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S E C R E T GENEVA 000583 
 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII:  WORKING GROUP MEETING ON PROCEDURES 
FOR CLOSING THE VOTKINSK PORTAL MONITORING FACILITY AND 
POINTS OF ENTRY; ABSENCE OF ITEMS OF INSPECTION (IOI) AT 
HILL AFB; AND QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. SITE DIAGRAMS, JULY 21, 
2008 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-010. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶2.  (S) A bilateral Working Group Meeting was held at the 
U.S. Mission on July 21, 2008, between the delegations of the 
Russian Federation and the United States, to discuss the 
closure of the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility and Points 
of Entry (POE) with the expectation that the START Treaty 
will expire in 2009; issues related to the absence of items 
of inspection (IOI) during a Data Update Inspection conducted 
at Hill AFB on March 7, 2008; and Russian questions 
concerning U.S. site diagrams. 
 
¶3.  (S) The Russian Delegation recommended that work begin on 
generating various lists of items and equipment as well as 
JCIC documents that would be used to determine the 
disposition and the timetable for removal of those items and 
equipment from the Portal Monitoring Facility at Votkinsk. 
The U.S. Delegation expressed the view that it envisioned a 
similar approach, on both Votkinsk and Points of Entry 
closure, to that presented by the Russian Delegation. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian Delegation also expressed its concerns 
with the information provided to the Russian inspection team 
which conducted a recent Data Update inspection at the Hill 
AFB ICBM Repair Facility.  Specifically, that Russian 
inspectors were not told the location of an MM III Training 
Model of Missile (TMOM) that was absent from the facility at 
the time of the inspection or the time that the TMOM would 
return to the facility which, in their view, was required by 
the Treaty.  Drawing upon the Treaty text, the U.S. 
Delegation explained that there was no Treaty requirement to 
inform inspectors of the location of this piece of support 
equipment since that requirement was applicable only at 
bomber bases.  Further, that since this TMOM was not in 
transit and was not located on a road between non-contiguous 
areas of the facility, there was no Treaty requirement to 
notify inspectors of the arrival time at the inspection site. 
 
¶5.  (S) The Russian Delegation expressed concerns regarding 
the lack of a prompt U.S. response to inspection team 
documented discrepancies on a number of U.S. site diagrams. 
In particular, they cited problems with the Oasis and Hill 
AFB site diagrams which did not have structures large enough 
to contain items of inspection (IOI) or road exits annotated 
on them.  The U.S. Delegation stated that these structures 
did not need to be placed on the site diagram as only those 
structures being used for, or are intended to be used for, 
IOI are required to be placed on the diagram as stated in 
Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding.  The U.S. 
Delegation agreed to review other site diagram discrepancies 
and make any needed corrections. 
 
------------------------ 
CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS ON 
THE CLOSURE OF VOTKINSK 
------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (S) Ryzhkov began the meeting by explaining that the 
Russian Federation felt obligated to raise the issue of 
closure of the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility due to its 
experience with the cessation of portal monitoring activities 
in Magna, Utah once the INF inspection regime came to a 
close.  He noted that a lot of work needed to be done on the 
tasks related to the similar closure of the Votkinsk Portal 
Monitoring Facility.  Since the JCIC met only twice a year, a 
lot of the work needed to be accomplished during the 
intersessional periods.  He also noted the role that the JCIC 
played in facilitating inspection procedures which would also 
include the closure of Votkinsk. 
 
---------------------------- 
WE NEED LISTS AND 
TIMELINES AND JCIC DOCUMENTS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Ryzhkov explained that it was the Russian view that 
various JCIC documents would need to be agreed to so that the 
competent authorities could be identified and the respective 
responsibilities and obligations of both Parties could be 
spelled out.  Further, such documents would allow both 
Parties to fully assess the workload, as well as the 
timelines for meeting those obligations.  He noted that a 
list of all items that would be removed from the Russian 
Federation, to include preliminary dates for their removal, 
would be needed so that the means of transportation as well 
as the schedule could be determined.  He also noted that 
separate lists for those items which would be given to other 
organizations within the Russian Federation, as well as items 
that might be sold to other organizations would need to be 
produced.  A final list would include those items which would 
be disposed of within the Russian Federation, with particular 
interest being paid to any environmental or safety-related 
concerns with such items.  He noted that this was done when 
Magna closed and Russian monitors did have some problems with 
disposing of certain items due to environmental concerns. 
Ryzhkov recognized that the form of any JCIC documents would 
be based upon the opinion of each Party's legal experts, but 
the options to consider could be an agreement, a joint 
statement, or a coordinated statement.  He noted that the 
Russian Delegation's view was that the appropriate form would 
be a JCIC Joint Statement so that all of the obligations of 
the Parties related to the closure of Votkinsk would be 
included.  He closed by stating that the Parties could have 
differing views, but these views could move closer together 
if work were done during the intersessional period through 
diplomatic channels so that, perhaps, a formal document could 
be considered during the next session of the JCIC. 
 
¶8.  (S) Couch stated that the U.S. view on how to tackle this 
issue, and the issue of closing START POEs for that matter, 
was similar to that of the Russian Federation and asked that 
the Russian Delegation provide its recommendations in writing 
on how to accomplish the closure of Votkinsk.  Ryzhkov noted 
that he had intentionally not raised the issue of POEs as it 
was a multilateral issue.  Also, that the closure of POEs 
would be less complicated and inspectors could simply remove 
stored equipment during the last inspection.  He also agreed 
to provide a paper outlining Russian recommendations. 
 
--------------------- 
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 
MISSING FROM HILL AFB 
--------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Ryzhkov prefaced the discussion on inspection issues 
by stating that it was traditional for the JCIC to deal with 
operational or inspection issues and that the next two issues 
concerning events at Hill AFB and questions on U.S. site 
diagrams fell into that category.  He emphasized that they 
were working issues and not matters of principle.  Referring 
to the inspection report from the Data Update Inspection 
conducted by the Russian Federation on March 5-6, 2008 at the 
Hill AFB ICBM Repair Facility, Ryzhkov explained that the 
Russian Federation had concerns regarding the information 
that was conveyed to Russian inspectors by U.S. escorts 
during the pre-inspection briefing (Reftel).  Specifically, 
the inspection team was not told the location of one of the 
five MM III TMOMs declared for the facility, but which was 
absent from the facility. The inspection team was also not 
told the time of return of this TMOM to the facility as 
required by paragraphs 8(d) and (e) of Section VII of the 
Inspection Protocol. 
 
--------------------------- 
THE ANSWER IS IN THE TREATY 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Couch noted that the U.S. in-country escort informed 
the Russian inspection team leader of the type, variant, and 
reason for the absence of the MM III TMOM which was specified 
for the inspection site, but was absent when the inspection 
team arrived at the Hill AFB Repair Facility for ICBMs, in 
accordance with paragraph 8(d), Section VII of the Inspection 
Protocol.  Further, there was no prohibition against this 
piece of support equipment being absent from the inspection 
site and no requirement to return it to the inspection site 
during the inspection.  Smith asked whether the Russian 
concern was that the information about the absence of this 
piece of support equipment was not briefed at the 
pre-inspection briefing or that it was not briefed at all. 
Ryzhkov responded that this was one concern, but also that 
the location of the TMOM was not briefed as required by 
paragraph 8(d) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, nor 
was the time briefed that the TMOM would return to the site 
as required by paragraph 8(e).  Smith turned the Russia 
Delegation's attention to the text of the Treaty.  He 
explained that there was no requirement to notify the 
inspection team of the location of the TMOM since that 
requirement in paragraph 8(d) was applicable only to heavy 
bomber bases.  Additionally, there was no requirement to 
notify the inspection team of when the TMOM would return to 
the inspection site, since the TMOM was not in transit nor 
was it located on a road between areas of the site but, 
rather, was at a location performing specific functions and 
was not returning to the inspection site.  In this case, 
paragraph 8(e) did not apply and U.S. escorts were somewhat 
confused and quite surprised when the Russian team leader 
cited this reference in the inspection report.  Some what 
flustered, Ryzhkov noted that it appeared that both Parties 
understood each other's concerns. 
 
----------------------- 
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING; 
U.S. SITE DIAGRAMS 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Ryzhkov reiterated that this issue was not 
substantive, but was a practical matter concerning U.S. site 
diagram accuracy.  He noted a couple of positive examples 
where each Party had promptly responded to expressed concerns 
and site diagrams had been updated.  He also pointed out 
several instances, including the diagrams of Oasis and Hill 
AFB, where Russian inspectors documented their observations 
in the official inspection reports over and over again but 
those concerns had been ignored for many years.  These 
observations included the lack of structures and road exits 
depicted on the site diagrams.  Couch stated that Russian 
views on certain U.S. site diagrams were well-known but, in 
the case of the ICBM Repair Facility at Hill AFB, the Russian 
inspection team leader was informed that the structures 
listed in the inspection report which were not annotated on 
the site diagram were not intended to be used for IOI or 
Support Equipment as specified by paragraph 9(b)(iii) of 
Annex J to the MOU and, as such, did not need to be placed on 
the site diagram.  He emphasized that Russian inspectors were 
granted access to all structures at the facility large enough 
to contain IOI and that the diagram for Hill AFB fully 
complied with all Treaty requirements.  He closed by stating 
that the United States always took note of Russian concerns 
regarding U.S. site diagrams and updated its diagrams as 
appropriate. 
 
¶12.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Russian language Ad-Referendum text of the S-Series 
Joint Statement on the site diagram for Drovyanaya, dated 
July 18, 2008. 
 
¶13.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Couch 
Ms. Bosco 
Mr. Brown 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Maj. Edinger 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hanchett 
Mr. Johnston 
LTC Oppenheim 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Tessier 
Mr. Vogel 
Mr. Yaguchi 
Dr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Kashirin 
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Semenov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Col Zaytsev 
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int) 
 
¶14.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



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