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RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #1120/01 2051105
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231105Z JUL 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001120 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS KINR EAID ECON EUN GO XH
SUBJECT: QUAD POLDIRS ON GEORGIA-ABKHAZIA 
 
REF: TBILISI 1258 
 
Classified By: USEU Political Counselor Christopher R. Davis, for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.(C) SUMMARY:  At a July 22 meeting in Brussels, Political 
Directors of Quad countries (Germany, U.S., UK, and France) 
agreed to pursue a three-phase  plan as outlined in the 
Germany "Friends" paper to bring the parties to the Abhkazia 
conflict to negotiate a peaceful settlement.  The Quad, in 
this formation also known as the "Western Friends of 
Georgia," pledged to launch negotiations in Berlin in the 
last week of July over a two to three day period.  The Quad 
further agreed to consider in such discussion various ways to 
reach agreement on a phase one package including a Georgian 
non-use of force pledge and balanced security arrangements, 
e.g., a freeze of the status quo, the principle of IDP 
returns and possible pull back of forces, including a joint 
Abkhaz/Georgian police force with international oversight. 
In response to a UK request, the U.S. supported the 
possibility of EU observation of the Berlin talks. In 
addition, the Quad planned for a Georgia ministerial meeting 
at the UN General Assembly High Level segment in 
September.  They also explored ways to increase the 
diplomatic costs to Russia of its continued obstructionism 
and develop possible incentives for the Abkhaz to negotiate a 
settlement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.(C)  On July 22, on the margins of the EU monthly foreign 
ministers meeting in Brussels, German Political Director 
Volker Stanzel convened a 90 minute meeting of the Western 
Friends of Georgia political directors, including for the UK, 
PolDir Sir Mark Lyall Grant; for France MFA DirGen for 
Eastern Europe Roland Galharague and Deputy Director 
Alexandre Vulic.  EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried was 
joined by EUR DAS Matthew Bryza represented the United 
States. 
 
3.(C) Stanzel opened the meeting with a read-out of German 
Foreign Minister Steinmeier's recent trip to Georgia and 
Russia.  Stanzel said that talks with the Georgians, Abkhaz 
and Russians served to highlight three problems already 
foreseen by the Quad: how to persuade Georgia to give a 
non-use of force (NUF) pledge; how to persuade the Abkhaz to 
enter into a process with an intended outcome (i.e., 
reintegration) to which they did not now agree how to work 
around the Russians who wanted toprevent the Abkhaz from 
negotiating?  Steinmeier reportedly concluded that the 
process was "not fully back to square one, but close to it." 
Steinmeier had not obtained an endorsement by any party of 
the three phase plan, but did acknowledge effort to get to 
that point by the three parties to the conflict. 
 
4.(C)  On next steps, Germany obtained the Quad's support to 
convene negotiations in the middle of next week in Berlin, 
based on a three-phase plan outlined in the German-drafted 
"Friends of Georgia" paper, but with details of each phase to 
be negotiated. Stanzel agreed with UK and U.S. emphasis on 
the need for flexibility in the negotiations to ensure the 
right combination of elements in each phase.  A/S Fried 
stressed the importance of emphasizing phase one and 
discussing security arrangements.  The Georgians were willing 
to offer a NUF but only as part of a package. With this in 
mind, the USG was currently looking at configuration of phase 
one with a view toward addressing policing problems in both 
the Gali district and the Kodori Gorge.  The Quad agreed to 
include in such discussion a joint Abkhaz/Georgian police 
force with international oversight. 
 
5.(C) The Germans proposed that the talks could begin at the 
expert level, then work up to Political Directors over two to 
three days.  Stanzel explained that this format could allow 
experts to have the opportunity to meet informally and 
explore possibilities for aspects of a settlement package 
before requiring formally staking out positions.  To make it 
more difficult for the Russians and Abkhaz to refuse to 
attend the event, Steinmeier intended to personally issue the 
invitations and open the first session.  Fried pledged to 
attend, but expressed concern that the Russians would be 
obstructionist in the early sessions if they knew in advance 
that the level would escalate to Political Directors.  He 
urged a rapid escalation to the Political Directors, without 
making it contingent upon progress at the lower level. In 
response to a UK query, A/S Fried supported the inclusion of 
EU observers to the process. DAS Bryza added that the Western 
Friends could use EU help in developing and implementing 
quick impact CBMs, such as in the health and humanitarian 
areas, could be useful.  Stanzel noted that the Russians 
would have to agree to any such EU role in the talks. 
 
6.(C)  The French added that a late summer lull in Euro 
Atlantic diplomacy toward Georgia (i.e., between the Berlin 
meeting and the UNGA) could be dangerous.  They urged Western 
 
BRUSSELS 00001120  002 OF 002 
 
 
Friends to ensure the continuity of the burgeoning political 
process  A/S Fried and DAS Bryza also warned that Russian 
attempts to resurrect an inflammatory resolution on Georgia 
in the UNSC could also damage prospects for the talks.  In 
any case, the UK and U.S. delegations suggested that we 
consider joint U.S.-EU demarches rather than isolated 
interventions. 
 
7.(C)  The Quad briefly discussed ways in which Transatlantic 
 partners could try to exert leverage on the Russians and 
Abkhaz, particularly in the event that Russia continued be 
obstructionist and provocative.  A/S Fried reported that the 
USG was making quiet efforts to reach out to the Abkhaz as 
well as to explore how to pressure Russia if its firms 
violated Georgia's sovereignty in Abhkazia.  He urged 
European partners to consider similar measures toward the 
Russians, as well as a ban on facilitating visa issuance to 
Abkhaz attempting to travel to Europe on Russian passports. 
 
8.(U) Assistant Secretary Fried has cleared this message. 
CHASE 
.