VZCZCXRO7138
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #0997/01 1831026
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011026Z JUL 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RXFPSH/SHAPE SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RHMFITT/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000997 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ERA, INL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL KPKO EUN UNMIK KV
SUBJECT: EULEX KOSOVO POLICE STAFFING GAPS AND TRANSITION 
ACTIVITIES 
 
Classified By: A/Political Minister-Counselor Alyce Tidball for reasons 
 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  EU officials described for member and third 
state contributors current EULEX shortfalls in specialized 
police capabilities including sniper and SWAT teams, K9 units 
and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units at a June 30 
workshop in Brussels.  Emphasizing that it had been the 
member states themselves that had decided these capabilities 
were required for the EU to effectively fulfill its police 
mandate in Kosovo, EULEX officials said that without adequate 
contributions, EULEX would lack the ability to perform 
high-risk operations and sufficiently protect EULEX 
personnel.  Staffing shortfalls do not extend to the crowd 
and riot control aspects of the mission; the EU has secured 
commitments to fill all four of the required police units in 
that functional area.  EULEX planners generally are satisfied 
with UNMIK reconfiguration plans, but admit that specific 
details remain to be discussed.  In the interim period before 
the EU assumes authority and begins implementing its mandate, 
EULEX personnel will deploy and work to build connections 
with and informally mentor Kosovar officials, as well as to 
familiarize themselves with UNMIK cases and files.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) EU Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) 
staff and EULEX mission officials held a June 30 workshop to 
solicit member and third state contributions to the EULEX 
Security and Intervention Units (SIU).  The SIU units include 
a 70-person Close Protection Unit (CPU), a K9 unit consisting 
of 20 dog handlers and dogs, a 12-person Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) unit, and a 56-officer Intervention Group 
which includes sniper and SWAT team components.  EULEX 
officials emphasized that only 50 percent of the slots have 
been filled in these units, and without full staffing, the EU 
would lack sufficient capacity to deal with high risk 
operations and protect EULEX personnel.  The EU currently has 
no formal offers of sniper squads or K9 units, and only one 
of three SWAT teams pledged.  They have only 2 of the 
requested 12 EOD officers.  Officials explained that their 
initial approach had been to request full 5-man SWAT teams or 
sniper squads from contributing states in order to reduce 
fragmentation and take advantage of national training but, 
due to the alarming gaps, they were revising the policy to 
accept contributions of individual officers with the required 
expertise.  The French Gendarmerie has offered pre-deployment 
training in France for any subsequent multinational, "mosaic" 
teams that are pieced together from new contributions. 
 
¶3.  (C) Describing these resources as ones "we need but hope 
we never have to use," CPCC officials emphasized that it was 
the member states themselves who directed planners to request 
these teams and capabilities because they were essential for 
the EU to fulfill the executive policing portions of its 
mandate in Kosovo.  Now the member states must make good on 
their commitments and fill the outstanding requirements, 
preferably before the July 10 deadline of the current call 
for contributions.  Moreover, one EULEX official noted, 
because the EULEX mission represents the first time the EU 
has executive powers in an ESDP mission and the first time 
the EU will provide the capability of a high-end intervention 
group, it would be especially shameful for the EU to fail at 
this "historic" effort due to lack of contributions.  He 
added that the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) currently lacks 
the capability to do high-risk operations, so EULEX initially 
will be providing the only high-end police expertise and 
equipment available in the country.  In response, 
representatives from Italy and Sweden agreed the necessity of 
fulfilling the requirements, but cautioned EU officials not 
to overuse the "historic ESDP" rhetoric, lest the EU be 
unfairly accused of trying to build the structure and power 
behind ESDP when it was merely trying to meet needs in 
Kosovo. (Note:  Roughly half of EU member states had 
representation at the workshop, and all third states except 
Switzerland attended.) 
 
¶4.  (C) On equipment issues, EULEX officials said that while 
the EU has defined the lists of equipment they expect to see 
transferred from UNMIK to EULEX, they remain unsure as to 
when that equipment will be received.  Because some of the 
SIU tasks will be different than what UNMIK currently 
performs and therefore not subject to transfer under 
reconfiguration plans, contributors were provided a list 
 
BRUSSELS 00000997  002 OF 002 
 
 
(sent to EUR/SCE and INL) of the specialized equipment 
required for the SIU units, and urged to contribute where 
they could.  Expressing some surprise at what was apparently 
a new list of requests for the member states, the Swedish 
representative raised the possibility that some of the 
equipment on the list would be prohibited under national laws 
or police practices and argued for more time for the EU to 
examine the list.  Otherwise silent through the presentation, 
EULEX Deputy Head of Mission Roy Reeve explained that the 
real focus for contributors should not be equipment, which 
the EU would purchase for these special teams if necessary, 
but rather the staffing gaps that remain, particularly in the 
K9 realm.  When asked privately on the margins what would 
happen if contributors did not provide the necessary 
capabilities, one CPCC official said that the EU would 
probably have to scale back its level of ambition with regard 
to these special policing tasks.  (Comment:  The 
embarrassment factor of not being able to perform key tasks 
could be the best instrument CPCC has to encourage member 
states to step up to the task they have set themselves.) 
 
¶5.  (C) According to CPCC planners, the shortfalls they are 
experiencing in filling SIU capabilities do not extend to 
other special police areas, which include crowd and riot 
control (CRC) and witness security.  Four integrated police 
units (IPUs) have been pledged by France, Italy, Poland, and 
Romania to fulfill the EU's current requirements to deploy 
two IPUs in Northern Kosovo, and two in the South, for a 
total of approximately 450 CRC police officers.  The Polish 
and Romanian IPUs will transfer over from UNMIK duty after 
reconfiguration, and EU officials note with some dismay 
rumors that France and Italy are considering moving their 
gendarme forces rom KFOR duty to EULEX.   The EU has 
receivedthe budgetary allocation, although not yet the 
political approval from member states, to add two additional 
IPUs (approximately 310 officers) if the security situation 
warrants.  These reserve units have not yet been pledged. 
CPCC planners anticipate a total mission strength of 
approximately 1850 personnel, including the CRC forces, but 
not including the contingency units.  There are nearly 210 
remaining vacancies spread throughout the police, justice, 
and customs sectors of the mission, including the unfilled 
SIU jobs.  The EU hopes to have these jobs filled during July. 
 
¶6.  (C) Asked about the UNMIK reconfiguration process, CPCC 
officials said that they thought they had "most of what they 
needed" from the UN, but specific details on deployment and 
asset transfer schedules are still being discussed.  In the 
meantime, they have defined roles and tasks for deployed 
staff with the goal of increasing EULEX visibility ahead of 
taking over executive responsibilities and implementing the 
EULEX mandate at the end of the transition period. 
Specifically, during this period EULEX police officers 
charged with performing the EU's monitoring, mentoring, and 
advising KPS duties will begin to build connections with the 
KPS and other actors and begin making assessments in order to 
be adequately prepared when EULEX assumes full duties.  EULEX 
anticipates close cooperation with UNMIK on reviewing the 
police involvement on criminal files and related evidence, as 
well as additional in country training for special police. 
On the justice side, judges and prosecutors will initially 
deploy in local courts and prosecution offices in Pristina, 
Peja, Prizren and Gilan to build connections with local 
officials and gain access to UNMIK case files. 
 
 
MURRAY 
 
 
.