O 251446Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6853
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T GENEVA 000601 
 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING TO DISCUSS 
THE "CONDUCT OF AN OBLIGATORY MEETING OF THE PARTIES TO 
DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF START EXTENSION," JULY 23, 2008 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States 
Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-016. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  July 23, 2008 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the 
U.S. Mission on July 23, 2008 to discuss the Article XVII 
requirement by the Parties to "meet to consider whether this 
Treaty (START) will be extended...."  The Parties agreed that 
the Treaty requires that a meeting be conducted prior to 
December 5, 2008, to "consider" the question of a Treaty 
extension, and also agreed that a final decision on the 
matter of Treaty extension did not have to be taken either at 
that meeting or by December 5, 2008.  The exact format, 
timing, level of representation and terms of the meeting 
remain to be agreed via diplomatic channels.  Only the 
Ukrainian Delegation expressed a definite position on Treaty 
extension, noting they would like START to be extended until 
2013 in order to complete the elimination of their SS-24 
systems.  In preparation for this HOD meeting, U.S. and 
Russian lawyers met briefly to exchange preliminary views on 
legal aspects of implementing Article XVII. 
 
------------------ 
WHAT ELEMENTS NEED 
TO BE RESOLVED 
------------------ 
 
¶4.  (S) Koshelev began the meeting by noting that the Treaty 
stipulates that Parties meet not later than one year prior to 
its expiration.  As the Treaty is scheduled to expire 
December 5, 2009, he shared his view that this meeting must 
occur prior to December 5, 2008.  He identified three crucial 
elements to be resolved:  the format (either within the JCIC 
or in a special arrangement), the level of representation, 
and what the possible results could be.  He said that Russia 
placed this item for discussion on the agenda at the JCIC in 
order to hear the perspectives of other delegations on the 
matter and to determine what our future work was, which we 
would then all communicate to capitals.  Koshelev offered no 
Russian view on extension of the Treaty. 
 
¶5.  (S) Kolesnik, reading from a prepared statement, 
emphasized the important role the START Treaty had played in 
contributing to nuclear disarmament and strategic stability. 
He noted that while one of the Treaty's main objectives, 
namely a 30 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms, 
has already been achieved, the START Treaty remains one of 
the most important elements in the international security 
architecture through its transparency, which was created by a 
unique and effective verification processes, that has 
improved the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.  He 
considered the Belarusian decision to accept the obligations 
of START through the Lisbon Protocol and the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state in May 
1992 to have been "well thought out" and had a historical 
basis.  Regarding the issue at hand, Kolesnik stated that the 
Parties needed to consider the question of the future of the 
Treaty in a very responsible way and that the decision should 
be reached on the basis of a careful analysis in terms of 
international security and nonproliferation.  He acknowledged 
that the issue could not be resolved at the current JCIC 
session, as the representatives were not authorized to do 
that and he urged that a special meeting should be held in an 
agreed format to consider the issue.  He stated that Belarus 
would carefully study proposals and that, absent a decision 
on the meeting details during this session, work should 
continue via diplomatic channels. 
 
¶6.  (S) Making good on a pledge to keep his remarks short, 
Akhmetalin made a brief reference to the importance of the 
question of START Treaty extension in the context of the 
global role of reduction of strategic offensive arms and the 
international security framework.  He stated that he joined 
Belarus, Ukraine and Russia in supporting a meeting to 
consider START extension prior to December 5, 2008, but he 
shared no view on whether the Treaty should be extended. 
 
¶7.  (S) Belashov stated that Ukraine also agreed that the 
fate of START was very important, noting that while many of 
its provisions had been fulfilled, there was also the view 
that not all of the opportunities afforded by the Treaty, 
particularly with regard to the JCIC, had been realized.  He 
asserted that Ukraine had fulfilled all of its obligations 
under the Treaty and under the 1994 Trilateral (Russia, 
Ukraine and United States) Agreement, and listed some of the 
Ukrainian accomplishments: -- all silo launchers had been 
eliminated, all deployed weapons had been removed from active 
duty and no longer exist, and the elimination of all heavy 
bombers.  While noting the achievements under START, the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and via "other 
instruments,", Belashov stated that there was work left to do 
regarding the second phase of the obligation to eliminate 
SS-24s, and noted that Ukraine would have difficulties 
dealing with the costs of this work relating to the 
facilities for "washing out" propellant.  He assessed that 
the removal of SS-24s from accountability would be completed 
by the end of 2013 (Begin comment:  Using the "washing out" 
process previously agreed by Parties during this JCIC 
session.  End comment.).  Based on this assessment, he 
expressed Ukraine's preference to extend the Treaty in order 
to ensure that work on the SS-24 was completed.  He also 
noted that extending START would allow for the retention of 
existing control and verification mechanisms, emphasizing 
that Ukraine supported transparency and openness and that it 
acts in accordance with the Treaty, other instruments and its 
multilateral and bilateral agreements.  He admitted that, at 
this JCIC session, the Parties would not be able to come to 
an agreement on a final decision on the future of START but, 
while highlighting Ukrainian flexibility regarding the 
meeting format, Belashov shared his opinion that the JCIC was 
competent to discuss the issue and to reach a decision on 
Treaty extension no later than December 5, 2008, and that no 
special mechanism needed to be created.  He added that there 
was a need for work through diplomatic channels during the 
intersessional period on this matter and that it would be one 
of the most important issues for the upcoming JCIC session. 
 
¶8.  (S) Taylor met with Belashov during a break in the 
meeting and Belashov admitted that he had no instructions on 
this issue and that he just wanted to get the discussions 
going.  He understood that no final decision had to be 
reached at the meeting to be held prior to December 5, 2008, 
but he wanted to state that such a decision could be made at 
that time.  When the meeting resumed after the break, both 
the Taylor and Koshelev sought to clarify Belashov's 
misinterpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article XVII, by 
explaining that the Treaty requires the conduct of a meeting 
regarding Treaty extension prior to December 5, 2008, but 
does not stipulate that a decision must be taken by that 
date.  Noting the absence of legal counsel in his delegation, 
Belashov finally agreed with that interpretation and 
expressed confidence that his lawyers in Kyiv would as well. 
 
¶9.  (S) Taylor expressed appreciation for the views expressed 
and stated that they would be reported to authorities in 
Washington.  He shared that the subject was still being 
discussed at a senior level within the U.S. Government and 
anticipated continued communications between Parties in the 
coming months. 
 
¶10.  (S) Koshelev summarized the views expressed by stating 
that all of the Parties agreed that there has to be a meeting 
prior to December 5, 2008, to consider whether START should 
be extended, and that concerning the format, representation 
and timing of such a meeting, it is still too early to reach 
agreement.  He stated that this is why the Parties need to 
clarify how work would proceed since there is not much time 
left.  He asked whether the next step should be through 
diplomatic channels or whether the legal advisers and other 
delegation members should meet before the end of this 
session, acknowledging that the Russian Delegation did not 
expect to be able to solve the issue of START extension 
during this session.  He stated that the Russian Delegation 
knew that this was a preliminary discussion and would lead to 
further discussions and that the results of these preliminary 
discussions would be provided to capitals. 
 
¶11.  (S) Belashov took the floor again to explain his 
interpretation of paragraph 2 of Article XVII.  He stated 
that the format of the meeting was not stipulated so that 
means that it is an open question.  He emphasized his 
preference that the meeting be conducted within the framework 
of the JCIC, noting that this was still a preliminary view. 
He expressed his understanding that these issues would be 
discussed at a higher level, but he believed that all the 
"expert" work should be done in the JCIC and that, if a 
decision is taken to extend START, all the necessary 
documentation could be done within the JCIC.  If, on the 
other hand, the decision was made not to extend START, then 
there was nothing for the JCIC to do to formalize that 
decision. 
 
-------------------- 
LAWYER'S PRE-MEETING 
ON ARTICLE XVII 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) At the request of Koshelev, U.S. and Russian lawyers 
(Brown and Kotkova) met on July 22 to discuss in a 
preliminary manner certain legal aspects of Article XVII 
prior to the HOD meeting concerning this issue.  Kotkova 
stated that Russia fully understood that any meeting convened 
under paragraph 2 of Article XVII (to consider whether the 
Treaty should be extended for 5 years) must include all five 
Parties and that the meeting could be held at any level of 
their respective governments.  She raised the issue of what 
forum might be most suited for such a meeting, explaining 
that, because the JCIC offers an opportunity for all five 
Parties to meet together, it might be the most convenient 
option.  She commented that, in such a case, the JCIC 
representatives (or others) might have to be 
authorized by their governments to represent that Party in 
the Article XVII meeting.  She acknowledged that the Article 
XVII meeting could take place outside of the JCIC framework 
but could include representatives who had been sent to Geneva 
also for the JCIC session.  Brown said that the United States 
was still in the process of reviewing a number of issues 
related to Article XVII and that all he would be able to do 
is to take her comments back to Washington or provide only 
unofficial reactions.  She indicated that, similarly, Russia 
was still thinking through these questions, but wanted to 
flag them so that there could be further exchanges during the 
intersessional period through diplomatic channels. 
 
¶13.  (S) On the question of whether any official 
acknowledgement of the Article XVII meeting had to be made, 
Kotkova said that Russia recognized that there was no legal 
requirement to notify or publicize to non-parties (or the 
public) that the Article XVII meeting was held, but that one 
possibility to record the meeting for the Parties' own 
purposes could be a plenary statement at the end of a JCIC 
session that such a meeting was held.  Kotkova asked whether 
a decision not to extend START had to be recorded formally in 
any way.  Brown indicated he did not think that it had to be 
formally recorded but that, if the Parties wanted to do so, 
he did not see a problem with some sort of an acknowledgment 
by the Parties.  She asked whether a decision to extend START 
for five years had to be submitted for ratification by the 
United States.  Brown indicated that it did not, and Kotkova 
confirmed that this was the same situation for Russia. 
 
¶14.  (S) Kotkova raised the issue of whether fewer than five 
Parties could decide to extend START for five years under the 
Article XVII authority and, if so, whether the U.S. and 
Russia had to be included in that group.  Brown stated that 
it was his interpretation that, in order to use the Article 
XVII procedures, all five Parties had to be part of the 
agreement to extend START for five years, so this did not 
appear to be a likely scenario.  Kotkova sought Brown's views 
on how the decision of the Parties to extend START would be 
recorded, raising the ideas of government-to-government 
agreements or exchanges of letters and noting that it would 
probably have to be some sort of international agreement. 
Brown agreed that an international agreement of some sort 
would probably be what our governments would expect, adding 
that executive agreements were how the Parties codified their 
agreement on START implementation issues.  Kotkova also 
raised the question as to what would be the form of any such 
exchange of letters, i.e., a letter from all four former USSR 
Parties addressed to the Government of the United States, or 
letters exchanged among all five Parties with each other. 
Brown indicated that he would have to consult before 
rendering anything more than a preliminary opinion based on 
the multilaterization of the Treaty through the Lisbon 
Protocol and the practice of the JCIC. 
 
¶15.  (S) Kotkova, referring to other possible meetings of the 
Parties on START extension, asked whether the decision to 
extend START could be taken even one day before termination 
of START, i.e., on December 4, 2009.  Brown opined that, 
hypothetically, such a situation would not be inconsistent 
with Article XVII but that, in practice, the timing of any 
decision to extend START would depend upon all Parties being 
able to reach such an agreement in time; otherwise, START 
would terminate.  Finally, she asked whether START could be 
extended for less than five years.  Brown responded that in 
his view any period of less than five years would require 
ratification: either as a new Treaty that superseded START 
during the extended five year period, or as an amendment to 
START that changed the period of extension from a five-year 
period to a lesser period.  She indicated that this  was also 
the Russian view. 
 
¶16.  (U) Documents exchanged.  None. 
 
¶17.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Ms. Bosco 
Mr. Brown 
LtCol Comeau 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Maj. Edinger 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hanchett 
Mr. Johnston 
LTC Oppenheim 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Tessier 
Mr. Vogel 
Mr. Yaguchi 
Dr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
BELARUS 
 
Mr. Kolesnik 
Mr. Ponomarev 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Mr. Akhmetalin 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr Koshelev 
Mr. Lapshin 
Mr. Kashirin 
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min 
Col Novikov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Semenov 
Mr. Serov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Col Zaytsev 
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
Mr. Belashov 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Maj Gen Fedotov 
 
¶18.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



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