Albert J Magnan  07/23/2008 09:10:19 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

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O 230721Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6779
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000572 
 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXII:  HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON 
UKRAINIAN SS-24 ELIMINATIONS, SS-27 RVOSI PROCEDURES, AND 
COURTLAND MISSILE ASSEMBLY FACILITY, JULY 18, 2008 
 
REF: ANC/STR 07-614/17 ON AUGUST 26 2007 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Join/t Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXII-008. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  July 18, 2008 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the 
U.S. Mission in Geneva, Switzerland on July 18, 2008 to 
discuss Ukrainian SS-24 eliminations, covers used during 
SS-27 Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspections (RVOSIs), and 
Russian concerns regarding the U.S. Courtland SLBM Production 
Facility.  All Parties except Kazakhstan were represented. 
On the Ukrainian SS-24 elimination issue, Ukraine agreed with 
the U.S. proposal to develop a JCIC Joint Statement and a 
JCIC agreement to incorporate into the Treaty both the 
current Ukrainian practice of burning out residual fuel from 
the motor cases after conducting propellant washout, as well 
as the Ukrainian proposal to drill a total of four holes, 
each no less than 80mm in diameter, in two diametrically 
opposed groups, through the cylindrical portion of each case 
near the bottom of the motor case. 
 
¶4.  (S) On the issue of SS-27 RVOSI, the U.S. Delegation 
restated its concern that the large covers used during SS-27 
RVOSIs did not allow inspectors to determine that the number 
of reentry vehicles (RVs) present did not exceed the one 
warhead attributed to the SS-27 ICBM.  Russia replied that it 
was looking for ways to address U.S. concerns, and reiterated 
that all SS-27 ICBMs contain no more than one reentry 
vehicle.  On the issue of the Courtland Missile Assembly 
Facility, the Russian Federation reiterated its concerns and 
the U.S. again provided clarification. 
 
---------------------------- 
UKRAINIAN SS-24 ELIMINATIONS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Taylor opened the Heads of Delegation Meeting on July 
18, 2008 and stated that the United Stated had carefully 
considered Ukraine's SS-24 elimination proposal and also had 
studied the Ukrainian water washout procedures.  Taylor 
stated that it was the understanding of the United States 
that, following propellant washout, residual propellant was 
burned out of the motor casing.  He stated that, if the 
Parties were to reach agreement on this issue, the United 
States required that the propellant burnout procedure would 
always be used in conjunction with the washout and that the 
proposed drilling of four 80mm holes in the motor casing 
would also be a mandatory part of the elimination.  With that 
in mind, the U.S. tabled a draft JCIC Agreement and a draft 
JCIC Joint Statement, which would incorporate into the Treaty 
the current Ukrainian practice of burning out residual fuel 
from the motor cases after propellant washout, and the 
Ukrainian proposal to drill a total of four holes (in two 
diametrically opposite groups), each no less than 80mm in 
diameter, through the cylindrical portion of each case near 
 
 
 
the bottom of the motor case (Ref A).  Taylor also urged 
Ukraine to issue a policy statement committing to inform the 
U.S. in advance if any of the rocket motor cases eliminated 
with these procedures was to be exported or removed from the 
territory of Ukraine. 
 
¶6.  (S) Shevtsov thanked the U.S. for providing the two 
documents.  He stated that the U.S. approach differed 
slightly in form from that discussed in previous sessions, 
and added that the substance of the U.S proposal still 
corresponded to Ukraine's vision.  Ukraine agreed with the 
U.S. proposal and promised to provide a Ukrainian-proposed 
joint draft text in the afternoon session.  Regarding the 
U.S. request to issue a policy statement to inform the U.S. 
in advance if any eliminated rocket motors were to be 
exported, Shevtsov replied that these motors were subject to 
national export controls, that Ukraine did not have licenses 
for sending them abroad, and that Ukraine would provide a 
policy statement.  Ponamarev added that Belarus would not 
provide any obstacles to the process if the U.S. and Ukraine 
agreed.  Koshelev confirmed that the proposed method of 
elimination was a technically feasible method (Begin comment: 
 He did not specify if he meant a feasible means to render 
inoperable, or a feasible means to eliminate under the 
Treaty.  End comment.), and asked that Russia be allowed time 
to read the U.S.-provided documents and advise its legal 
representatives. 
 
----------- 
SS-27 RVOSI 
----------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Taylor restated U.S. concerns that the covers used by 
the Russians during SS-27 RVOSIs did not allow U.S. 
inspectors to determine that the number of reentry vehicles 
(RVs) present did not exceed the one warhead attributed to 
the SS-27 ICBM.  He stated that U.S. concerns had been 
heightened by several specific facts pertaining to the SS-27. 
 First, Russian press accounts continued to indicate that 
Russia planned to equip the SS-27 with multiple warheads. 
Taylor cited a Russian television program from February, 
2008, in which SS-27 designer Yuriy Solomonov stated that the 
first launch of an SS-27 with multiple warheads had already 
occurred.  Taylor acknowledged that the U.S. understood that 
not all press reporting was accurate, but added that there 
must be some credibility to statements by the chief designer 
of the SS-27, as well as previous statements by the Chief of 
the General Staff and commander of the Strategic Rocket 
Forces.  Second, Taylor pointed out that the SS-25 had been 
flight-tested with a substantially lighter RV, which 
increased U.S. concerns regarding the number of RVs deployed 
on both the silo-based and mobile versions of the SS-27 
variant of the SS-25 ICBM, and stated that these concerns 
were amplified by similarities between the SS-27 and the 
prototype RS-24, which had been flight-tested with multiple 
RVs. 
 
¶8.  (S) Taylor added that it was particularly troubling that 
Russia continued to use very large RV covers over the front 
section during RVOSIs on both the road-mobile and silo-based 
version of the SS-27.  He stated the U.S. believed the 
responsibility for proposing solutions that would resolve 
U.S. concerns rested with the Russian Federation, because it 
was the obligation of the inspected Party not to hamper the 
inspecting Party's ability to determine that the front 
section contained no more RVs than the number of warheads 
 
 
 
attributed to missiles of that type, but also because only 
Russia understood the sensitivities involved with its system. 
 Taylor repeated the U.S. readiness to work seriously and in 
good faith with the Russian Federation to resolve this issue 
to the satisfaction of both sides, and stated that the United 
States would be willing to explore possible SS-27 RVOSI 
solutions that took into account whatever sensitivities led 
to the use of overly large covers.  He concluded by stating 
that if the Russian Federation believed a demonstration of 
new SS-27 RVOSI procedures beyond those already employed 
could help resolve these concerns, then the U.S. believed 
direct involvement of JCIC delegation members in a 
demonstration could facilitate the discussion of 
Russian-proposed solutions to U.S. concerns. 
 
---------------------- 
DON'T PAY ANY 
ATTENTION TO SOLOMONOV 
---------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Koshelev responded, stating he understood that the 
U.S. closely followed the Russian press, but remarked that 
when high-level officials made comments to the press, they 
often had a political motivation and were seeking to achieve 
a desired result.  Ryzhkov later added that Russian 
journalists were not experts and often referred to all mobile 
missiles as "Topol."  In contrast, the Russian JCIC 
delegation was authorized to make official statements and 
Koshelev reaffirmed that all SS-27 do not have more than one 
reentry vehicle.  Koshelev then repeated the Russian position 
that neither the size of RVs or covers was limited by the 
START Treaty, and stated that the size of the cover was 
determined by the design features of the missile front 
section.  He recalled that Russia had chosen not to use a 
hard cover for RVOSIs.  He stated that SS-27 RVOSI was a 
sensitive issue, but Russia was looking for ways to address 
U.S. concerns and find an acceptable solution.  He added 
Russia was looking to remove this issue from the JCIC agenda. 
 Ryzhkov concluded by adding that the similarities between 
Russian mobile missiles was natural because some technology 
from older Russian missiles was used in newer ones, and 
stated that U.S. concerns regarding the number of RVs on the 
SS-27 could be resolved through telemetry, which showed that 
the SS-27 had never released more than one RV. 
 
------------------------ 
KOSHELEV-TAYLOR SIDE-BAR 
ON START EXTENSION 
------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (S) During a short break, Koshelev proposed to Taylor a 
meeting of U.S. and Russian lawyers to discuss the question 
of whether and how to record the holding of the Article XVII 
meeting (to consider whether to extend START), explaining 
that it was a START obligation to hold such a meeting and 
that there could be questions raised as to whether such a 
meeting was ever held.  He also commented that the Parties 
needed to decide at what level such a meeting should be held 
(i.e. at the JCIC or higher), given its political importance. 
 Brown indicated that in his view there was no Treaty 
requirement that there be any document certifying that such a 
meeting was held, but recognized that there might be 
political reasons to do so, and added that the lawyers should 
be able to implement whatever the Parties decided to do in 
terms of documentation.  Koshelev said he thought that 
Belarus wanted a statement about START extension to include 
 
 
 
the retention of some START provisions after START 
expiration, but stated that he would prefer something 
simpler, maybe just a joint statement that such a meeting was 
held.  Taylor said the whole subject of the meeting to 
consider START extension, which was raised by the Russian 
side, would be in a later meeting during this session, and 
that Koshelev's comments about the political aspects of 
recognizing that the Article XVII meeting had in fact been 
held, as required by the Treaty, were understandable. 
 
---------------- 
COURTLAND ENCORE 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) The last item on the agenda was the Courtland 
Missile Assembly Facility.  This item was placed on the 
agenda by the Russian Federation so Taylor turned the meeting 
over to Koshelev.  Koshelev said that the Russian Federation 
had expressed its concerns about what was to be produced at 
this facility in its March 28, 2008 aide-memoire.  He stated 
that the declaration of this U.S. facility (Ref B) by 
reference A does not correspond to the definition of a 
Production Facility in the START Treaty.  The U.S. 
notification stated that there was no intention to produce 
first-stage motors and that target vehicles would be 
assembled using Trident I first-stage motors.  Koshelev 
reiterated the questions in the Russian aide-memoire and 
asked:  What was the status of the facility?  What would be 
the new product subject to START production at Courtland? 
What were the technical characteristics of the new product? 
He stated that this facility was new, subject to START and 
further inquired into how the U.S. was going to monitor and 
track the new product, where would it be deployed, and which 
launcher would it be loaded. 
 
¶12.  (S) Taylor thanked Koshelev for his comments and stated 
that: 
 
-- The United States had reviewed the Russian Federation's 
aide-memoire of March 28, 2008, "On the U.S. Side's 
Declaration of a Production Facility for ICBMs or SLBMs or 
First Stages of ICBMs or SLBMs under the START Treaty."  The 
United States assured the Russian Federation and the other 
Treaty Parties that the declaration of the SLBM production 
facility, Courtland Missile Assembly Facility, Alabama, was 
in full compliance with the START Treaty. 
 
-- The U.S. declared the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility, 
Alabama, in accordance with paragraph (10) of section I of 
the Notification Protocol.  The Courtland Missile Assembly 
Facility, Alabama, was listed in Annex B of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) as an SLBM production facility. 
 
-- As stated in the remarks section of U.S. notification 
ANC/STR 07-614/17, this facility would assemble target 
vehicles using the Trident I SLBM first-stage motor.  These 
target vehicles would be for use in testing of the U.S. 
ballistic missile defense system.  This facility would not 
produce any new Trident I SLBM first stages or any new items 
subject to the Treaty. 
 
-- Any Trident I SLBM first-stage motor that left the 
Courtland Missile Assembly Facility, Alabama, either as a 
first-stage motor or as a target vehicle incorporating the 
first-stage motor of a Trident I SLBM, would remain 
accountable as a Trident I SLBM in accordance with paragraph 
 
 
 
3(a), Article III, of the Treaty and, therefore, would be 
subject to all the relevant provisions of the START Treaty as 
a Trident I SLBM. 
 
-- The technical data for the Trident I SLBM remained 
unchanged from that provided in Annex F of the U.S. MOU. 
 
-- Upon departure from the Courtland Missile Assembly 
Facility, Alabama, any target vehicle incorporating the 
first-stage motor of a Trident I SLBM would be located only 
at facilities specified in paragraph 9(a), Article IV, of the 
Treaty.  Furthermore, the movement of any target vehicle 
incorporating the first-stage motor of a Trident I SLBM would 
be notified in accordance with paragraph 1, Section II of the 
Notification Protocol. 
 
¶13.  (S) Taylor concluded by providing a U.S. Delegation 
Paper on the U.S. Response to the Russian Federation 
Aide-Memoire of March 28, 2008, on the U.S. Declaration of an 
SLBM Production Facility, July 18, 2008.  (Begin Comment: 
The paper contained the points made by Taylor on this issue. 
End Comment.)  Koshelev thanked him and said the Russian 
Delegation would provide any comments after the paper is 
studied. 
 
¶14.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S. 
 
    -- Draft JCIC Agreement on Elimination Process for ICBMs 
of Road Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, dated July 18, 2008; 
 
    -- Draft JCIC Joint Statement on the Destruction of Solid 
Rocket Motor Cases Located in Ukraine, dated July 18, 2008; 
and 
 
    -- U.S. Delegation Paper on the U.S. Response to the 
Russian Federation Aide-Memoire of March 28, 2008, on the 
U.S. Declaration of an SLBM Production Facility, July 18, 
¶2008. 
 
¶15.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Ms. Bosco 
Mr. Brown 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. Edinger 
Mr. Fortier 
Maj Gondol 
Mr. Hanchett 
Mr. Johnston 
LTC Oppenheim 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Tessier 
Mr. Vogel 
Mr. Yaguchi 
Dr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
BELARUS 
 
 
 
Mr. Ponamarev 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Kashirin 
CAPT (1 Rank) Kuz'min 
Mr. Lapshin 
Col Novikov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Serov 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Mr. Smirnov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Col Zaytsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Bodarenko 
MG. Fedetov 
Mr. Chernayavskiy 
Mr. Perevezentsev 
Mr. Demidenko 
Mr. Dotsenko 
 
¶16.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



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