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S E C R E T GENEVA 000585 
 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII: WORKING GROUP MEETING ON DROVYANAYA 
SITE DIAGRAM AND MM III RVOSI ISSUES, JULY 18, 2008 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 0565 (JCIC-XXXII-005) 
     ¶B. 07 GENEVA 2570 (JCIC-XXXI-028) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-009. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  July 18, 2008 
                Time:  3:30 - 5:10 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Working Group (WG) Meeting was held at the U.S. 
Mission on July 18, 2008, to discuss Russian-proposed changes 
to the Site Diagram of Drovyanaya former Silo ICBM Base and 
Russian concerns with Minuteman III (MM III) reentry vehicle 
on-site inspection (RVOSI) procedures. The United States, 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were represented.  The 
Kazakhstani Representative said he had just arrived in 
Geneva, but was ready to begin work in the JCIC. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian Delegation gave a slide presentation 
explaining the changes proposed to the site diagram for 
Drovyanaya.  They provided a new site diagram, dated July 17 
2008, that removed the silo training launcher that was 
erroneously placed on the site diagram provided to the U.S. 
through diplomatic channels in April 2008, and highlighted 
the differences in boundary locations from the site diagram. 
(Begin comment:  The Russian-proposed Joint Statement was 
e-mailed to State/VCI/SI.  There was no reporting cable.  End 
comment.). 
 
¶5.  (S) The Russian Delegation also presented its concerns 
regarding the possibility of a one-time demonstration of the 
inside of the lower portion of the MM III front section.  The 
U.S. Delegation listened to, and sought clarification of, 
those concerns.  The U.S. Delegation responded by reiterating 
the U.S. position that any such demonstration would not 
result in additional procedures for use during MM III RVOSIs. 
 The Russians would not guarantee that a satisfactory outcome 
to such a demonstration would alleviate their concerns 
regarding the space in the lower portion of the front section. 
 
----------------------- 
DROVYANAYA SITE DIAGRAM 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Couch opened the Working Group (WG) meeting by 
welcoming everyone and recognizing the representative from 
Kazakhstan, Colonel Akhmetalin, since this was the first 
meeting he had been able to attend.  Couch outlined the WG's 
agenda and turned over a Delegation paper with questions 
concerning the changes to the Drovyanaya site diagram that 
had been asked at the HOD meeting on Drovyanaya.(Ref A).  The 
text of the U.S. Delegation Paper follows. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                    JCIC-XXXII 
                                    U.S. Delegation Paper 
                                    July 17, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
Clarification questions posed to the Russian Federation 
regarding the revised Site Diagram for Drovyanaya former Silo 
ICBM Base 
 
1)  The proposed boundaries of the formerly declared facility 
depicted on the revised site diagram would significantly 
reduce the inspectable area beyond what was discussed during 
JCIC-XXXI.  The U.S. seeks to better understand why the 
proposed boundary changes that were not discussed during the 
previous session are necessary for the formerly declared 
facility. 
 
2)  It is our understanding that the silo training launcher 
associated with the Drovyanaya Silo ICBM Base was explosively 
destroyed and officially eliminated in accordance with the 
START Treaty on August 25, 1995.  While subparagraph 9(b) 
(iii) of Annex J of the Memorandum of Understanding requires 
that silo training launchers be shown on the site diagram of 
the facility at which they are declared, it is not clear why 
the Russian Federation depicted the location of the former 
silo training launcher on the revised site diagram since it 
was not reflected on the last agreed site diagram for the 
facility and it had previously been eliminated and no longer 
declared as IOI. 
 
End text. 
 
¶7.  (S) Ryzhkov thanked the U.S. Delegation for its draft 
S-Series Joint Statement and provided the other Parties with 
the new site diagram, dated July 17, 2008, with the reduced 
boundary and the absence of the previously-eliminated silo 
training launcher.  Ryzhkov reiterated that Russia did not 
intend to use the area excluded from this diagram for 
activities inconsistent with the Treaty.  Ryzhkov clarified 
the reasons for the difference in size of the excluded area 
from what was discussed during JCIC-XXXI by saying that the 
Russian Federation only recently made final decisions about 
the area to be excluded.  The text of the U.S.-proposed 
S-Series Joint Statement on Drovyanaya follows. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                     JCIC-XXXII 
                                     U.S.-Proposed Text 
                                     July 18, 2008 
 
         JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION 
              JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER S-(BLANK) 
 
        ON CHANGES TO THE BOUNDARY OF DROVYANAYA ICBM 
              BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS 
 
     The Parties, referring to paragraph 19 of Annex J to the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data 
Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 
31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, taking into 
account the information provided in Annex A to this Joint 
Statement with respect to the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Silo 
Launchers of ICBMs, agree on the following: 
 
     (1)  The new boundary of the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for 
Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundary shown on the 
site diagram of the maintenance facility of the base dated 
April 6, 2008, which is attached as Annex B to this Joint 
Statement. 
 
 
     (2)  The portions of the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Silo 
Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint 
Statement, from within the boundary shown on the existing 
site diagram of the maintenance facility dated May 29, 1995, 
shall not be subject to inspection unless such portions are 
included within the boundary of any inspection site. 
 
     (3)  The changes to the boundary of the Drovyanaya ICBM 
Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on 
the date specified in the notification provided by the 
Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section 
I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or 
the date such notification is provided by the Russian 
Federation, or the date of entry into force of this Joint 
Statement, whichever is latest. 
 
............... (United States of America) 
............... (Republic of Belarus 
............... (Republic of Kazakhstan) 
............... (Russian Federation) 
............... (Ukraine) 
 
                           ANNEX A 
 
       INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
   ON CHANGES TO THE BOUNDARY OF THE DROVYANAYA ICBM BASE 
                FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS 
 
     The Russian Federation: 
 
     (1)  pursuant to subparagraph 19(a) of Annex J to the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data 
Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the 
Memorandum of Understanding, declares that the requirements 
set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of Section IX 
of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or 
Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty have been met 
with respect to the portions of the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for 
Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded from within the 
boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the facility 
dated May 29, 1995; 
 
     (2)  pursuant to subparagraph 19(b) of Annex J to the 
Memorandum of Understanding, states that all structures that 
were ever shown within the boundaries shown on the existing 
site diagram of the Drovyanaya ICBM Base for Silo Launchers 
of ICBMs dated May 29, 1995, pursuant to subparagraph 
9(b)(iii) or 9(b)(iv) of Annex J to the Memorandum of 
Understanding and that will be excluded from within the 
boundary of this facility pursuant to this Joint Statement, 
will remain unchanged but will no longer be used for items of 
inspection as of April 6, 2008. 
 
End text. 
 
--------------- 
NOW YOU SEE IT, 
NOW YOU DON'T 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Kuz'min gave a slide presentation on the changes to 
the site diagram.  The first slide showed the site diagram 
from May 29, 1995, then overlaid the new boundaries with 
shading to indicate the area to be excluded.  The new site 
diagram no longer showed the silo training launcher that was 
eliminated in August 1995.  The next several slides showed 
photographs from the areas to be excluded showing empty 
spaces or abandoned buildings.  The slide indicated the 
places from which the photographs were taken and the 
direction of the camera.  (Begin comment:  the 1995 site 
diagram shown by Kuz'min had a silo training launcher 
depicted on it.  The actual May 29, 1995 approved Drovyanaya 
site diagram did not have a silo training launcher depicted 
on it.  End comment.) 
 
¶9.  (S) Fortier asked whether there was a fence line that 
indicated the new boundary and Kuz'min answered that fences 
exist around areas previously discussed and a fence would be 
established along the portion of the site proposed to be 
reduced. 
 
¶10.  (S) Couch stated that the U.S. could accept the new site 
diagram and was ready to move it into the Conforming Working 
Group. 
 
¶11.  (S) Ryzhkov presented the U.S. Delegation with an 
updated draft of the Russian-proposed S-Series Joint 
Statement, indicating that there were two words the Russian 
Delegation added to the text that did not change the 
substance of the document.  Kuz'min indicated he would 
address these changes in the Conforming Working Group. 
 
--------------------- 
MM III RVOSI CONCERNS 
--------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Ryzhkov began the discussion on Minuteman III RVOSI 
by highlighting the importance of this issue and welcomed the 
U.S. Delegation's desire to resolve it.  Ryzhkov began by 
responding to the questions contained in the U.S. Delegation 
paper from December 2007 (Ref B) that stated the ability to 
inspect the underside of the MM III front section would 
resolve Russian concerns. 
 
¶13.  (S) Russia would agree with the United States conducting 
a demonstration at a specially-allocated site, but believed 
it was better to approximate actual RVOSI procedures.  Such a 
demonstration should follow the Inspection Protocol, Annex 3 
procedures for conducting an RVOSI. 
 
-------------------------- 
MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL 
-------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Russian Delegation was 
surprised by the U.S. question about indirect viewing. 
Russia would prefer a direct method of examination of the 
underside of the front section but would accept an indirect 
method, perhaps using a mirror-like device.  Ryzhkov referred 
to previous demonstrations (e.g., King's Bay, Vypolzovo) that 
alleviated concerns of each side and stated THAT, if the 
demonstration satisfied Russian concerns, this issue would be 
closed.  However, Ryzhkov would not state unequivocally that 
a one-time viewing would allay Russia's concerns because the 
procedures to be used during that viewing had not yet been 
determined. 
 
¶15.  (S) Couch stated that the U.S. wanted to resolve this 
issue, but was very concerned about any change in procedures 
with respect to nuclear weapons.  Couch used a photograph of 
the MM III front section suspended in the silo that had been 
presented during JCIC-XXXI and asked whether Russian concerns 
would be satisfied by seeing if RVs could be placed in the 
lower portion of the front section in a rear-facing or 
horizontal configuration.  (Begin comment:  After asking that 
question, Zaytsev nodded his head firmly.  End comment.) 
 
¶16.  (S) Ryzhkov stated that Russia had wanted to know for a 
long time whether the volume and engineering of the space 
inside the lower portion of the MM III front section was 
capable of being equipped with reentry vehicles. 
 
¶17.  (S) Couch assured the Russian Delegation that the U.S. 
wanted to resolve this issue, but needed to ensure that any 
demonstration could be done in a safe and secure way that 
satisfied Russian concerns.  Couch reiterated the U.S. 
position that any demonstration would not lead to new 
procedures to be used during future RVOSIs. 
 
----------------------------- 
THE GIFT THAT KEEPS ON GIVING 
----------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (S) Ryzhkov responded that it was up to the United 
States to structure a demonstration, and outlined Russian 
thinking about a demonstration's relationship to future 
inspections.  He opined that, during future inspections, 
Russian inspectors would need to see the front section as it 
was during the demonstration.  To ensure this was the case, 
the U.S. would need to identify a distinguishing element on 
the front section, preferably inside the lower portion of the 
front section, that Russian inspectors could see either 
directly, or indirectly, with a mirror-like device.  Ryzhkov 
added that if the demonstration showed no need for additional 
procedures, Russia would not insist on any. 
 
¶19.  (S) Smith stated that the essence of the discussion was 
the volume of space inside the lower portion of the front 
section.  The U.S. hope was that any demonstration would show 
that the volume was inadequate to contain additional RVs. 
Smith explained that the U.S. goal was to satisfy Russian 
concerns without adding to existing RVOSI procedures, and any 
talk of mirrors or distinguishing elements would lead to 
additional procedures which the U.S. hoped to avoid.  Smith 
asked, if the U.S. could demonstrate that the volume of space 
beneath the front section was unable to contain additional 
RVs, would that satisfy Russian concerns? 
 
¶20.  (S) Ryzhkov referenced the SS-25 RVOSI demonstration at 
Vypolzovo stating that, during the demonstration, the U.S. 
made suggestions about the procedures to Russia, based on the 
demonstration itself, and Russia incorporated those 
suggestions into the finally agreed-on procedures because 
they made sense. 
 
¶21.  (S) Smith responded that the U.S. questions were never 
intended to lead to new procedures.  (Begin comment:  Ryzhkov 
was becoming visibly frustrated.  End comment.) 
 
----------------- 
MAYBE, JUST MAYBE 
----------------- 
 
¶22.  (S) Ryzhkov stated that this was the fourth time the 
U.S. Delegation pushed for a direct answer as to whether or 
not a demonstration of the space beneath the front section 
would resolve Russian concerns, but the Russian Federation 
could not provide an answer until after the demonstration was 
conducted.  He urged the U.S. to conduct the demonstration 
and then the answer would be known. 
 
¶23.  (S) Couch asked Ryzhkov to elaborate on the idea of a 
distinguishing element to be used during future RVOSIs. 
Smith asked whether such an element needed to be within the 
space of the lower portion of the front section or if it 
could be an element normally seen outside of that space 
during current procedures. 
 
¶24.  (S) Ryzhkov pointed out that the Russian idea was that 
the element should be within the lower portion of the front 
section, and it could be an element that could be seen with a 
mirror.  Ryzhkov stated "if you can persuade us otherwise, go 
ahead." 
 
¶25.  (S) Couch attempted to re-verify the Russian position 
that a successful demonstration would not require new 
procedures and that use of a mirror would be for the 
demonstration only.  Ryzhkov responded maybe or maybe not. 
 
---------------- 
THE ANSWER IS 
UNDER THE NAPKIN 
---------------- 
 
¶26.  (S) Ryzhkov built a small model of the MM III front 
section using a napkin, his pen and a water glass.  To 
demonstrate what Russia is concerned about he raised it up to 
look underneath, and said they wanted to see what was covered. 
 
¶27.  (S) Both delegations agreed each now clearly understood 
the other's position on this issue and Couch concluded the 
session stating the U.S. would study Russian concerns and 
respond at a later time. 
 
------------------------------ 
SIDE-BAR DISCUSSION ON RUSSIAN 
DECLARATION OF FORCE MAJEURE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶28.  (S) Smith conducted a short side-bar discussion with 
Ryzhkov and Kuz'min after the meeting concerning the Russian 
declaration of force majeure which resulted in the 
cancellation, at the point of entry (POE), of an RVOSI which 
was to be conducted at the Tatishchevo ICBM Base in the 
Russian Federation.  Smith asked Ryzhkov whether he had any 
additional information regarding the reason for the force 
majeure declaration.  Ryzhkov stated that the big secret was 
a visit by the President of Russia to Tatishchevo that day 
and there were extreme security concerns.  He also noted that 
force majeure can be declared for reasons other than natural 
disasters.  Smith advised Ryzhkov that the Russian inspection 
team chief, Colonel Petrov, who conducted an inspection ten 
days later in the U.S., had informed the U.S. escorts that 
the situation at Tatishchevo had been of short duration and 
if the U.S. inspection team had declared another inspection 
site and, after that inspection, had requested to go to 
Tatishchevo they would have been able to conduct the 
inspection.  Smith asked, if that was the case, why couldn't 
the Russian escort exhibit some flexibility and allow the U.S 
inspection team to stay at the POE one more day and then 
conduct the inspection rather than making them return to the 
Unites States?  Ryzhkov replied that, at the time, the 
Russian escorts did not know how long the restrictions would 
be in place at the site but that, currently, Tatishchevo was 
available for inspection at any time and U.S. inspection 
teams were welcome there. 
 
 
¶29.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S.: 
 
    -- United States Delegation Paper on Questions For 
Clarification on Drovyanaya Site Diagram Changes, July 17 
¶2008. 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Site Diagram Drovyanaya, July 17 2008; and 
 
    -- Draft JCIC S-Series Joint Statement On Changes To The 
Boundary Of Drovyanaya ICBM Base For Silo Launchers Of ICBMs, 
July 18, 2008. 
 
¶30.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Couch 
Ms. Bosco 
Mr. Brown 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Maj Edinger 
Mr. Fortier 
Maj Gondol 
Mr. Hanchett 
Mr. Johnston 
LTC Oppenheim 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Tessier 
Mr. Vogel 
Mr. Yaguchi 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Col Akhmetalin 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Col Ryzhkov 
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min 
Col Novikov 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Avdeyev (Int) 
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
 
¶31.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text