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S E C R E T GENEVA 000603 
 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII:  U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT, JULY 
24, 2008 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States 
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-020. 
 
.  (U) Paragraph 3 below contains the text of the U.S. 
statement that was delivered at the closing plenary meeting 
of the Thirty-second Session of the START Treaty's Joint 
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), held at the 
Russian Mission on July 24, 2008.  The unclassified 
attachments, referred to in this closing statement, will be 
sent septel. 
 
¶3. (S) Begin text: 
 
                          STATEMENT 
            BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO 
        THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION 
                AT THE CLOSING PLENARY MEETING 
                 OF THE THIRTY-SECOND SESSION 
 
                        July 24, 2008 
 
     The U.S. Delegation joins with the Representatives of 
the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the 
Russian Federation, and Ukraine in closing the Thirty-second 
session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission. 
 
                              I 
 
     This has again been a productive session despite the 
short duration and compressed work schedule.  During our 
opening meeting, the U.S. Delegation indicated that, after 
nearly six years of discussion on Ukrainian proposals to 
eliminate SS-24 solid rocket motor cases and remove them from 
START accountability in a manner that would permit their 
reuse in a civilian capacity, the Parties were close to 
resolution of that issue.  As an additional element of the 
resolution of elimination of SS-24 solid rocket motor cases, 
Ukraine has made a unilateral statement committing Ukraine 
not to transfer those eliminated cases beyond its national 
territory.  The U.S. Delegation also indicated that, after 
some additional clarification of Russian-proposed changes to 
the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs site 
diagram, the United States was prepared to complete the 
S-Series Joint Statement on Drovyanaya.  I am pleased to 
acknowledge that both of these issues have been resolved. 
 
     These successes are indicative of our Governments' 
commitment and ability to work together constructively, 
during the intersessional period, in concert with the 
business-like maner in which we approach these issues here 
in Geneva. 
 
                              II 
 
     TheUnited States continues to be extremely concerned 
regarding the use of very large covers on missilefront 
sections during SS-27 Silo and road-mobileICBM reentry 
vehicle on-site inspections (RVOSIs).  The use of these large 
covers prohibits our inspectors from ascertaining that the 
front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the one 
warhead attributed to these missiles.  We understand that the 
Russian Federation is studying how to resolve this issue and 
we look forward to its solution. 
 
 
                              III 
 
     The U.S. Delegation welcomes the changes that have been 
made to the SS-25 elimination procedures beginning in 2008. 
To date, 28 SS-25 ICBMs have been eliminated.  However, the 
United States still has concerns with the 109 SS-25 ICBMs 
which the Russian Federation has removed from accountability, 
but that the U.S. does not consider to have been eliminated. 
Until all elements of those remaining 109 missiles are 
eliminated, the United States cannot consider those ICBMs to 
have been eliminated under the Treaty.  The United States 
understands that the Russian Federation is studying how to 
resolve this issue and looks forward to a satisfactory 
resolution soon. 
 
                              IV 
 
     The Parties again discussed Russian concerns about 
Minuteman III RVOSI.  The U.S. Delegation understands that 
the Russian Federation cannot commit to resolution of the 
issue until a demonstration of the interior space under the 
lower portion of the front section has been conducted. 
However, if the United States were to commit to such a 
demonstration, the Russian Federation must understand that 
any additional procedures that may be used during such a 
demonstration would not be incorporated into the existing 
Minuteman III RVOSI procedures.  The United States would 
expect that inspectors would be satisfied with the results of 
the demonstration and determine that additional procedures 
would not be necessary for any follow-on RVOSI of MM III. 
 
                              V 
 
     The Parties also discussed Russian concerns with the 
Courtland Missile Assembly Facility.  The U.S. Delegation 
provided explanations and answers to the Russian Aide-Memoire 
of March 28, 2008.  The U.S. Delegation stresses that there 
will be no new production of Trident I first stages at this 
facility.  The U.S. Delegation also stresses that the Trident 
I first stages that are assembled into target vehicles 
supporting U.S. Missile Defense programs remain accountable 
under the Treaty and subject to the Treaty's provisions. 
 
                              VI 
 
     Russian concerns with the conversion of the B-1 heavy 
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range 
nuclear ALCMs to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear 
armaments was discussed at this session, as was the issue of 
the basing of these converted B-1 heavy bombers.  The U.S. 
Delegation notes that the distinguishing features for the 
converted heavy bombers were confirmed by Russian, Ukrainian 
and Belarusian inspectors.  Concerns with the conversion, as 
expressed by the Russian Delegation, include that the items 
removed from the aircraft to make it incapable of carrying 
nuclear armaments were not demonstrated to the Russian 
inspectors,  Russian inspectors cannot confirm that the 
aircraft is no longer capable of carrying nuclear armaments, 
and have concerns that the conversion is not "irreversible." 
The U.S. Delegation reemphasizes that the conversion 
procedures used by the U.S. render the converted B-1 heavy 
bombers incapable of carrying nuclear armaments in accordance 
with paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Conversion or 
Elimination Protocol.  The U.S. also points out that there is 
no Treaty obligation to demonstrate the items removed during 
the conversion process.  Additionally, the phrase "incapable 
of carrying," in its ordinary meaning, as well as in the 
context of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, means 
that, with respect to the modifications carried out on the 
pylon attachment joints and in the weapons bay, the converted 
B-1 heavy bomber is no longer capable of, or suited for, the 
operational deployment of nuclear armaments.  It is clear, in 
both Russian and English language texts that the phrase 
"carrying nuclear armaments" does not mean simply the ability 
to load or hold an object the size and weight of a nuclear 
weapon.  The criterion of capability or suitability to 
support the operational use of the nuclear armaments, as 
being inherent in the phrase "incapable of carrying nuclear 
armaments," is consistent with the meaning of "carry" as used 
in the START Treaty.  Furthermore, the U.S. Delegation 
stresses that there are no Treaty provisions that give the 
other Parties the right to seek agreement on the conversion 
procedures.  Conversion procedures are at the discretion of 
the Party conducting the conversion.  What is relevant to the 
inspection regime is the recognition of the distinguishing 
features declared by the inspected Party, as well as the 
confirmation by the inspecting Party of the requirements for 
conversion. 
 
     Regarding the basing of the converted heavy bombers, the 
U.S. Delegation stresses that, for Treaty accountability, 
these heavy bombers are attributed to the Davis-Monthan 
Conversion or Elimination Facility in the MOU.  Converted 
B-1s located at facilities other than Davis-Monthan will be 
there in a "visiting" status. 
 
                            VII 
 
     The United States appreciated hearing the views of the 
other START Treaty Parties regarding the issue of meeting to 
consider the extension of the Treaty in accordance with 
Article XVII.  As was made clear by the Parties, this is an 
important issue that will require consideration by capitals. 
The United States looks forward to working with its Treaty 
partners on this matter during the intersessional period. 
 
                            VIII 
 
     With the expectation that the START Treaty will expire 
in December 2009, the Parties initiated discussion of the 
activities and the planning that will be required for closing 
of the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility and the various 
Points of Entry related to the START Treaty.  The United 
States is aware that much work needs to be done to 
efficiently and effectively close those locations.  The U.S. 
Delegation agrees that there are many logistical issues that 
must be resolved and that those details must be worked 
together with our Treaty partners.  We also note that this 
planning must take into account that the United States 
expects to exercise its Treaty inspection and monitoring 
rights until the expiration of the START Treaty. 
 
                              IX 
 
     We once again strongly encourage our Treaty partners to 
communicate, through diplomatic channels, their views on 
agenda items, as well as any related information in support 
of those views well in advance of our next JCIC session. 
 
     As we continue to learn, communication and dialogue in 
advance of a session are key to enhancing our chances of 
success when we meet here in Geneva. 
 
 
                               X 
 
     Thank you all for your work here in Geneva.  I look 
forward to continuing to work together during the 
intersessional period. 
 
     Once again, I would like to thank our translators and 
interpreters for their exceptional work.  Without them, we 
could not function. 
 
     Have a safe journey home. 
 
End text. 
 
¶4.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
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