O 261238Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6880
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T GENEVA 000612 
 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII:  RUSSIAN NON PAPER ON B-1 CONVERSION, 
JULY 24, 2008 
 
Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States 
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-026. 
 
¶2.  (U) Paragraph 3 below contains the text of the official 
translation of a Russian Non-Paper, dated July 24, 2008, on 
the "U.S. Conversion of B-1 Heavy Bombers to a Non-Nuclear 
Variant."  The non-paper refers to photographs that were 
taken during an inspection on January 19, 2008.  The 
photographs cannot be included in this reporting cable and 
have been e-mailed to Washington (State/VCI/SI). 
 
¶3.  (S) Begin text: 
 
                                   Official Translation 
 
                                   Non-Paper of the 
                                   Russian Federation 
                                   July 24, 2008 
 
         On U.S. Conversion of B-1 Heavy Bombers to 
                   a Non-Nuclear Variant 
      (Materials Presented by the Russian Side at the 
 Working Group Meeting on July 22, 2008, during JCIC-XXXII) 
 
     The Russian side is presenting the text of the briefing 
on the topic of U.S. conversion of B-1 heavy bombers (HBs) 
equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear 
ALCMs into HBs equipped for non-nuclear armaments. 
 
     First, we consider it necessary to remind you of some of 
the provisions of the Treaty and its associated documents and 
then to assess the results of the inspections conducted under 
Article XI, paragraph 8, of the Treaty. 
 
     We will begin by enumerating certain facts, which we 
will take into account later on. 
 
   -- The conversion of heavy bombers is regulated by 
      the START Treaty, and in fulfillment of its 
      obligations under the Coordinated Statement of 
      March 24, 2004, the U.S. informed the Treaty 
      Parties of its plans to modify the pylon attachment 
      joints and its overall plans for conversion of 
      B-1 heavy bombers (Russia received this document, 
      No. MFA/140/07 from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, 
      on November 2, 2007). 
 
   -- The Conversion or Elimination Protocol and the 
      Inspection Protocol provide for verification 
      (through inspections under Article XI, paragraph 8, 
      of the Treaty) of compliance with the terms and 
      the declared conversion procedures. 
 
     We will respond to the following questions: what is the 
(begin underline) objective of, and what are the terms and 
procedures for (end underline) conversion? 
 
     Declared U.S. Objective (underlined). 
 
     To convert a B-1 heavy bomber equipped for nuclear 
armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs into a heavy 
bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. 
 
     Terms. (underlined) 
 
 
     The first and most important one is set forth in Section 
VI, paragraph 11, of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol: 
"A heavy bomber must be converted so that (begin underline) 
it is no longer (end underline) equipped for nuclear 
armaments." 
 
     Important Point. (underlined) 
 
     Russia proceeds from the understanding that the words 
(begin underline) "is no longer equipped" (end underline) 
mean that it will be impossible in the future to change the 
conversion objective that has been achieved (i.e. to return 
the bomber to its former status). 
 
     The (begin underline) conversion procedures (end 
underline) (Section VI, paragraph 11, of the Conversion or 
Elimination Protocol) stipulate that all weapons bays 
equipped for nuclear armaments shall be modified so as to 
render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments.  All 
external attachment joints for nuclear armaments and all 
external attachment joints for pylons for nuclear armaments 
shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable 
of carrying nuclear armaments. 
 
     The conversion procedures are defined and declared by 
the U.S. in the relevant notifications. 
 
     Verification that these declared procedures have been 
carried out is provided by the relevant type of inspection 
(Article XI, paragraph 8, of the START Treaty). 
 
     Let's look at the results of the inspections conducted 
and assess them from the standpoint of the possibility of 
verifying and confirming that the procedures and terms for 
conversion have been carried out and that the ultimate 
objective of the conversion has been achieved. 
 
     Using as an example the first inspection, which took 
place on January 19, 2008, we will look at the results 
obtained.  The results of all of the subsequent ten 
inspections of converted B-1 HBs were analogous. 
 
     Let's recall the salient points from the pre-inspection 
procedures.  The U.S. escorts declared the modification of 
the weapons bays and pylon attachment joints and listed 
additional arguments confirming, in the inspected Party's 
view, the non-nuclear status of the B-1 heavy bomber: 
 
     - the B-1 heavy bomber has not carried nuclear weapons 
since 1997; 
 
     - the infrastructure of B-1 bases does not support the 
maintenance of nuclear weapons; 
 
     - software for nuclear weapons is not supported on the 
B-1 heavy bomber; 
 
     - flight and technical staff are not being trained in 
the use and maintenance of nuclear weapons. 
 
     Clearly, none of the information listed can be used in 
the context of the START Treaty provisions. 
 
     In this connection, the Russian inspection team leader 
stated that these additional arguments had nothing to do with 
the START Treaty provisions and asked the following question: 
 
 
 will the elements removed from the B-1 heavy bomber be 
presented to the inspection team? 
 
     The answer to this question was:  no, they will not, and 
all the removed elements have been eliminated. 
 
     Let's turn to the official inspection report. 
 
     Ambiguity No. 1. (underlined) 
 
     The inspected Party declared that two objects which it 
considers to be cable connectors for nuclear armaments had 
been removed from each of the weapons bays, i.e. the forward, 
middle and aft weapons bays.  The objects removed were not 
presented to the inspecting Party.  It is not clear to the 
inspecting Party whether and where these objects were removed 
and whether this procedure is consistent with the objective 
stipulated in Section VI, paragraph 11, of the Conversion or 
Elimination Protocol. 
 
     Photograph reflecting Ambiguity No. 1. 
 
     (Photograph in Russian text.) 
 
     The inspectors saw that in the location of two cable 
connectors there were cannon plugs glued on.  The cable 
connectors that had been removed were not presented (i.e. the 
inspectors did not have an opportunity to reliably confirm 
the fact of their removal).  The cable network that goes to 
the box on which the connectors are located remained 
unchanged (this is evident if one compares the photographs of 
the forward weapons bay of the B-1 heavy bomber equipped for 
nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs), which 
is illustrated by the photograph (all cables are in place). 
 
     The inspectors observed the very same situation in the 
middle and aft weapons bays. 
 
     (Two photographs in Russian text.) 
 
     The cable network also remained unchanged.  As before, a 
multipurpose rotary launcher, which, in turn, is capable of 
carrying nuclear aerial bombs, can be placed in the weapons 
bays. 
 
     Results of declared conversion of the three weapons 
bays: (underlined) 
 
     Taking into account that: 
 
     - the cable network in the weapons bays was unchanged; 
 
     - it was not shown how the cables attached to the 
connector box terminated; 
 
     - the removed connectors for nuclear armaments were not 
presented; and 
 
     - the possibility remains for installing a rotary 
launcher capable of carrying nuclear weapons in the weapons 
bays, the inspectors concluded that the modification of the 
weapons bays carried out by the U.S. does not meet the 
requirements of Section VI, paragraph 11, of the Conversion 
or Elimination Protocol and that (begin underline, bolded 
text. for the heavy bomber bays the objective of the 
conversion was not achieved. (end underline, bolded text) 
 
 
     This has prompted the Russian Federation's concern, i.e. 
that the modification of the weapons bays should be (begin 
underline. more thorough and irreversible. (end underline; 
para in bold text.) 
 
     In the U.S. response of May 28, 2008, to Russia's 
Aide-Memoire of February 15, 2008, the U.S. informed us that 
such modification of the weapons bays (which consists in 
using cannon plugs to "seal" the sockets for the cable 
connections) ensures they are "unsuited for the (begin 
underline. operational deployment end underline.) of nuclear 
armaments."  Let's recall that the Treaty does not contain 
the concept, the term, or the criteria (including time 
criteria) for operational deployment of nuclear armaments. 
 
     Let's turn to the pylon attachment joints. 
 
     Ambiguity No. 2. (underlined) 
 
     The inspected Party stated that objects which it 
considers to be collet receptacles for nuclear armaments were 
removed from the forward and aft pylon attachment joints. 
The objects removed were not presented to the inspecting 
Party.  It is not clear to the inspecting Party whether and 
where these objects were removed and whether this procedure 
meets the objective stipulated in Section VI, paragraph 11, 
of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 
 
     The inspection team was shown the forward attachment 
joint, as follows. 
 
     (Photograph in Russian text.) 
 
     The inspection team was faced with the following 
question:  was it modified? 
 
     As you know, in the past the inspectors never observed 
an attachment joint prior to modification (it was closed off 
by covers).  Now the removed elements are not being presented 
to the inspectors for purposes of comparison.  That is a 
statement of fact. 
 
     Question.  On the basis of what can the inspection team 
conclude that this joint is not compatible with a nuclear 
ALCM pylon?  It would seem that there is no basis for doing 
so.  In this connection, the inspection team declared 
Ambiguity No. 2. 
 
     In addition, it should be noted that on July 10, 2008, 
the Russian Federation conducted an inspection at 
Davis-Monthan under Article XI, paragraph 3, of the Treaty. 
From the results of that inspection, it was found that on one 
B-1 heavy bomber (No. 84055) equipped for nuclear armaments 
(which had been partially disassembled) one pylon attachment 
joint for long-range nuclear ALCMs was in plain view.  The 
Russian inspectors were surprised that it looked (begin 
underline. exactly the same as the modified forward 
attachment joint. (end underline) 
 
     Ambiguity No. 3 concerns the aft pylon attachment joints. 
 
     The inspected Party presented the aft pylon attachment 
joints to the inspecting Party with cylindrical metal sleeves 
welded to the inside wall of the well.  However, it is not 
clear to the inspecting Party how this procedure corresponds 
to the objective stipulated in Section VI, paragraph 11, of 
the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 
 
 
     Let's look at the photograph taken by the inspectors. 
 
     (Photograph in Russian text.) 
 
     (begin underline) In the past (end underline) the 
inspectors (begin underline) never observed (end underline) 
the "old" joints, and photographs of them were not provided 
to the Treaty Parties.  The collet receptacles that were 
declared to have been removed were not presented.  It is not 
clear that the welded sleeve precludes the possibility of 
attaching a pylon for nuclear ALCMs. 
 
     In notification ANC/STR 08-53/90 of January 26, 2008, 
the U.S. stated (begin bold type) "that all the attachment 
joints have been changed so as to be incompatible with 
long-range nuclear ALCM pylons, but this was not demonstrated 
either during the HB exhibition or during conversion 
inspections." (end bold type)  (Translator's Note: 
Retranslation from Russian.) 
 
     The inspection team did not confirm that the objective 
of conversion had been achieved as regards the pylon 
attachment joints. 
 
     The circumstances listed do not allow the inspectors at 
each conversion inspection to confirm the fact that a B-1 
heavy bomber has been converted to a non-nuclear variant. 
 
     The inspection report (summary comments):  "The 
inspecting Party did not confirm the fact that the inspected 
Party had completed the procedures for conversion of the B-lB 
heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than 
long-range nuclear ALCMs into a heavy bomber equipped for 
non-nuclear armaments because, in the inspecting Party's 
view, the modification of the weapons bays and external pylon 
attachment joints that was carried out (begin underline) is 
not sufficient (end underline) to render them (begin 
underline) incapable of carrying nuclear armaments." (end 
underline) 
 
     For the above reasons, the inspected Party's answers 
contained in the reports of conversion inspections and in the 
U.S. paper of May 28, 2008, (begin underline) cannot satisfy 
(end underline) the Russian side. 
 
     Thus, the Russian side (begin underline) has the 
following concern: (end underline)  (begin bold text)  "The 
procedures declared by the U.S. for conversion of a B-1 heavy 
bomber to a non-nuclear variant do not conform to the 
requirements of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.  The 
Russian Federation believes that after conversion the B-l is 
still capable of carrying nuclear armaments." (end bold text) 
 
End text. 
 
¶4.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text