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OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #1138/01 2071356
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O 251356Z JUL 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001138 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR FOR FRIED, BRYZA; NSC FOR WILSON AND STERLING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2008 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS KINR EAID ECON EUN GO XH
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: A/S FRIED ENCOURAGES EU TO DO MORE 
 
REF: USEU 1120 
 
Classified By: Christopher Davis, Political Minister-Counselor for reas 
ons 1.4(d) and (e) 
 
¶1.  (C/NF)  Summary:  EUR Assistant Secretary Dan Fried 
emphasized to a group of EU Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) Ambassadors that the situation in Georgia was growing 
increasingly tense.  He noted U.S. support for a 
German-drafted Western Friends' three-phase plan to reach a 
settlement to the Abkhazia conflict and highlighted 
opportunities for the EU to play an increased role in 
implementing the proposals.  PSC officials emphasized the 
EU's increased attention to Georgia and explained that member 
states would soon decide on an options paper  for increased 
engagement there.  The Ambassadors raised concerns about 
balancing competing interests with regard to Russia and 
queried Fried on the impact of Georgia and Ukraine moving 
closer to NATO.  Separately, A/S Fried briefed Council 
Secretariat DirGen Robert Cooper on the Quad meeting and 
highlighted specific steps the West should consider taking to 
support the German plan as well as options in the face of 
Russian attempts to block it.  Cooper observed that "the 
problem resides in Moscow"  and thought Berlin could exert 
powerful influence on the Kremlin by hinting at consideration 
of support for Georgia MAP.  End Summary. 
 
Cooper: The Problem Resides in Moscow 
------------------------------------- 
¶2. (C/NF) In a July 22 meeting accompanied by Ambassador 
Silverberg, A/S Fried and Robert Cooper EU Council 
Secretariat Director General exchanged readouts of the Quad 
and the GAERC discussions of Georgia held earlier the same 
day (reftel).  Cooper noted that German FM Steinmeier 's 
"information point" on the Western Friends of Georgia 
negotiations proposal had sparked an unfocused debate among 
EU Foreign Ministers without leading to a concrete plan. 
Ministers expressed frustration and a feeling of growing 
danger.   " Steinmeier's plan was reasonable, the situation 
in Georgia was not."  Cooper noted that "the problem resided 
in Moscow with its creeping annexation (of Abkhazia) and 
provocations."   This had made it all the more difficult for 
the EU, as "an enlightenment organization" to handle. 
Nonetheless, the EU FMs felt overall that the EU needed to 
get involved.  Fried suggested the EU consider specific steps 
to support the German plan at different stages, including 
tasks related to policing,  border monitoring, and economic 
rehabilitation.  Secretary Rice, was exceptionally tough with 
Georgian leaders during her early July trip to Tbilisi and 
had succeeded in bringing them around to make key concessions 
in Phase One of the German-drafted plan. 
 
3.(C/NF) Cooper said CFSP High Rep Solana believed the EU 
should adhere to three principles for engagement: support for 
Georgia's territorial integrity, support for some level of 
autonomy for Abkhazia, and rejection of settlement by force; 
"and keep repeating it."  A/S Fried warned Cooper that there 
were signs of Russian backtracking on the first point.  He 
pointed to a recent Medvedev letter to President Bush in 
which he referred to the "problem of" Georgia's territorial 
integrity.   In  the face of Russian attempts to block 
negotiations, the EU should consider ending visa facilitation 
for Abkhaz holders of Russian passports and imposing 
sanctions against Russians engaged in  illegal investment in 
Abkhazia.   Cooper agreed that "the problem resides in 
Moscow" and thought Berlin could exert powerful influence on 
the Kremlin by hinting at consideration of support for 
Georgia MAP. 
 
PSC Ambassadors : We Want to Do More 
------------------------------------ 
¶4.  (C)  A/S Fried also briefed a group of ten EU Political 
and Security Committee (PSC) officials July 23 on Quad (UK, 
U.S., Germany, and France) Political Directors meeting on 
Georgia of July 22.  He warned that the situation in Georgia 
was deteriorating faster than the diplomatic process could 
move to address it.  The atmosphere is growing tenser, and 
one incident could trigger a downward spiral, said Fried. 
While the Georgians are not without blame, the Russians are 
the principal aggressors.  He highlighted a possible danger 
that the Russians could misjudge U.S. and EU priorities and 
assume that the partners were otherwise engaged with 
presidential elections and getting the Treaty of Lisbon back 
on track and try to take advantage of that situation.  It 
remains important to demonstrate to Moscow that the U.S. and 
EU share common objectives and resolve. 
 
BRUSSELS 00001138  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) A/S Fried underscored U.S. support for German FM 
Steinmeier's engagement on Georgia and cited as a good basis 
for work a German paper which details three phases for 
engagement to reach a settlement:  first, non-use of force 
pledges and accompanying security measures; second, 
confidence-building measures; and third, status issues. 
Fried noted that Political Directors will soon meet to flesh 
out the details of the first phase of the plan and suggested 
that the EU could play a role in the phase one activities, 
possibly in the shape of providing outside observers in the 
instance of a mutual Georgian-Abkhazian withdrawal.  If the 
German process works, Fried foresees a Ministerial-level 
meeting on the margins of UNGA.  He warned that if the 
Russians refuse to participate, we will collectively need to 
think about ways to ensure that Moscow pays a diplomatic 
price for its unwillingness to engage on finding a solution. 
Fried also praised a recent New Friends of Georgia grouping 
led by Poland and including Sweden and other nations which 
can intervene with Georgia in ways that other countries with 
different historical experiences cannot. 
 
¶6.  (C) In response to Fried's remarks, UK PSC Ambassador 
Barrow and Irish PSC Ambassador Cross highlighted recent EU 
internal discussions about Georgia and noted the increasing 
priority the member states are giving to the issue.  French 
Deputy PSC Ambassador Chabert explained that the EU next week 
would take decisions on a Georgia "options paper" which 
discusses ways of creating security-building measures, 
methods of supporting the initiative to create a free trade 
zone and possibilities to weaken links between the Abkhazian 
and Russian sides.  (Note:  In a July 22 meeting with A/S 
Fried and EUR DAS Matthew Bryza, Swedish FM Carl Bildt said 
the European Commission's FTA proposal " did not go far 
enough" and that ending visa facilitation for Abkhaz Russian 
passport holders required passport data the EU did not 
currently possess, but that it was not impossible.  End 
Note.)   In response to a UK question as to whether Russia 
would participate in the upcoming meeting, Fried assessed 
that it will be hard for the Russians to avoid the event, but 
they likely will try to stall progress.  A Finnish official 
questioned how long the Georgians would wait for the German 
plan to yield concrete results.  Fried replied that the more 
support we provide, the more patience we can expect.  Our 
goal should be to extend the time frame at play by 
stabilizing the situation and convincing Georgians that there 
is no need to be in a hurry.  Russian intransigence and 
ongoing provocations gave us cause for genuine alarm, 
however. 
 
¶7.  (C) European officials also raised questions about 
Russian behavior more broadly, specifically noting that while 
Russia's involvement on Georgia was troublesome, there were 
other issues where Moscow's cooperation was necessary, 
particularly at the UN.  Fried agreed that balancing the 
interests would be difficult, citing as examples Russian 
helpfulness on Iran and intransigence on Zimbabwe. He 
highlighted the importance of countering Russia's perceptions 
that the U.S. and EU are divided in New York.  Fried also 
addressed recent "1970s-style" proposals from Moscow on new 
European security architecture and urged that we start 
querying the Russians about the details of their ideas, 
specifically how this will fit in with Georgia, address 
energy policies, and relate to the existing security 
structures in Europe. 
 
¶8.  (C) Irish and Czech PSC Ambassadors requested A/S Fried's 
assessment of the impact of Georgian and Ukrainian bids to 
join NATO.  On Georgia, Fried noted that the decisions made 
at Bucharest were ambiguous enough to give Russians a chance 
to negatively intervene.  Russia is relieved by the political 
turmoil in Ukraine, said Fried, and it is clear that Moscow 
will continue to try to exert pressure there.  Although it is 
a long road to full NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, 
Fried underscored the importance of not permittin Russia to 
draw a line in Europe. 
 
¶9. (U) ER A/S Fried did not have the opportunity to clear 
this message before departing post. 
SILVERBERG 
.