Headquarters in El 
Geneina, West Darfur, by marauding Arab militias.  UNAMID did 
nothing to prevent or respond to the incident, proving again its 
lack of understanding at the operational level of the Chapter VII 
elements of its mandate, which allow it to take all necessary 
actions to protect its personnel and facilities. The officer was 
later released because of the intervention of Sudanese intelligence 
(NISS) not because of UNAMID. 
 
NECESSITY OF DEFINING 1769 TERMS 
-------------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) Rather than castigating Adada for his misrepresentations 
and misunderstandings (one of Adada's Political Assistants recently 
scoffed at the JSR's mention of 20 patrols per day, noting that rare 
was the occasion when they ever broke double-digits) a better use of 
the international community's time would be to attempt to help 
UNAMID correct the problem. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Deliberations on 1769 renewal would best be spent taking an 
inventory of what in the resolution has and has not been implemented 
to date and task UNAMID leadership accordingly.  For example, OP13 
states: "Calls on all parties to the conflict in Darfur to 
immediately cease all hostilities and commit themselves to a 
sustained and permanent cease-fire."  This provision of 1769 has 
gone unobserved by all players, providing a perfect example for the 
UNSC to focus pressure on the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the 
rebel movements to abide by 1769 expectations if there is to be any 
progress in Darfur.  This exercise would also provide a perfect 
pretext for the Council and the international community to empower 
UNAMID to oversee such implementation by calling upon its leadership 
to re-invigorate the Ceasefire Commission (dormant since March 2008, 
largely due to Force Commander frustration) as a way of going beyond 
simply acknowledging violations to more actively investigating and 
condemning violations and demanding accountability for violators. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Perhaps the most important paragraph is OP15 -- UNAMID 
leadership, including the Force Commander (FC), needs to be taken to 
task on how to apply a Chapter VII mandate in Darfur.  The FC 
himself asked in a subsequent UNAMID briefing for an investigation 
into why UNAMID failed to react to the June 18 incident involving 
civpol and Arab militias in El Geneina.  Such an instance provides a 
perfect chance for the UNSC to press for accountability within 
UNAMID.  The Council could suggest that the results of this 
 
KHARTOUM 00000966  002 OF 002 
 
 
investigation be released in the next Secretary-General's Monthly 
Darfur Report.  The Council could require mandatory training for all 
commanders, from the FC on down, on application of OP15 with a 
progress report due as of a specific date thereafter.  If the FC 
does not know how or in what context to apply Chapter VII, then 
there is no way any Sector Commander or infantryman on the ground is 
going to know either.  (Comment: We are not suggesting that it is an 
easy decision for a UNAMID soldier to engage what was reported to be 
a column of 1000 Arab militiamen.  If this column had been fired 
upon by UNAMID forces, it is likely that a very serious escalation 
would have ensued.  We suggest that this point should be 
acknowledged by the UNSC if it is to have any credibility in 
reviewing this particular incident.  Nonetheless, we suggest that 
the incident be used to frame a thoughtful discussion of the need 
for UNAMID to review its ROE and better train its forces. End 
comment.) 
 
TIMING IS EVERYTHING 
-------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) The idea of building in benchmarks to chart UNAMID progress 
against resolution 1769 is not new.  OP5, despite the initial 
bristling it caused in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
provided definite dates by which UNAMID progress ahead of Transfer 
of Authority could be measured.  A similar mechanism could be used 
to chart other aspects of 1769 implementation, with direction from 
the UNSC and DPKO.  In short, until UNAMID understands and 
implements its current mandate at the operational level, post 
suggests that an expansion of UNAMID's existing mandate would be an 
exercise in futility.  Rather, a re-evaluation of tasks, a push for 
the UN to clarify terms, and a designation of duties with definite 
deadlines could give the Mission the push it needs to differentiate 
itself from its African Union predecessor (which now some parties 
claim was more effective - a damning claim) and to prove its own 
efficacy on the ground. 
 
¶8. (SBU) So far the UN has taken the path of least resistance in 
Darfur. It has hid behind very real logistical problems, wrangling 
with TCCs, and a thorny relationship with a duplicitous Sudanese 
regime, to mask its own unwillingness or inability to use the tools 
it does have. Both UNAMID and DPKO need to be pressed and 1769's 
renewal may be a golden opportunity to do so. 
 
FERNANDEZ