VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFN #0330/01 1960922
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140922Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2032
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC//DHO-7// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2/HSE/DIA REP// PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L FREETOWN 000330 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W AND NSC AFRICA DIRECTORATE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07-08-2018 
TAGS: KMRS AODE PINR AMGT SL
SUBJECT: (C//NF) NSDD 38 - U.S. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
STAFFING IN FREETOWN, SIERRA LEONE 
 
REF: SECSTATE 68307 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JUNE CARTER PERRY REASON: 1.4(C) 
 
¶1.  (C) As Chief of Mission, American Embassy Freetown, I 
concur with the Defense Intelligence Agency's request to 
establish an additional position, that of a Operations 
Non-Commissioned Officer (Ops NCO) in the Defense Attache 
Office at post and consent to the NSDD 38 agreement.  Please 
see responses to specific questions in reftel. 
 
¶2.  (C) Is the need for the proposed staffing change 
reflected in the most recent MSP?  If not, what circumstances 
have changed to justify the NSDD 38 proposal? 
 
(U) In 2001, the Defense Intelligence Agency was approved to 
establish an office of three personnel to include a Defense 
and Air Attache in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel (O-5), an 
Operations Coordinator in the rank of Master Sergeant (E-7), 
and an Operations Non-Commissioned Officer in the rank of 
Staff Sergeant (E-6).  In 2005, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency was approved to add a position for a Defense Liaison 
Officer in the rank of a GS-11/12.  During the period of 1999 
to 2003, the Defense Intelligence Agency was standing up 20 
offices throughout Africa and lacked the manpower to support 
all positions being filled.  Since 2001, due to staffing 
shortages at the Defense Intelligence Agency and poor 
conditions in country, which many times were less than ideal 
for married personnel, the Defense Intelligence Agency simply 
chose to not staff the position.  However, in the past year, 
both the Defense AttachQ and the Defense Liaison Officer have 
opted for tours of three and four years each due to much 
improved conditions which have led the Defense Intelligence 
Agency and the Chief of Mission to desire and support filling 
all positions of the Defense AttachQ Office-Freetown, Sierra 
Leone. 
 
Some of the circumstances that support increased staffing of 
the position include: 
 
a. (C) Intelligence Reporting Increase of 200%.  In 2008, 
with the arrival of two extremely, experienced collectors, 
intelligence reporting increased 100% within the first four 
months.  As of today, reporting is 200% (163 reports) over 
reporting in 2007 (82 reports) and 300% over reporting in 
2006 (40 reports).  Having experienced collectors versus 
first time collectors means the quality and placement of 
contacts has greatly improved but also resulted in more 
reporting and more administration and care of contacts. An 
OPS NCO is desperately needed to assist with the 
administration of Operating Directives, preparation and 
management of intelligence reports and contact memorandums. 
 
b. (C) Official Entertaining Increase of 200%.  In 2008, 
with the experienced collectors, official entertaining has 
increased by 200%.  This has improved the Defense Attache 
Office's ability to assess and access well placed contacts, 
building a portfolio of reliable, ever vigilant sources.  The 
result has been an increase in reporting from 40 reports a 
year to what we anticipate will be 175 reports in 2008.  Each 
contact requires constant interaction and the production of 
contact memoranda and intelligence reports.  An OPS NCO is 
desperately needed to assist with managing the contact 
databank, the recruitment reports, the validation reports, 
contact memoranda and production of intelligence reports 
associated with contacts. 
 
c. (C) Security Assistance Duties Increasing.  In 2008, the 
Defense AttachQ Office dual-hatted as a Security Assistance 
Office, is sending host nation military to the United States 
for the first time after a five year self imposed suspension 
of International Military Education and Training (IMET).  The 
suspension occurred in 2003 as a result of four host country 
military students failing to return from training in the 
United States.  The Defense Attache Office plans to send two 
host country students in 2008 and 15 students in 2009.  While 
sending host country military to the United States has the 
advantage of building United States influence, it also 
requires enormous administration:  from selection of 
candidates to pre course screening requirements to fitness 
training to preparation of military orders and finances to 
monitoring of students while they are in school.  An OPS NCO 
is therefore needed to assist with managing the processes and 
paperwork associated with host nation students attending 
International Military Education and Training courses in the 
U.S. 
 
d. (C) Host Nation Entry into EUCOM/AFRICOM Counter-Narcotic 
Program.  Sierra Leone is a major transshipment zone for 
 
illegal drugs moving from Latin America to Europe.  In 2008, 
illegal drugs transiting Sierra Leone's airport and coastal 
waters have increased substantially so much so that the 
Maritime Wing, Republic of Sierra Leone, and Ministry of 
Defense have requested assistance with capacity building in 
counter narcotics.  In 2008, the United States Embassy 
requested the Maritime Wing, Republic of Sierra Leone Armed 
Forces enter the AFRICOM Counter-Narcotics Program.  While 
entry into the AFRICOM Counter-Narcotics program will be 
helpful to the Maritime Wing, it means addtional work for the 
Defense AttachQ Office.  The Defense Attache Office 
anticipates having to write yearly counter narcotics plans 
for training and technical assistance; planning and managing 
five to ten week long seminars building law 
enforcement/security capacity; design and manage renovations 
and work projects like a new wharf, a maintenance bay and 
oversee purchases of equipment and tools.  An OPS NCO is 
desperately needed to assist with the overall management of 
training activities, oversight of work projects and logistics 
purchases. 
 
e. (C) International Military Advisory Training Team to 
Sierra Leone Downsizing Footprint.  As the British military 
footprint in Sierra Leone decreases, the Defense Attache 
Office expects to lose access to large quantities of military 
order of battle, troop strengths, and troop capabilities that 
will create conditions for the unit's two collectors having 
to travel up country more to verify information.  At the same 
time, the British, in downsizing, are reaching out the 
Defense Attache Office for increased U.S. commitments to 
engagement and capacity building with the Republic of Sierra 
Leone Armed Forces.  Some of the engagement/capacity 
activities include sending 8 Staff Judge Advocates to IMET 
training over the next two years; sending 8-12 NCOs to 
enlisted NCO development; and assistance with training of the 
Standby Force, Economic Community of West Africa States 
(ECOWAS).  Again, while great initiatives, they come with 
additional work and the need for an OPS NCO to assist with 
production of intelligence reports designing and managing 
seminars, selecting and preparing host nation military for 
schools in the U.S. and managing and caring for increased 
deployed U.S. personnel. 
 
f. (C) EUCOM/AFRICOM Engagement.  EUCOM engagement in Sierra 
Leone has been non existent over the past eight years.  With 
creation of an Africa focused command, increased stability in 
Sierra Leone and British requests for more U.S. engagement, 
there is great potential for AFRICOM to host five to ten 
engagement activities a year in Sierra Leone.  Some of the 
planned engagement activities include military-to-military 
exchanges in base security, maritime law, military justice, 
military chaplains to name a few.  Each of these military 
exchanges is months in the planning and takes dedicated 
military personnel to execute.  Again, while great 
initiatives, they come with the need for manpower that only 
an OPS NCO can provide. 
 
¶3.  (C) If the agency proposes to add staffing based on 
workload, are there other resources already present at post 
that are performing or could perform, the functions? 
 
(C) While the two collectors' positions are declared 
intelligence positions, the names of contacts and much of the 
information provided by contacts which goes into intelligence 
reporting is classified at the CONFIDENTIAL to TOP SECRET 
level.  Much of the work in gathering information, meeting 
and maintaining contacts is based on classified training that 
requires trained, experienced collectors with a TOP SECRET 
security classification.  Unfortunately, there is no way that 
we can train foreign service nationals to maintain contact 
databanks, prepare recruitment forms, conduct assessment 
exercises, write validation reports, contact and meet with 
contacts and then produce contact memorandums ultimately 
resulting in intelligence reporting.  Many U.S. spouses also 
do not have the security clearance, background or experience 
to perform the function. 
 
¶4.  (C) Could the function be accomplished through the use of 
TDY, Foreign National, contract, or other local hire 
personnel? 
 
(C)  No, the mission requires trained experienced 
intelligence collectors with a security clearance of TOP 
SECRET.  Much of the information being gathered is 
subsequently put into intelligence reports as actionable 
intelligence again requiring sensitive handling and trained 
intelligence officers to act on the information.  How we 
collect and gather intelligence especially as to persons 
recruited, methods and tactics are classified actions 
 
requiring a top secret security classification and lengthy 
courses in collection and preparation of intelligence 
information.  While TDY intelligence personnel could perform 
the function, the cost of their hotels and per diem month 
after month are more costly then establishment of a permanent 
position. 
 
¶5.  (C) Identify the specific administrative support, space 
and funding arrangements that have been made for the increase 
in staffing. 
 
(C) The Defense Attache Office already possesses dedicated 
space for a Non Commissioned Officer in the Defense AttachQ 
Office.  The space would require installment of a classified 
Defense Intelligence Agency computer and a classified 
Department of State computer.  The Defense Intelligence 
Agency would provide the U.S. Embassy the start up costs for 
a new billet, money to rent a house or apartment and would 
seek to buy into the furniture pool.  The Defense 
Intelligence Agency would like to have a person in place by 
30 September 2008. 
 
¶6.  (C) Do the benefits of increasing the staff outweigh the 
inherent security risks associated with additional personnel? 
 
(C) The Defense Intelligence Agency would like to provide an 
experienced Non-Commissioned Officer in the grade of Staff 
Sergeant who is well trained in intelligence collection and 
has received training in force protection, 
counterintelligence targeting, counter terrorism training and 
familization with how to remain free of becoming a  target 
for criminal activity or a target for terrorists.  The 
individual would be well-versed in handling weapons in the 
event the country were to become unstable and the Defense 
Attache Office were asked to assist with an evacuation.  The 
country's rankings as to terrorist threat and criminal 
activity make it highly unlikely the person would become a 
victim of a terrorist attack or a criminal act. 
 
PERRY