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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001286 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR D, P, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS 
NSC FOR E.PHU 
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/AP CLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL TBIO MARR ID
SUBJECT: POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S POSSIBLE MEETING WITH 
PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4(b+d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Mission understands that President Bush may 
have a short meeting with Indonesian President Yudhoyono on 
the margins of the upcoming G-8 Summit.  We recommend that 
the President raise the troubled state of health cooperation 
as the most pressing issue to advance our bilateral 
relationship.  U.S.-Indonesian cooperation on sample sharing, 
particularly avian and seasonal influenza, benefits both 
countries and the international community.  If President 
Yudhoyono raises security cooperation, we recommend 
underscoring the U.S. commitment to advance cooperation, 
including finding ways to engage the Indonesian Army Special 
Forces (Kopassus).  END SUMMARY. 
 
BILATERAL HEALTH COOPERATION THREATENED 
 
¶2.  (C) The U.S. and the international community are 
concerned about Indonesia's steady withdrawal from 
established global health security institutions and 
processes.  The Indonesian government refuses to share 
disease samples with the global scientific community, 
threatening scientific cooperation that could prevent a 
global influenza pandemic.  Available data suggest that most 
influenza-related deaths are caused by seasonal strains that 
originate in Southeast Asia.  Indonesian Minister of Health 
Supari is not sharing any influenza strains--either seasonal 
or avian influenza--with the World Health Organization and is 
limiting more and more Indonesian scientific and health 
collaboration.  Refusing to share seasonal influenza samples 
increases the likelihood of more seasonal flu deaths in the 
U.S. (now at 40,000 annually) due to less comprehensive flu 
vaccines.  Indonesia has the highest number of avian 
influenza cases (135) and fatalities (110) in the world. 
Indonesian laboratories do not have capacity to adequately 
monitor changes in avian influenza strains nor to assess risk 
for possible pandemics.  The U.S. and international partners 
want to help Indonesia prevent a possible global pandemic, 
but the Indonesian government needs to cooperate. 
 
¶3.  (C) One bilateral element of this problem concerns the 
U.S. Naval Area Medical Research Unit (NAMRU-2) in Indonesia. 
 The Health Minister has repeatedly called for NAMRU-2's 
closure and questioned the official status of NAMRU-2's U.S. 
government staff.  The behavior of the Health Minister is 
damaging the broader bilateral relationship and President 
Yudhoyono has made little effort to reign her in.  NAMRU-2 is 
a premier scientific organization that benefits both 
Indonesia and the U.S.  The Minister's attacks have undercut 
nearly completed negotiations for a new Memorandum of 
Understanding for NAMRU-2's continued operation in Indonesia. 
 The official status of NAMRU-2's U.S. government officials 
is a major sticking point and source of confusion.  The U.S. 
requests continued administrative and technical status (A&T) 
status, the same status that USAID employees and many others 
at our Embassy have.  Without A&T status, NAMRU-2 cannot 
remain in Indonesia. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) We suggest two talking points on our health 
cooperation: 
 
-- Indonesia has a moral and UN treaty obligation to monitor 
and report infectious disease cases and to collaborate with 
the global health community in developing effective vaccines 
against infectious diseases.  Indonesia's refusal to share 
samples endangers global health and increases the chances of 
a pandemic from untested Indonesian strains.  It is essential 
that Indonesia resume cooperation with the WHO and other 
international health security institutions. 
 
-- NAMRU-2 benefits Indonesia and the United States.  We want 
NAMRU-2 to remain, and we want to work with Indonesia in 
fighting disease, but we can do so only if Indonesia is 
willing to collaborate on a professional basis.  Our U.S. 
staff do not need diplomatic status, but they must have 
administrative and technical staff status.  Nowhere in the 
 
JAKARTA 00001286  002 OF 002 
 
 
world does the United States allow U.S. government employees 
to work with less. 
 
SECURITY COOPERATION 
 
¶5. (C) Since Secretary's Rice's lifting of legislative 
sanctions against Indonesia in November 2005, U.S.-Indonesian 
military-to-military cooperation has progressed steadily. 
Indonesia has also played a constructive role in UN-sponsored 
international peacekeeping, particularly its 850 troops in 
Lebanon with UNIFIL, in which the president's son has 
participated.  Since Suharto stepped down a decade ago, the 
Indonesian military has made transformational changes, many 
under Yudhoyono's leadership when he was still in the 
military. 
 
¶6.  (C) Accountability for past human rights violations 
remains a concern, particularly in the U.S. Congress. 
Criticism of Indonesian military, particularly on human 
rights, focuses on the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus). 
Kopassus is the sole force that remains excluded from our now 
broad bilateral engagement with the Indonesian military.  In 
the past, this elite force committed human rights violations, 
but since 2004 it has made firm commitments to reform. 
Kopassus now receives regular human-rights training from the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 
 
¶7.  (C) The special military forces play an essential role in 
Indonesia's ability to protect U.S. interests in Indonesia. 
Kopassus and their police counterparts protect the U.S. 
Embassy and Indonesian sites in the event of terrorist 
attack, hostage-taking, aircraft hijacking, and violent 
demonstrations.  Not engaging Kopassus neglects fundamental 
security interests of the U.S. in Indonesia.  Indonesia 
resents that the United States will not engage with Kopassus. 
 This resentment is damaging overall bilateral cooperation. 
 
¶8. (SBU) It is possible that President Yudhoyono will mention 
security cooperation, particularly Kopassus.  IF ASKED, we 
suggest: 
 
-- We support full re-engagement with Indonesian military 
forces, including Kopassus.  Such re-engagement builds on our 
conversation in Sydney and the U.S. decision in 2005 to lift 
sanctions and to rebuild the bilateral security partnership. 
Although U.S. Congressional concerns regarding human rights 
abuses in the past continue to restrict our ability to engage 
with Kopassus, we are actively seeking to find ways in which 
Congress can support that engagement.  Security cooperation 
and human rights promotion are two mutually reinforcing goals 
in U.S.-Indonesian relations. 
 
-- The Indonesia-Timor-Leste Commission on Truth and 
Friendship (CTF) is an important opportunity to demonstrate 
Indonesia's commitment to accountability on human rights. 
This is a major step in supporting human rights and we urge 
the Indonesian government to implement its recommendations. 
 
HUME