VZCZCXRO4808
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0818/01 1931103
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111103Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0806
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1128
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0356
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0850
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000818 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W, PM/WRA, DRL AND INR/AA 
 
HQ USAFRICOM FOR SCPO JOSEPH SEVERINO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KDEM HDP SG
SUBJECT:  HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION AND SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS 
PROGRAMS IN SENEGAL AND GUINEA-BISSAU 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  A joint visit by State Department PM/WRA Program Manager Deborah 
Netland, AFRICOM Humanitarian Mine Action Manager Senior Chief 
Joseph Severino to Dakar, Senegal and (with Dakar demining watcher) 
Guinea-Bissau from 15-22 May shed valuable light on the progress in 
demining and arms and ordnance destruction and education in the 
southern Casamance region of Senegal and in neighboring 
Guinea-Bissau.  After conferring with Handicap International (HI) 
Senegal, State Department PM/WRA Deborah Netland and post concur to 
place humanitarian mine action (HMA) funding for FY 08 under review. 
 Should funds become available, USG funding to continue HI efforts 
in the Senegalese Casamance could continue to grow a local popular 
constituency that would be a basis for an eventual peace agreement. 
In Guinea-Bissau (GB), the USG end-state would be more realistic as 
achieving an impact-free status as opposed to completing capacity 
building.  Unfortunately the GOGB does not have funds to keep 
deminers employed, therefore without continued financial support, 
capacity developed through DOS and DOD will deteriorate.  With a 
commitment of no more than $1 million a year to sustain US developed 
operational capacity, GB could be completely free of ERW in as 
little as 5 years. 
 
SENEGAL 
------- 
 
¶2.  PM/WRA agreed to assist Senegal to clear mines and UXO 
(unexploded ordnance) in the southern Casamance region and to 
eliminate small personal stockpiles of small arms/light weapons 
(SA/LW).  The destruction of currently known stockpiles was 
completed in July 2007, and planners anticipated that the Casamance 
would be mine-free by the end of FY08, assuming that the region 
would be safe enough to demine during this time.  This has not 
turned out to be true, though.  Funding is however uncertain and 
PM/WRA will place further Casamance HMA funding under review for FY 
¶08. 
 
¶3.  Post strongly agrees with this review, because the simmering 
Casamance conflict that frequently comes to a boil since its 
outbreak in 1982 is part of a larger strategic sub-regional setting 
that includes frequent street-level discontent with lack of economic 
opportunity in northern Senegal, a minority dictatorship in the 
Gambia deeply involved for ethnic reasons in the Casamance 
rebellion, the failure of the state of Guinea-Bissau, and easy 
passage of terrorist suspects from neighboring Mauritania to 
Senegal, Gambia, and finally to Guinea-Bissau.  Abandoned and buried 
munitions can be abused as IED (improvised explosive devices).  The 
prevalence of cocaine trafficking through Guinea-Bissau could spread 
northward to the Casamance because the Senegalese state is weak 
there and instead in large parts it is controlled by rebels. 
American interests are strongly served in the region by providing a 
safe and environment and potential economic growth for local 
populations by demining and otherwise clearing hazardous areas so 
that peasants can return to cultivating their fields. 
 
 
GUINEA-BISSAU 
------------- 
 
¶4.  Accompanied by Dakar demining officer Matt Dever, Netland and 
Severino visited former mine/UXO impacted sites to observe the 
benefits to local communities. Although the city of Bissau is now 
mine impact-free, it still has serious UXO contamination.  The U.S. 
team visited impacted locations in Bissau and other parts of the 
country as well as ordnance disposal sites. Sites visited were: 
 
 a.  Illonde UXO site 
 b.  Plaque 1, Interramento, and two Paiol de Bra minefield sites 
     c.  Xime, a minefield and UXO site 
     d.  Buruntuma, Mines & UXO 
     e.  Cataba minefield 
     f.  Rossun  UXO contamination and ordnance disposal site. 
 
Although the planned DOS end-state was completion of capacity 
building in FY08, this visit has determined that this is not a 
realistic approach to making Guinea-Bissau safe from all explosive 
remnants of war (ERW).  It is unrealistic to expect the Government 
of Guinea-Bissau to provide the resources to sustain the required 
capacity without adequate donor support.  With modest but realistic 
support to sustain the capacity developed through DOS and DOD 
resources, Guinea-Bissau could reasonably become free of ERW within 
5 years. 
 
DAKAR 00000818  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶5. DoD Training.  In 2007, through coordination with the National 
Mine Action Coordination Center (CAAMI), USAF training teams 
provided extensive and successful training in explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD), battlefield clearance (BAC), first responder field 
medics and mine risk education (MRE).  This resulted in the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) certification of seven 
EOD level 3, five EOD level 2 and nine EOD level 1 operators with 
the national NGO HUMAID. 
 
      a. During a meeting with CAAMI, it was noted that a 
significant amount of demining equipment and medical supplies used 
during the DoD training has been held in the CAAMI compound since 
Dec 2007.  The equipment is stored in two (2) DoD provided ISU 90 
containers.  Although a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by CAAMI 
that the equipment would be used to support operational demining in 
Guinea-Bissau, no action has yet been taken to distribute this 
equipment to the HUMAID and LUTCAM national operators. This 
equipment is mandatory for the DoD trained instructors to maintain 
their EOD level I, 2 and 3 IMAS certification. Severino will take 
follow-on action to resolve the situation in regards to the 
appropriate distribution of the DoD equipment. 
 
 (SBU) b.  Observations of the CAAMI organization during this visit 
make it clear that corruption and a lack of commitment in managing 
mine action activities hinder rather than support the efforts of 
operators to deal with legitimate priorities in the country. 
 
           c. Although CAAMI leadership is corrupt, some of the 
mid-level staff appear to be sincere in their desire to obtain 
training that will improve their job skills.  As a result of this 
expressed interest, SCPO Severino will explore possible DoD 
management training in areas such as operational planning, 
finance/budget, information technology (IT) support, etc.  Severino 
made it clear to the Director of CAAMI that in order for AFRICOM to 
consider training support, a formal request from CAAMI that 
specifically details what training is required must be submitted 
through Embassy Dakar for consideration. 
 
¶6.  In-Country Operations.  Two national NGOs HUMAID and LUTCAM and 
one international NGO, Cleared Ground, carry out operations in the 
country.  Regrettably, donor support is limited and HUMAID, who has 
successfully conducted the majority of clearance over the years has 
run out of funds.  LUTCAM operations continue only as a result of 
their partnership with Cleared Ground, which has been able to 
mobilize some donor funding. 
 
 a.  $200,000 in FY08 NADR-HD funds allocated for use in 
Guinea-Bissau was intended for local purchase of a cab and flatbed 
to support movement of the DoD Humanitarian Demining R&D MAXX 
mini-excavator.  During this visit, however, the USG team found that 
Cleared Ground has already obtained other donor funding for a truck 
with crane and a trailer for the MAXX to support their demining and 
EOD operations in the country.  Therefore, the $200,000 from PM/WRA 
will now enable HUMAID to start work again. 
 
      b.  Cleared Ground has agreed to partner with HUMAID so that 
both organizations can maximize operational resources and 
experienced personnel. This will also streamline the funding process 
by enabling PM/WRA to amend the existing CG grant, incorporating the 
HUMAID funding. 
 
¶7.  This funding and partnership fits neatly into American interests 
in Guinea-Bissau:  sustainable development in Guinea-Bissau cannot 
occur without the maximum possible cultivation of land to produce 
cash crops.  Although demining and UXO removal have freed up 
thousands of hectares of land to cultivate cashews, the country's 
most important crop, much remains to be done as demining NGOs work 
thoroughly from site to site across the country to make land 
available to peasants anxious to recommence tilling their land after 
decades of dangerous fallowness.  As in Senegal, terrorists can 
procure UXO to refashion mines, missiles and bombs into IEDs that 
HUMAID and Cleared Ground would otherwise remove and destroy. 
 
SA/LW and MANPADS 
------------- 
 
¶8.  PM/WRA-AFRICOM-Mission Dakar team discovered the existence of 
MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense System) in Guinea Bissau.  CG 
stated that they are currently in military stockpiles, and that CG 
had already destroyed a few, and will provide identification 
information to PM/WRA forthwith.  CG further indicated that it has 
strong reason to believe in the existence of more MANPADS that the 
 
DAKAR 00000818  003 OF 003 
 
 
Guinea Bissau armed forces will turn over to CG for destruction. 
Netland asserted the high USG priority of MANPAD destruction and 
that PM/WRA will engage in more detailed discussions with CG on 
MANPAD destruction initiatives. 
 
¶9.  With continued USG funding, CG and HUMAID continue to destroy 
small arms and ammunition from military arms stores, including 
cluster bomb units (CBU) that contain cluster munitions housed 
inside. 
 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶10.  HUMAID and Cleared Ground are dedicated professionals whose 
commitment in a difficult physical and bureaucratic environment 
could translate into emergence of an impact-free country in less 
than 5 years.  Financial resources to meet this goal are relatively 
modest and realistic.  USG investment in the goals of achieving an 
impact-free Guinea-Bissau support the American objectives of 
sustainable development, denial to terrorists of explosive ordnance, 
and prevention of loss of civilian life and limb.  USG investment in 
demining the Casamance to the extent possible is a strategic 
sub-regional US priority given the geopolitical interdependence of 
Senegal, the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau: demining the Casamance 
increases a local popular constituency for a peace settlement 
because Casamancais will literally and figuratively reap the harvest 
of land they have not cultivated for significant periods of time. 
 
SMITH