VZCZCDRI493
RR RUEHC RUCNIAD RUCNSAD RUEHMS RHMFIUU RUEAIIA
DE RUEHDR #0444/01 2001123
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181123Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7704
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0064
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA//J3
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 DAR ES SALAAM 000444 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR AF/E, INR/AA, S/CT, DRL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TZ IGAD
SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR PRIMER: THE ISSUE, WHY IT MATTERS & WHAT 
WE ARE DOING ABOUT IT 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Zanzibar accounts for only three percent 
of Tanzania's population, yet it is a major preoccupation for 
the Government of Tanzania due to its longrunning severe 
political tensions, history of violent and flawed elections, 
and mediocre governance.  The Zanzibar/Tanzania relationship 
is convoluted and occasionally contentious.  This mission is 
concerned about the negative influence of Zanzibar's 
persistent political problems on our counterterrorism, 
regional stability, human rights and health promotion goals. 
We are engaged with central government and Zanzibari leaders 
to encourage a power sharing deal to address these concerns. 
The USG's extensive interagency assistance programs in 
Zanzibar give us great standing with the Zanzibari people and 
with political leaders from both camps, allowing us to speak 
out on Zanzibari political issues as a proven friend of the 
islands' people.  In mid-August 2008 our Zanzibar affairs 
officer will arrive to staff our newly established Zanzibar 
American Presence Post (initially to operate from Embassy Dar 
es Salaam).  A less fractious, more united, and better 
governed Zanzibar could reawaken a dynamic and creative 
culture to the benefit of Zanzibaris, Tanzanians and East 
Africans.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Background to the Conflict 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Zanzibar, population about one million, consists of 
two main islands and several small ones just off the 
Tanzanian coast.  The two largest islands are Unguja (often 
referred to simply as Zanzibar) and Pemba.  Prior to the 
bloody anti-Arab uprising of 1964, Zanzibar's population was 
roughly 15 percent Arab, 5 percent Asian (Indo-Pakistani), 60 
percent Shirazi (native Zanzibari) and 20 percent mainland 
African.  Shirazis consider themselves to be the descendants 
of settlers from southwestern Iran who arrived in Zanzibar 
and intermarried with the Bantu original inhabitants of the 
islands during the 10th century.  Together with their 
ethnic-linguistic cousins in the Comoros Islands, Mombassa, 
Lamu, Dar es Salaam and elsewhere on the East Africa coast, 
they further developed the Swahili language, which is a Bantu 
language with significant Arabic-origin vocabulary.  Islam 
appears to have arrived in Zanzibar prior to the wave of 
Arab/Persian immigrants as a result of trade contacts with 
Islamic societies.  Shirazis as a whole tend to identify more 
with the Arab world than with mainland Africa. 
 
¶3. (U) In the early 1830s the Omani Sultan transferred his 
capital to Zanzibar, set up an Arab state and encouraged Arab 
immigration.  The Arab population comprised the ruling class 
and landed aristocracy under the Sultanate, which became a 
British Protectorate in the 1880s.  At one time the Zanzibar 
Sultanate controlled much of the East African coast between 
Mozambique and Somalia.  Arabs, primarily from Oman, seized 
large tracts of land on Unguja (except in the less fertile 
far north of the island) to set up highly profitable spice 
plantations (mostly cloves).  Dispossessed Shirazis became 
agricultural workers, sharecroppers or semi-serfs.  Their 
labor was supplemented by the importation of slaves from the 
mainland.  Zanzibar was long the primary entrepot for the 
East Africa-Middle East slave trade.  There was also 
significant mainland migration to the islands, especially 
Unguja, to work menial jobs during the boom years of the 
clove trade.  The Afro-Shirazi population of Unguja mostly 
resented their Omani and British rulers. 
 
¶4. (U) Shirazis from the northern tip of Unguja (and the 
nearby island of Tumbatu) and Pembans enjoyed symbiotic 
commercial relations with the Arab new arrivals and their 
Sultanate.  They were not dispossessed of their lands.  They 
mostly prospered under the Omanis.  (The Pembans had 
previously been ruled by an Arab Sultanate based in Mombasa.) 
 Pembans and far northern Ungujans intermarried with Arab 
families.  Some Pembans became major landholders and even 
owned slaves.  Consequently, Pemban and far northern Ungujan 
Shirazis tended to identify their interests with the Omani 
Sultanate. 
 
¶5. (U) The British ruled Zanzibar on behalf of the Sultan, 
not on behalf of his subjects.  Their policies explicitly 
favored Arabs and Asians over Shirazis and mainland Africans 
(in that order).  A series of pre-independence elections 
revealed two camps: the anti-Sultanate, Africa-oriented, and 
secular Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) with a stronghold in the 
densely populated areas of Unguja, and the pro-Sultanate, 
Middle East-oriented, and explicitly Islamic Zanzibar 
Nationalist Party (ZNP) and its Pemban ally (the Zanzibar and 
Pemban People's Party - ZPPP), which was supported by most 
Arabs, Asians, far northern Ungujans, Pembans and those who 
worked for the state.  The ASP consistently received a larger 
share of the popular vote (though not by much), but the ZNP 
and its ally received more seats because they predominated in 
more constituencies.  At independence the British handed 
power to the two parties friendliest to the Sultanate and the 
status quo: the ZNP and ZPPP. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In January, 1964, one month after independence from 
the UK, Zanzibar (specifically Unguja) experienced a very 
bloody uprising against the institutions of the Sultanate, 
the ZNP/ZPPP government, the Arab and Asian communities and 
any Shirazis considered friendly to the state (such as ZNP 
members and Pembans).  Several thousand Arabs were murdered. 
Rape and other atrocities were widespread.  Arabs were 
expelled or fled in large numbers.  Asian shops were looted. 
(Many Arab, Asian and pro-Sultanate Shirazis fled no further 
than Dar es Salaam, Mombasa and Tanga, on the mainland 
Swahili Coast).  Property was expropriated and re-distributed 
to ASP-supporters.  After a period of confusion, the ASP 
leadership and its allies assumed control under a "Supreme 
Revolutionary Council" dictatorship and extended their 
control to Pemba (which had not participated in the 
uprising).  Pemba was ruled by "Commissars" who used 
floggings, forced labor and public humiliation to enforce 
their will over a hostile population.  After a few months, 
the ASP leadership opted to accept an offer of union with 
Tanganyika (forming the nation of Tanzania), both to prevent 
a counter-revolution and to buttress the political position 
of the ASP leaders among other members of the Supreme 
Revolutionary Council.  The Union Agreement granted 
wide-ranging autonomy for Zanzibar. 
 
¶7. (U) This history is quite fresh.  Zanzibaris in their 50s 
and older recall these traumatic events.  Younger Zanzibaris 
have all been told of how their families fared during the 
"revolution," for better or worse.  Politics in Zanzibar is 
infused with a great deal of raw emotion and bitter memories. 
 
 
Zanzibar's Relation to Tanzania 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Under the Union Agreement, Zanzibar has extensive 
autonomy within Tanzania.  Although Zanzibar accounts for 
only 3 percent of Tanzania's population, it is guaranteed at 
least 18 percent of seats in the Union Parliament (plus an 
indeterminate number of appointed seats).  Furthermore, the 
constitution stipulates that either the Union President or 
the Vice President must be Zanzibari.  Zanzibar has its own 
President, legislature and bureaucracy ("the Revolutionary 
Government of Zanzibar" led by "the Revolutionary Council") 
that presides over all non-union matters.  The Tanzanian 
Union Parliament legislates on all union matters (Foreign 
Affairs, Defense, Police, monetary issues, etc.) and 
non-union matters for the mainland.  Thus Zanzibari members 
of the Tanzanian legislature have a say on non-union matters 
governing the mainland, but their mainland colleagues have no 
say on non-union issues concerning Zanzibar.  Aside from 
Zanzibar, no other region of Tanzania has its own government. 
 Many mainlanders complain that Zanzibar was given too much 
influence when the union deal was struck.  Yet Zanzibaris 
regularly complain that their autonomy is not far-reaching 
enough.  Most Zanzibari leaders from both political camps 
insist that Zanzibar has the status of a country, not merely 
a region of Tanzania. 
 
Zanzibar Politics in the Multiparty Era 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Supreme Revolutionary Council, dominated by the 
ASP, directly ruled Zanzibar without the benefit of elections 
from 1964 until 1985.  In 1977 the ASP merged with the single 
legal party of the mainland, the Tanganyika African National 
Union, to form a new Tanzania-wide single authorized party, 
the Chama Cha Mapinduzi Party (CCM - Revolutionary Party). 
Under ASP/CCM-Zanzibar rule dissent was violently repressed. 
In 1985 Zanizibar's constitution was changed to permit 
constituency-based single-party elections.  This meant that 
Pembans could once again be guaranteed seats in the 
legislature.  In 1995 Tanzania, including Zanzibar, returned 
to multiparty politics after 30 years as a one-party state. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The 1995 multiparty election in Zanzibar returned 
to the same dynamics of the pre-independence multiparty 
elections.  The Civic United Front (CUF), which is also the 
main opposition party on the mainland (as measured by the 
Union President vote), is supported by mostly the same 
electorate that once supported the ZNP/ZPPP alliance: the 
great majority of Pembans, far north Ungujans and pockets 
within Zanzibar town.  CCM/Zanzibar is supported by most 
Ungujan Shirazis and those of mainland origin.  (The Arab and 
Asian communities of Zanzibar now amount to only a small 
fraction of their independence-era numbers.)  Both camps have 
roughly equal numbers of supporters, generating close 
elections which CCM/Zanzibar won in 1995, 2000 and 2005.  In 
all three of these contests there were widespread reports 
from Zanzibaris, the media and international observers of 
state violence and state-managed rigging to ensure 
CCM/Zanzibar victories (although the 2005 election was 
appreciably better in these regards than were the previous 
two).  There were also reports of CUF electoral misdeeds and 
of post-election violence initiated by youthful CUF 
supporters, but not on the same scale as CCM/Z abuses. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Note that CCM/CUF political competition on the 
mainland is more civil.  CCM so dominates mainland politics 
that the party has never needed to manipulate elections to 
secure a national majority, but is credibly accused of having 
done so in some constituencies in some elections. 
 
Unguja & Pemba: Disparate Treatment 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (SBU)  Pemba, which was relatively prosperous prior to 
the events of 1964, has been purposely neglected ever since. 
Even CCM/Zanzibar supporters admit this, stating that "of 
course the island hosting the capital must get more 
resources."  However, CCM/Z's policy of disparate treatment 
is clearly aimed at punishing Pembans for their refusal to 
support CCM/Z and at implicitly offering Pembans a fairer 
share of resources once they shift their political loyalties. 
 Pemba has very little infrastructure or utilities, no proper 
airport and few government services.  Foreign investors and 
NGO leaders tell us that the CCM/Zanzibar government actively 
discourages investment or NGO activity on Pemba.  Pemban 
elders recently petitioned for Pemba to be divorced from 
Zanzibar and placed directly under mainland rule. 
CCM/Zanzibar leaders accused them of seeking independence 
from Tanzania (which nowhere appears in the petition).  The 
elders were arrested and briefly held.  The elders warn that 
the islands youth are becoming increasingly desperate and 
frustrated. 
 
CCM/Zanzibar Narrative: Representing the Oppressed 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶13. (SBU) The following presents Zanzibari politics from the 
viewpoint of a CCM/Zanzibar supporter:  "In 1964 we liberated 
ourselves from British colonialism and Arab colonialism.  For 
well over a century the Arabs and their British allies 
oppressed us, taking our land and depriving us of our rights. 
 They treated Africans with contempt.  We will always support 
the revolution.  Our opponents are Islamic extremists and 
pro-Arab reactionaries who wish to separate Zanzibar from 
Tanzania and re-institute the Sultanate.  We will resist our 
re-enslavement with every possible means.  Most of the people 
are with us.  Exiled Arab elites have paid traitors to tell 
lies about us to foreigners.  The elections are run fairly 
and police actions are only taken to prevent the intimidation 
of our supporters by Islamist thugs paid by Arab exiles. 
Pembans have only themselves to blame for their situation. 
They stubbornly persist in resisting the revolution.  Once 
they show loyalty to Zanzibar and Tanzania, and drop their 
ties to counter-revolutionary and separatist exiles, then 
they will find us prepared to forgive them and to include 
them in the economic development of Zanzibar." 
 
¶14. (SBU) Following the events of 1964, many Pembans and ZNP 
supporters turned to the mosque as the only institution not 
entirely taken over by the revolutionaries.  Nearly all 
Zanzibaris are Muslim, but in general CCMers have a more 
modern and secular orientation while CUFites have a more 
traditional and Islamic orientation.  CCMers are more 
Africa-oriented and more favorable toward the Union, while 
CUFites are more Middle East-oriented and more skeptical of 
the union.  Though of course there are individual exceptions 
to these generalities.  "Exiled Arab counter-revolutionaries" 
are almost entirely figments of inflamed CCM/Zanzibar 
imaginations, although CUF likely receives some financial 
support from Middle East-based supporters.  (Note that CUF, 
like all other Tanzanian parties, receives nearly all its 
funding from state subsidies provided on the basis of vote 
share.)  While some CUF youth are known to feel the pull 
toward Islamic radicalism, the leadership and the great 
majority of the rank and file are in no sense Islamic 
extremists.  There is no radical, salafist/wahabist religious 
tradition in Zanzibar.  It is well documented that 
CCM/Zanzibar committed vote-rigging and violence (including 
rape, extrajudicial killings and police firing into unarmed 
gatherings of CUF supporters) during the last three 
multiparty elections, with the 2005 vote less marred by these 
abuses than were the previous two. 
 
CUF Narrative: Representing the Oppressed 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU)  The following presents Zanzibari politics from the 
viewpoint of a CUF/Zanzibar supporter: "We have always been 
the majority in Zanzibar.  "The revolution" is just a name 
our opponents use to justify their violence against us.  They 
could not win by the ballot box, so they seized power through 
the gun and the machete.  They have not changed.  They 
continue to kill us, beat us, arrest us and charge us with 
treason simply for opposing them politically through peaceful 
means.  It is slander to call us Islamic extremists.  We are 
not.  It is slander to call us separatists.  We are not.  Of 
course we want a better deal for Zanzibar within the Union 
and we want a better deal for Pemba within Zanzibar.  We 
understand why some of our people are using the rhetoric of 
religious extremism and separatism.  It is out of 
frustration.  But the leadership and members of CUF reject 
these views.  We are Tanzania's main opposition party, both 
in Zanzibar and the mainland.  All we want is free and fair 
elections, a power sharing arrangement that will end our 
exclusion from government, an end to corruption, improved 
governance, and a fair distribution of resources and services 
to all parts of Zanzibar." 
 
¶16. (SBU)  CUF has occasionally used violence (mostly 
beatings and property damage) and vote padding to pursue 
their electoral campaigns.  Their post-election 
demonstrations have featured violence and property damage. 
Neither the violence nor the padding were at CCM/Z levels, 
but CUF is not as pure as they claim to be.  CUF leaders do 
not use religious extremist rhetoric, nor does the rank and 
file membership, as a rule.  However, some supporters, 
especially youth, taunt CCM/Z supporters as Islamic apostates 
who have sold their souls to Christian mainlanders and seek 
the evangelization of Zanzibar.  These populist anti-CCM/Z 
charges are patently false. 
Muafaka 
------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) President Kikwete announced soon after assuming 
office in 2005 that Zanzibar reconciliation was a top 
priority for his administration.  Previous Union presidents 
had tried and failed to achieve Zanzibar reconciliation.  The 
two sides once again entered into negotiations in January 
2007 (referred to in kiSwahili as "Muafaka").  Agreement on a 
power sharing formula that guaranteed a role in government 
for both sides and improved electoral transparency was 
tentatively reached in February 2008.  In March 2008, 
President Karume of Zanzibar, in closed-door CCM Central 
Committee meetings, effectively scuttled the agreement by 
unilaterally insisting that it be put to a referendum. 
(There is no history or constitutional provisions for 
referendums in Tanzania.)  He secured the agreement of the 
national CCM leadership on this point.  Since then, CUF has 
refused to re-engage with CCM.  The party is now fanning 
anti-Union sentiments as a way to garner cross-party support 
among Zanzibari nationalists from both camps and so pressure 
the Union and Zanzibar governments to deal with CUF sincerely 
and respectfully. 
 
Why Zanzibar Matters 
-------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU)  Zanzibar consumes this mission's attention well 
out of proportion to its share of Tanzania's population. 
Zanzibar is a preoccupation of Tanzania's Union government as 
well.  Our reasons justifying this level of engagement are 
several: 
 
Counterterrorism:  Zanzibaris are among the al-Queda members 
involved in the 1998 attack on this mission.  There are 
pockets of extremist support throughout the Swahili cultural 
region (the coasts of Kenya and Tanzania, Zanzibar and the 
Swahilophone Comoros islands).  The reservoir of unemployed, 
desperate, hopeless, angry and alienated Islamic youth for 
terrorists to recruit from is greater in Zanzibar than 
elsewhere in the Swahili cultural area.  Family and 
commercial links within the Swahili world are such that 
repercussions of events in one place are felt elsewhere in 
the region.  Increased radicalization in Zanzibar would 
infect the whole region.  Conversely, a settlement that led 
to improved governance and increased prosperity would 
decrease the attraction of extremist ideology throughout the 
region. 
 
Regional Stability:  President Kikwete is nearly three years 
into what is likely to be a ten year stay in office. 
Tanzania is having some success at reforming itself and is a 
net contributor to regional stability.  It is important to 
U.S. interests that Kikwete's presidency is successful and 
that he continues to adhere to an agenda of economic and 
governance reforms.  He has publicly committed to Zanzibar 
reconciliation as a top goal of his administration.  Failure 
to achieve that goal will hurt the president's political 
standing and will allow Zanzibar to continue to blemish 
Tanzania's international image. 
 
Human Rights:  A review of our annual human rights report 
shows that Zanzibar looms large and compares unfavorably to 
the state of human rights on the mainland (media freedom is a 
strong case in point).  The misbehavior of Zanzibar's 
government mars Tanzania's otherwise respectable human rights 
record.  Much of the intensity of Zanzibari politics is 
driven by fear that loss of power will result in loss of 
wealth, privilege and even life.  A power sharing settlement 
that guarantees security and a role in government for the 
leadership of both political camps while denying monopoly 
power to either side, would establish a climate for greatly 
improved human rights.  Politics would no longer be a life or 
death, zero-sum struggle. 
 
Health:  USAID/Tanzania, CDC and their Tanzanian/Zanzibari 
counterparts have achieved a dramatic reduction in malaria 
prevalence in Zanzibar, nearly eliminating the once pandemic 
disease from the isles.  Close collaboration with the 
Zanzibar government plays a key role in that continuing 
success.  PEPFAR is also engaged on the islands.  Without a 
political settlement, rising tensions prior to the 2010 
elections could likely disrupt ongoing health promotion 
programs. 
 
USG Engagement 
-------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) This mission encourages Zanzibaris and the Union 
government to achieve a political settlement that improves 
governance and ends the intense alienation of one-half of 
Zanzibar's population.  We believe that an abatement of 
political tensions and improved governance could yield 
dramatic gains for the prosperity of all Zanzibaris.  In 
Mid-August we will staff our  new American Presence Post 
Zanzibar office, initially working from Dar es Salaam.  The 
mission maintains a guest house and office in Zanzibar town. 
Below is a summary of our engagement in Zanzibar. 
 
Front Office:  The Ambassador regularly travels to Unguja for 
discussions with Zanzibari officials, political leaders from 
both camps, civil society, religious leaders and the American 
community.  He has also traveled to Pemba.  He has 
participated in project inaugurations on both islands. 
Zanzibar is an agenda item in our discussions with President 
Kikwete and prominent mainland opinion leaders.  The USG's 
extensive interagency assistance programs in Zanzibar 
(described below) give us great standing with the Zanzibari 
people and with political leaders from both camps, allowing 
us to speak out on Zanzibari political issues as a proven 
friend of the islands' people. 
 
American Citizen Services:  At present, there are 40 
registered American citizens on Unguja and none on Pemba.  We 
suspect that there are about another ten American citizens 
resident on Unguja who have not registered.  Temporary 
registered American citizens on Unguja averages 25 a month, 
but we believe this is a fraction of the true number as many 
American tourists add a few days in Zanzibar to their 
itineraries and do not register.  During tourist high season 
(June to September) we suspect the number of temporarily 
resident American citizens to number about 100 a month.  We 
stay in contact with American community wardens in Unguja and 
one third-country warden on Pemba. 
 
USAID/CDC/PEPFAR: The USG supports development initiatives on 
both Pemba and Unguja.  USAID support to Unguja includes a 
livelihoods program for women, which also encourages 
sustainable use of coastal resources, through promotion of 
pearl and seaweed farming.  On Pemba and Unguja, the 
President's Malaria Initiative (USAID & CDC) has undertaken a 
comprehensive malaria program that includes prevention, case 
finding and treatment and that resulted in a dramatic decline 
in the rates of malaria.  The Education team (USAID) has 
supported the development of Pre-K curriculum in government 
schools on both islands as well as general education and 
literacy materials, complemented by radio programming, to be 
used by communities in their Madrassas.  Also, USAID has 
provided funding for family planning services. 
 
All of this work has been complemented by the PEPFAR program. 
 On both Pemba and Unguja, PEPFAR resources, implemented 
through USAID and CDC programs, are supporting HIV/AIDS 
treatment, care and prevention services, including the 
prevention-of-mother to child transmission and the provision 
of antiretroviral therapy.  In addition, PEPFAR has 
strengthened the national health care infrastructure on 
Unguja by supporting the creation of a blood safety 
laboratory and donation center as well as an HIV voluntary 
and counseling center of excellence.  A key prevention 
intervention has been work with injecting drugs users and 
commercial sex workers, the key drivers of the epidemic on 
the main island. 
 
USAID/POL-ECON - Ambassador's Self Help Fund:  In FY 08, the 
Ambassador's Special Self-Help Fund is providing grants 
totaling $14,896 to three Zanzibar community based 
organizations, one in Pemba and two on Unguja. 
 
Public Diplomacy: The Public Affairs Section conducts a wide 
range of outreach programs throughout 
Unguja and Pemba using all the Public Diplomacy products and 
programs in its arsenal.  Examples in 
the past year have included U.S. Speakers Programs on Islam 
in America, a Performing Arts Initiative 
with Muslim Hip Hop, journalist exchange programs, and an 
English Language Fellow resident on Unguja 
who split time between Pemba and Unguja to strengthen 
education through teacher training.  PAS recruits 
from Zanzibar for Humphrey, Fulbright, Foreign Language 
Teaching Assistants, Junior Staff Development 
programs, and American Fulbrighters also conduct research and 
lecture on the islands.  Many prominent 
Zanzibaris are alumni of International Visitor, Voluntary 
Visitor, and other ECA programs; we actively 
recruit from Zanzibar in each cycle for those programs.  The 
mission hosts an American Corner on Unguja 
and one on Pemba as platforms for outreach to those 
communities, including regional training for the 
American Corners, staff.  PAS operates the English Access 
Microscholarship program exclusively on the 
islands to provide English tutoring and exposure to American 
culture. 
 
Five of the last six Ambassador,s Fund for Cultural 
Preservation projects were carried out on Pemba. 
For FY 2008 the Department of Antiquities will restore one of 
the oldest mosques in East Africa to 
protect its 12th century Kufic inscriptions.  In FY 2006, two 
communities on Pemba were funded to 
restore their mosques which date to the 17th and 18th 
centuries.  In FY 2005, the National Archives 
was funded to digitize and catalogue their slave records from 
Stone Town, a major slaving center until 
slavery was outlawed in the late 1800s.  In FY 2002 the AFCP 
supported the restoration of a museum on 
Pemba Island. 
 
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA): (SBU) 
CJTF-HOA began conducting Overseas Humanitarian Disaster 
Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) projects and senior 
religious leader engagement activities on Pemba in early 
¶2007.  CJTF-HOA,s OHDACA projects involve hiring local 
contractors to construct schools and school dormitories, 
medical dispensaries, and well bore holes.  The first OHDACA 
project completed on Pemba was Matale Village Primary School 
in the central township of Chake Chake.  This $200,000 
project, completed in August 2007, supports over 250 students 
ages 7-13 and will help alleviate the high illiteracy rate 
among the adult population in an area known to be an entry 
point for drug smuggling.  CJTF-HOA is currently soliciting 
bids for a primary school in Pemba,s northwestern township 
of Bopwe.  Bopwe is one of only two townships in Pemba,s 
Wete district that don,t have a primary school.  This 
$350,000 project, with an estimated completion date of March 
2009, will support over 300 students in one of Pemba,s most 
poverty-stricken areas.  Both projects are the result of an 
ongoing partnership between CJTF-HOA and USAID, with USAID 
providing all the furnishings. CJTF-HOA anticipates an 
increase in OHDACA projects, senior religious leader 
engagements, and Civil Affairs activities on Pemba in FY 
2009, leveraging the momentum of successful CJTF-HOA projects 
in the neighboring mainland region of Tanga. 
 
MCC:  Out of a total compact for Tanzania of USD 698 million, 
Zanzibar is to receive USD 76.6 million in support (11 
percent of the total).  Unguja is slated for an underwater 
electricity distribution cable (USD 63.1 million).  Pemba is 
programmed for USD 13.5 million in rural roads. 
 
Peace Corps:  Peace Corps volunteers serve on both islands. 
 
 
Proposed Policies 
----------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU)  We propose that: 
 
I) To assist in breaking the impasse, and to bring pressure 
on the parties to negotiate in good faith, the Ambassador 
make a major policy statement on the way forward in Zanzibar 
as seen by a historic friend of the Zanzibari people.  He 
will vet this statement with Africa Bureau leadership, other 
friends of Zanzibar and with President Kikwete.  The address 
will call on both sides to rise above historic grievances for 
the good of all Zanzibaris, point to the potential 
post-settlement prosperity of the isles, and compare 
Zanzibar's challenges to similar episodes in American 
history.  We will ensure wide media coverage of the address. 
 
II) Senior policymakers express strong support for a Zanzibar 
settlement in discussions with top Union and Zanzibar 
leaders. 
 
III) We make it known to leaders of both sides that we 
prioritize our relations with the Zanzibari people over our 
relations with any individual leader or party, i.e. we are 
prepared to go public with our views identifying any leader 
who selfishly obstructs an agreement. 
 
IV) We make the point initially to political leaders but 
publicly if necessary that continued political strife 
threatens Zanzibar's sizable tourism industry. 
 
Prospects 
--------- 
 
¶21. (SBU)  Zanzibar is widely considered to be the center of 
Swahili culture.  Its historic influence has never recovered 
from the trauma of the 1964 uprising and the bitter divisions 
that predated independence.  A less fractious, more united, 
and better governed Zanzibar could reawaken a dynamic and 
creative culture to the benefit of Zanzibaris, Tanzanians and 
East Africans. 
 
GREEN